Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Plaintiff’s standing and legal interest to act on behalf of the late Carmela Zanti Bossio under a notarial power of attorney and as estate administrator were squarely challenged and upheld.
• Scope and clarity of successive case management and provisional injunction orders, particularly the obligation to remit rents collected for September, October and November 2024 to plaintiff’s counsel in trust, were central to the contempt analysis.
• Proof of contempt required demonstration beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s knowledge of the orders, his non-remittance of the specified rents, and his intentional, wilful breach of those orders.
• Credibility of defence witness Carlo Bossio, and the evidentiary weight of an alleged November 3, 2024 receipt for rent and leases allegedly transferred to a third party (Johnny Bossio), were critically assessed and rejected.
• Alleged involvement of the defendant in Tribunal administratif du logement applications by tenants, and whether these acts constituted a breach of orders prohibiting him from holding himself out as mandatary or collecting rent, was examined but not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Use of contempt as a “last resort” led the Court to acquit on some allegations (case management order and subpoena duces tecum) where alternative procedural remedies existed, while convicting only on the precise non-remittance of rents under the injunctions.

Background and parties

The dispute arises out of the management of eight residential rental units owned by the late Carmela Zanti Bossio in Montreal. Dr. Gina Palombo, the plaintiff, is Carmela’s daughter. Before Carmela’s death, a notarial power of attorney dated 20 August 2024 authorized Dr. Palombo to act on Carmela’s behalf in relation to her property and affairs, including the rental buildings. After Carmela’s death in March 2025, Dr. Palombo continued to act in her capacity as administrator of the estate. In contrast, the defendant, Leo Fuoco, had previously been mandated to manage the rental properties but his mandate was terminated. A key factual backdrop is that, despite termination, he continued to act as if he remained authorized to manage the buildings and collect rent, which triggered the underlying injunction proceedings and, ultimately, the contempt application.

Facts leading to the injunction proceedings

On 29 October 2024, Dr. Palombo commenced an action in the Superior Court of Québec seeking interlocutory and permanent injunctions and damages against Fuoco, following the termination of his mandate to manage the eight rental apartments. The plaintiff’s case was that Fuoco was improperly continuing to act as mandatary for her mother and was collecting or controlling rents that should be paid to the owner’s authorized representative. On 5 November 2024, in a case management context, the Court ordered Fuoco to provide copies of the eight leases and to render an accounting of rent collected from September to November 2024. Fuoco was present and later served with this order. He sought leave to appeal, arguing that the power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff was illegal and therefore that she lacked authority to demand compliance. The Court of Appeal dismissed his attempt to appeal and refused to stay the injunctive order, leaving the case management order intact. Despite this, Fuoco did not comply.

The situation escalated when, by letter dated 20 October 2024, tenants were advised to continue paying rent to Fuoco rather than to the plaintiff. This prompted a provisional injunction on 19 November 2024. In that injunction, the Court ordered Fuoco to remit to the plaintiff’s attorneys, in trust, by certified cheque or bank draft, all rents he had collected for the properties, including the rents for the rental units in question, by a specified deadline in December 2024. The order further enjoined him from receiving or collecting any more rent from the tenants and from holding himself out as mandatary or representative of the owner. Fuoco contested the injunction, maintaining that the power of attorney was invalid, that he was “doing the right thing” by withholding monies, and that he was keeping rents to protect Carmela Zanti Bossio from alleged misuse of funds by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the provisional injunction was renewed repeatedly—on 3 December 2024, 12 December 2024 (rectified 16 December), 20 December 2024, 8 January 2025, 17 January 2025 and 3 February 2025—ultimately remaining in force, with an extended compliance deadline of 22 February 2025. Despite service of each renewed order, Fuoco still did not remit the rents.

Tenants’ applications before the housing tribunal

An important factual thread involves the conduct of tenants and related proceedings before the Tribunal administratif du logement (TAL). In November and December 2024, Carlo Bossio—a close friend of Fuoco and cousin of the plaintiff—encouraged tenants to seek a determination from the TAL as to whom rent should properly be paid, given the conflict between Fuoco and the plaintiff. Applications were filed, and copies of these filings were sent to the plaintiff’s counsel from Fuoco’s fax machine. As a result, tenants withheld rent after November 2024 while waiting for a ruling. In April 2025, the TAL dismissed the tenants’ applications, holding that rent was clearly payable to the owner’s duly authorized representative. This finding aligned with the Superior Court’s recognition of the plaintiff’s authority, but the Superior Court still had to determine whether Fuoco’s behaviour in connection with these TAL proceedings breached its own orders.

Challenge to plaintiff’s legal interest and capacity

Fuoco repeatedly argued that Dr. Palombo lacked the required interest or capacity to institute and pursue the action. The Court therefore first addressed this threshold issue. Under article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party must generally have a direct and personal interest to sue. However, articles 1316 of the Civil Code of Québec and 89 CCP carve out exceptions that allow administrators, tutors and similar representatives to sue on behalf of another. Here, the Court held that Dr. Palombo had sufficient interest. When the action was instituted on 29 October 2024 and when the injunctions and case management orders underlying the contempt charges were rendered (between 5 November 2024 and 12 February 2025), Carmela was still alive and Dr. Palombo was acting under a valid notarial power of attorney. Moreover, by the time of the contempt hearing she was also acting as estate administrator following Carmela’s death. A prior Superior Court judge, Justice Gaudet, had already recognized her capacity to act for Carmela when renewing the provisional injunction in February 2025. The Superior Court in the contempt case, therefore, firmly rejected Fuoco’s interest-to-sue challenge.

Legal framework for contempt of court

The Court then turned to the law of civil contempt. Contempt is characterized as a quasi-criminal proceeding, intended to punish and deter violations of court orders in order to protect the authority of the courts and the administration of justice. To obtain a conviction, the complainant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the alleged contemnor knew of the order; (2) he breached it (the actus reus); and (3) he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly committed the public disobedience, such that the conduct tends to depreciate the authority of the court (the mens rea). There is no requirement to prove that the person intended to interfere with the administration of justice specifically; it suffices that he intended to do the prohibited act knowing of the order. At the same time, appellate guidance stresses that contempt is an exceptional remedy to be used sparingly and as a last resort. Courts must ask whether other, less drastic remedies are available and suitable, reserving contempt for egregious behaviour that meaningfully impugns the authority of the courts. Even where the elements of contempt are met, the judge retains discretion not to convict if the circumstances militate in favour of alternative procedural measures.

The range of sanctions is governed by article 62 CCP. For an individual, the maximum fine is $10,000, and the Court can impose community service. In exceptional cases involving ongoing refusal to comply with orders—such as injunctions—the Court may impose coercive imprisonment up to a maximum of one year, provided that the sanction remains necessary and proportionate to the gravity and persistence of the non-compliance.

Alleged breaches related to the case management order

The first group of contempt accusations concerned Fuoco’s failure to comply with the 5 November 2024 case management order requiring him to supply copies of the eight leases and to provide an accounting of rents for September, October and November 2024. The terms of the order were clear, it was issued in advance of the hearing on the provisional injunction, and Fuoco both attended the hearing and was served with the written order. The Court found that Fuoco knowingly failed to comply, thus satisfying the technical requirements for contempt. However, exercising its residual discretion, the Court declined to convict on these counts. By the time of the contempt hearing, the plaintiff had already resorted to other effective procedural avenues: the subsequent provisional injunction of 19 November 2024 required Fuoco to remit the same rents in question, making a separate accounting redundant, and the tenants ultimately provided copies of their leases either directly to the plaintiff or when they pursued their TAL applications. Given the availability and use of alternative remedies, the judge held that contempt was not an appropriate or necessary response in this specific respect and acquitted Fuoco on these allegations.

Alleged breaches of the provisional injunction orders

The most serious accusations related to the provisional injunction granted on 19 November 2024 and its multiple renewals. Those orders required Fuoco to remit to the plaintiff’s attorney, in trust, all rents he had collected for the September, October and November 2024 period, and prohibited him from holding himself out as mandatary or collecting new rents. The Court first noted that the injunctions were clear and that Fuoco had full knowledge of them; he was present for many of the renewal hearings and was served each order. The evidence did not, however, establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he continued to hold himself out as representative, to collect rent, or to actively encourage tenants to withhold rent after 19 November 2024. Although the tenants’ TAL applications had been faxed from his residence or by him, the tenants who testified spoke mainly of contacts with Carlo Bossio and another tenant, and insisted that Fuoco was not the instigator of their filings. Concerned about potential double payment, they sought clarification from the TAL because of the visible conflict between Fuoco and the plaintiff. On this evidentiary record, the Court acquitted Fuoco of contempt in relation to allegedly continuing to represent himself as owner’s representative, collecting rent, or inciting rent withholding after 19 November 2024.

However, the outcome was very different regarding the specific obligation to remit rents already collected. The plaintiff alleged, and the Court ultimately found, that Fuoco never remitted the rents for September, October and November 2024 to the plaintiff’s counsel as ordered. Fuoco attempted to rebut this by calling Carlo Bossio, who testified that on 3 November 2024—before the first injunction—he had personally delivered the leases and “21 envelopes” containing rent to a relative, Johnny Bossio, and produced an alleged receipt signed by Johnny. The Court rejected this evidence on several grounds. It found Carlo Bossio not to be a credible witness, noting that his testimony appeared rehearsed and that he was being led by Fuoco’s questions. His account was contradicted by Fuoco’s own earlier submissions to the Court, in which Fuoco had insisted, after the purported 3 November transfer, that he was deliberately withholding rent monies to protect Carmela’s interests and prevent alleged diversion of funds by Dr. Palombo, and that he would continue to do so. Further, the plaintiff’s attorney, Mtre Michael R. Concister, testified that he had never been told that rents and leases had been remitted to Johnny Bossio, had never seen the alleged receipt during the long course of dealings with the family, and that conversations with Johnny over the years never mentioned any such transfer. Finally, although Fuoco served Johnny with a subpoena to appear at trial, he elected not to call him as a witness, despite the availability of virtual testimony; the Court drew an adverse inference from this omission. Considering all of this, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuoco had knowledge of the injunction orders for remittance and that he wilfully failed to comply with the requirement to pay over the September, October and November 2024 rents to plaintiff’s counsel. On these specific grounds—non-remittance of the three months of rent—Fuoco was declared guilty of contempt for Accusations 3 to 8 inclusive.

Alleged contempt by failing to attend examination on discovery

The final group of contempt allegations related to a subpoena duces tecum served on Fuoco on 6 January 2025, requiring his attendance at an examination on discovery on 21 January 2025 and production of various documents, including copies of the leases. Fuoco did not attend on 21 January, instead serving that very morning a motion to quash the subpoena on the plaintiff, but he never filed the motion in the court record. The plaintiff, unaware of the motion’s service, registered a default. In assessing whether this conduct amounted to contempt, the Court returned to the principle that contempt is a last resort. It held that contempt was not the appropriate remedy for a first failure to appear at an examination, especially where the proper procedural step was for the plaintiff to seek an order compelling attendance under article 284 CCP (provided the plaintiff advanced the requisite fees) and then, if Fuoco refused to answer questions or produce documents without valid justification, consider whether contempt might be justified under article 288 CCP. Since alternative, structured civil-procedure remedies were clearly available and had not first been exhausted, the Court acquitted Fuoco on this contempt count as well.

Outcome, successful party, and monetary consequences

In its dispositive section, the Court acquitted Fuoco of contempt with respect to: (1) non-compliance with the 5 November 2024 safeguard/case management order (Accusations 1 and 2); (2) allegations that he continued to hold himself out as owner’s representative, collect rent or encourage tenants to withhold rent after 19 November 2024 (Accusation 9); and (3) his failure to attend the 21 January 2025 examination on discovery and provide the subpoenaed documents (Accusation 10). The Court nevertheless declared him guilty of contempt for failing to remit to the plaintiff’s attorneys, in trust, the rent collected for the months of September, October and November 2024 as ordered by the injunction of 19 November 2024 and as repeatedly renewed to 12 February 2025 (Accusations 3 to 8). It set the matter down for a subsequent sanction (sentencing) hearing and ordered legal costs against Fuoco. As a result, the successful party on the contempt application is Dr. Gina Palombo, who obtained a clear finding that Fuoco was in contempt of the injunctions governing the critical three-month rent period. However, the judgment does not specify the amount of rent collected for those months, does not fix any fine or coercive monetary sanction at this stage, and does not quantify the costs awarded. Accordingly, while the plaintiff is the prevailing party, the total monetary award, including any eventual fine, rent amount effectively recovered, or precise court costs, cannot be determined from this decision alone.