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Association sociale éducative et culturelle v. Ville de Montréal

Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

  • Characterization of the ASEC premises as a prohibited “lieu de culte” in a commercial (C301) zone despite being authorized only for community and sociocultural uses
  • Weight given to objective physical features (ablution area, prayer rugs, shoe rack, donation box marked for the mosque, prayer schedule, microphone and “imam’s chair”) in proving a religious use of the premises
  • Deference owed on appeal to the trial judge’s assessment of credibility, especially regarding attempts by ASEC’s representatives to minimize or reframe the prayer activities
  • Proper interpretation of “lieu de culte” where the term is undefined in the zoning by-law, including reliance on ordinary-language dictionaries and prior case law focusing on use rather than building type
  • Limits of treating religious activities as “accessory uses” to an otherwise permitted community center when the accessory use is itself expressly prohibited by zoning
  • Alleged impact on freedom of religion balanced against municipal power to regulate land use and restrict locations of places of worship without infringing the constitutional right to practice religion

Facts of the case

The Association sociale éducative et culturelle (ASEC) is a non-profit organization founded in April 2021 to provide services to immigrants and the broader community in Montréal. Its stated activities include Arabic language classes, Quran instruction, parental education for families facing difficulties with children, housing assistance, networking for newcomers, homework help, remedial classes, recreational activities for children, and community suppers, including distribution of food baskets and prepared meals, especially during Ramadan. Its premises are located at 8750, boulevard Métropolitain Est, in a commercial condominium building in Montréal’s Anjou borough. A citizen complaint in December 2021 led to the involvement of the City’s urban planning department, which assigned inspector Ahmed Labbaci, who is Muslim and Arabic-speaking, to investigate. On 20 April 2022, around 7 p.m., he visited the ASEC premises. The exterior door bore an Arabic sign reading “Centre immigration,” and the door was unlocked, allowing public access. Inside, he observed a large room of about 200 square metres, a room at the back right fitted out for ablutions (ritual washing before prayer), and another room to the left occupying a substantial portion of the large space. At the entrance, there was a shoe rack with a box labelled in Arabic “Dons pour la mosquée” or “Aumône pour la mosquée.” He removed his shoes, performed ablutions, and returned to the main hall, where about ten people were waiting for the call to prayer. A chair and microphone were present, and a five-minute group prayer was conducted and led by Mr. Mohamed Ayed, ASEC’s vice-president and treasurer, who explained that volunteers, not an imam, lead the prayers. In the ablutions area, Labbaci also noted ongoing construction of a purification space and observed an area described by Ayed as a women’s prayer room and bathroom. Labbaci advised Ayed that ASEC had no authorization for a use compatible with zoning because a place of worship is not permitted in that zone. He indicated that ASEC could seek authorization for a conforming use, took photographs, and subsequently issued a notice of non-compliance. On 26 May 2022, at ASEC’s request, he nonetheless issued a certificate of authorization for “social, charitable, educational and cultural” activities categorized as permitted commercial uses (C1, C2, C4a). On 22 July 2022, at about 1:33 p.m., he returned for follow-up. The parking lot was busy, and approximately fifty people, some in traditional robes, were leaving the premises; the Friday prayer had just ended. Inside, some people were still praying. The physical layout was essentially unchanged, except for a new carpet and a digital calendar showing the five daily prayer times from dawn. Labbaci again informed Ayed that the use of the premises was illegal and was invited to return on a Saturday to see that the space also functioned as a school for children. He remained about thirty minutes, took more photographs, and later prepared his report and drafted the infraction notice that is at the heart of the litigation. This notice was authorized on 19 July 2023.

Zoning framework and regulatory context

The premises at 8750, boulevard Métropolitain Est, are located in zone C301, a commercial zone, under the Anjou borough’s zoning By-law RCA 40. Article 2 of the zoning by-law requires that any land, building, structure or part thereof be constructed, occupied or used in conformity with the by-law. The zoning map and specification grids (Annex C) divide zones by families of uses: H (residential), C (commercial), I (industrial), R (recreational), and P (public and institutional equipment). In zone C301, only commercial uses are permitted, including neighbourhood commerce (C1), local commerce (C2), and certain automotive service uses such as gas and grocery (C4a). ASEC’s certificate of authorization reflects this, describing its principal activities as social, charitable, educational, and cultural, falling under the C1/C2/C4a commercial categories. Places of worship, however, fall in the “Équipement collectif et institutionnel” family, specifically in subcategory P2a (“Institution–Établissement de culte”). The term “lieu de culte” is not defined in the municipal regulation itself. Prior case law, including decisions concerning Jewish, Christian, and other religious communities, has treated “lieu de culte” as focused on the use made of premises—what happens there and how consistently—rather than on the formal designation of the building as a church, mosque, synagogue, or temple. Accordingly, even a residential condo or corporate residence can be classified as a place of worship if its dominant or organized use fits that description under the zoning scheme.

Proceedings and issues on appeal

In municipal court, Judge Marie-Josée Dionne convicted ASEC of occupying a land or building contrary to article 309 of Zoning By-law RCA 40, by using the premises as a “lieu de culte” in a C301 commercial zone. The municipal infraction laid out that on 22 July 2022 ASEC occupied the premises as a place of worship in a zone where such use is not authorized. At trial, inspector Labbaci testified for the prosecution, while ASEC’s president Anis Loukil and vice-president/treasurer Mohamed Ayed testified for the defence. They highlighted the wide range of community and sociocultural activities and sought to frame the prayers as incidental, volunteer-led, and non-institutional. Judge Dionne, however, concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the main hall and associated spaces were effectively arranged and used as a place of worship, especially on weekdays and Fridays, and that organized prayer was central rather than merely incidental. She also found portions of the defence evidence not credible, particularly explanations about the donation box labelled for the mosque, the minaret appearing in ASEC’s logo, and the claimed timelines and regularity of community classes and networking activities. ASEC appealed to the Quebec Superior Court (Criminal and Penal Chamber), presided over by Justice Sylvain Lussier. On appeal, ASEC advanced three principal grounds: that the trial judge erred in her appreciation of the evidence and misapplied the R. v. W.(D.) standard for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt; that she erred in law in defining “lieu de culte”; and that she erred in treating prayer as a prohibited activity rather than as a permissible accessory use to a valid community-center use.

Court’s analysis and reasoning

On the evidentiary ground, Justice Lussier reiterated the high level of deference owed to a trial judge’s assessment of testimony, especially credibility findings. He noted that Judge Dionne had not simply preferred “the prosecution’s version”; instead, she relied heavily on objective, uncontested physical and functional evidence: the layout of the premises, the ablution space, the prayer rugs, the shoe rack and mosque donation box at the entrance, the digital prayer timetable, the presence of a chair and microphone used during prayers, and the fact that on weekdays and Fridays the premises were overwhelmingly used for organized prayers. She also accepted several aspects of the defence testimony concerning community activities, but reasonably rejected attempts to portray the prayer use as anecdotal or subordinate. Inconsistencies about when Arabic and Quran classes began, what activities occurred in July 2022, and who organized “networking” events led her to view parts of ASEC’s evidence as unreliable. Justice Lussier held that no manifest and decisive error in fact had been shown and that the W.(D.) framework was properly understood and applied: the judge evaluated whether believing the accused’s version, or having a reasonable doubt based on it, was warranted, and ultimately found the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. On the definition of “lieu de culte,” the Superior Court emphasized that, since the zoning by-law contains no definition, the trial judge appropriately relied on standard principles of statutory interpretation and on ordinary-language dictionaries, as recommended by P.-A. Côté. Dictionaries such as Le Robert and Larousse define “culte” in terms of religious homage to a divinity, and the place of worship is considered from the standpoint of its affectation—what is done there. Prior case law, including Conseil des juifs hassidiques du Québec v. Procureur général du Québec, Organisation de la jeunesse Chabad Loubavitch v. Ville de Mont-Tremblant, and various decisions concerning synagogues, chapels, or private oratories, similarly treats “lieu de culte” as determined by actual use, not by the building’s architectural type or formal institutional label. ASEC had invoked a definition from the Office québécois de la langue française suggesting that a place of worship is “generally a building” destined for religious practice and argued that an institutional vocation of the building as such is required. The court rejected this narrow reading, agreeing with the trial judge that modern zoning law focuses on use and occupation. A corporate community centre that is in practice planned, arranged, and used as a regular public prayer venue can be a “lieu de culte,” even if it also hosts other activities and even if there is no official imam or religious corporation holding title. Regarding the comparison to the case Essalam c. Ville de Mascouche, where a court found that occasional prayers within a community center did not turn the premises into a prohibited place of worship, Justice Lussier agreed with the trial judge’s distinction. In Essalam, the prayer took place during Ramadan as part of community activities, was not formally organized by the center, and there was no proof of a dedicated prayer hall or specific religious fit-out. By contrast, at ASEC the evidence showed regular daily prayers from Monday to Thursday and extended Friday prayers, with premises arranged specifically for worship, a permanent prayer schedule display, prayer carpets, ablution facilities, and an organized system whereby someone was designated to lead prayers. In this context, ASEC effectively offered structured religious services rather than merely tolerating spontaneous prayer. On the argument that classificatory focus on prayer as a place-of-worship use infringed freedom of religion, the court drew on prior appellate jurisprudence (including the Belz/Val-Morin litigation and Lafontaine) stressing that municipal zoning inevitably constrains where religious uses may be located but does not, merely by limiting zones, violate the fundamental right to freedom of religion. Municipalities have constitutional authority over land use and may prohibit religious institutions in certain zones so long as worship is not barred entirely from the territory and believers remain free to practice their religion, albeit subject to spatial constraints. Turning to the accessory-use argument, ASEC maintained that prayer was only secondary and thus permissible as an accessory to its main, authorized community-center activities. The trial judge had invoked the six-part test for accessory uses outlined by the Court of Appeal in L’Ange-Gardien (Municipalité) v. Fortier, as further discussed in Ville de Montréal v. Thomas. One of those criteria is that the accessory use must itself comply with applicable regulations. Justice Lussier endorsed the municipal court’s conclusion that a use expressly prohibited in a given zone cannot become lawful simply by being labelled “accessory” to a permitted principal use; just as one cannot acquire vested rights through illegality, an expressly banned use does not become authorized by being coupled with a lawful activity in the same premises. Thus, even if one accepted that community and sociocultural activities were the principal use, operating an organized place of worship remained illegal in zone C301 and could not be validated as an accessory use.

Outcome and implications

Justice Lussier concluded that ASEC had not demonstrated any manifest and overriding errors of fact in the municipal court’s assessment of the evidence, nor any legal errors in the interpretation of “lieu de culte” or in the treatment of organized prayer as a prohibited use in the C301 zone. The Superior Court therefore dismissed the appeal, maintained the conviction, and ordered that this be done “with costs of justice,” confirming that the City of Montréal (the prosecuting party) was successful. The judgment does not specify a monetary figure for the fine, damages, or costs, and the total amount ordered in favour of the City cannot be determined from this decision alone.

Association sociale éducative et culturelle
Ville de Montréal
Law Firm / Organization
Dubois et associés
Lawyer(s)

Frédéric Beaulne

Quebec Superior Court
500-36-011023-242
Public law
Not specified/Unspecified
Respondent