Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Central challenge was whether a civil action could proceed against a professional regulator and Crown actors given statutory immunity, prior discipline and court proceedings, and allegations framed as torts and Charter breaches.
• The plaintiff’s pleading was found to be a collateral attack on earlier discipline decisions and appeals, raising issues already decided or that could have been raised in prior proceedings, amounting to an abuse of process.
• Statutory immunity under s. 45(1) of the Veterinarians Act barred negligence-based and good faith regulatory acts, with the court holding that the plaintiff had not pleaded material particulars of bad faith sufficient to pierce that immunity.
• Multiple tort claims (abuse of process, misfeasance in public office, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, negligent investigation, breach of statutory duty, defamation) were held to be untenable due to missing essential elements and lack of specific material facts.
• Claims against the Attorney General were nullities for failure to comply with mandatory 60-day notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, and the Minister was further protected by policy-level immunity for supervisory and oversight decisions.
• Alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7 and 11(d)) and defamation via publication of discipline outcomes were characterized as attempts to relitigate, with the proper remedies lying in appeal or judicial review rather than a fresh damages action in tort.

Background and long-running disciplinary history

The case concerns Dr. Khawar Hanif, a veterinarian in Ontario, whose dispute with his regulator, the College of Veterinarians of Ontario (the College), spans nearly two decades. The litigation before the Superior Court arises out of professional disciplinary proceedings, multiple appeals, and human rights complaints stemming from consumer complaints about his veterinary practice. Two pet owners complained in 2006 about his treatment of their animals. The College investigated and referred the matters to a Discipline Committee hearing under s. 24(2) of the Veterinarians Act. After an 11-day hearing, the Discipline Committee in 2010 dismissed all but one allegation, finding Dr. Hanif guilty of professional misconduct solely for prescribing a flea medication intended for dogs to a cat. The College appealed the ruling to the Divisional Court under s. 35 of the Veterinarians Act, while Dr. Hanif did not cross-appeal the adverse finding. In 2011, the Divisional Court concluded the Discipline Committee’s reasons were inadequate, allowed the College’s appeal, and ordered a new panel to rehear the complaints. Dr. Hanif’s attempt to obtain leave to appeal further was unsuccessful, leaving the rehearing order in place.

Subsequent HRTO proceedings and expanded allegations

Parallel to the discipline process, Dr. Hanif turned to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO). He alleged that the College’s handling of the complaints was discriminatory. His first HRTO application was dismissed for delay in 2011, and reconsideration was refused. A second HRTO application in 2013, alleging discrimination and prosecutorial misconduct, was also dismissed. The Tribunal held there was no reasonable prospect of success regarding the Discipline Committee’s decisions and actions in the rehearing and that relitigating previously dealt-with issues was an abuse of process. It also relied on adjudicative immunity and collateral attack doctrines, together with s. 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction over many of the concerns raised.

Rehearing, expanded misconduct findings, and penalty and costs

A new Discipline Committee panel reheard the complaints in 2012–2013 over 13 days. That panel found Dr. Hanif guilty of professional misconduct relating to both original complaints. It imposed a four-month suspension of his licence and ordered him to pay $73,000 in costs. In the course of these proceedings, there were dissenting reasons from panel member Dr. David Kozuch. Those dissenting reasons, upon which the plaintiff later relied heavily, were highly critical of the fairness of the process and the conduct of the College’s prosecution, suggesting an overzealous drive for conviction. Nonetheless, they remained dissenting reasons and did not alter the panel’s majority decision.

Appeals to Divisional Court and penalty reconsideration

In 2017, on appeal from the rehearing decision, the Divisional Court set aside the finding of guilt on the cat-medication allegation, but otherwise upheld the findings and rejected arguments of bias, procedural unfairness, and improper reliance on expert evidence. The matter returned to the Discipline Committee for reconsideration of penalty and costs following the partial success on the cat count. In 2019, upon reconsideration, the Discipline Committee reduced the licence suspension to one month and lowered the cost award to $65,000, which included $15,000 attributable to unsuccessful post-appeal motions by Dr. Hanif. A further appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed in 2021, with costs awarded against him. The court emphasized that his own conduct had lengthened the proceedings and that much time and energy had been spent repeating or re-arguing issues already decided or improperly raised. Leave to appeal to higher courts was refused.

The 2024 civil claim and themes of abuse of process and systemic failure

In December 2024, Dr. Hanif commenced this civil action in the Ontario Superior Court, suing three defendants: the College of Veterinarians of Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and the Minister of Agriculture. He sought $600,000 in general damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The Statement of Claim spanned 161 paragraphs over 27 pages and alleged wide-ranging misconduct and systemic failure in the regulatory framework. He asserted that the College’s prosecution was prolonged and unjust, that he had been subjected to abuse of process and misuse of power, and that legislative and structural weaknesses shielded the College’s internal decision-making from meaningful oversight. The claim also alleged that the courts, constrained to reviewing only Discipline Committee decisions, gave a misleading appearance of fairness because they could not reach into what he called the “hidden machinery” or “black box” of regulatory prosecution and deliberations.

Specific torts and Charter breaches pleaded

The claim pleaded multiple causes of action: abuse of discretion, abuse of power, malicious prosecution, conspiracy to harm, breach of investigative process, negligent investigation, breach of public duty, malfeasance and failure of oversight, violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, breach of statutory duty, negligent disclosure, and defamation. In his factum and oral submissions, the plaintiff argued that the College’s prosecutor adhered to a predetermined narrative, ignoring objective clinical evidence and effectively “curating” the record to secure a conviction while insulating the outcome from appellate correction. He sought discovery of internal College communications, prosecutorial instructions, committee deliberations, and decision-making records, asserting that these materials would expose bad faith and misconduct by what he described as a “ghost committee.” He also claimed that as of May 2024 the College’s website continued to show him as guilty on the cat-medication matter, despite the Divisional Court’s 2017 decision setting that finding aside, and he framed this publication as defamatory and indicative of statutory breach.

Legal framework: statutory immunity and limits on civil liability

A central legal framework in the decision was s. 45(1) of the Veterinarians Act, which grants the College, its Council, committees, and officers immunity from actions for damages for acts or omissions done in good faith in the performance or intended performance of their statutory duties or powers. The court drew on analogous case law under the Law Society Act to conclude that this type of immunity requires a plaintiff to plead and prove bad faith involving malice or improper intent; mere negligence is insufficient. The purpose of such immunity is to enable regulatory bodies to discharge their public duties without constant exposure to civil litigation. The court found that while the Statement of Claim was full of generalized assertions of abuse of power and bad faith, it lacked material particulars: it did not specify the alleged pattern of wrongful acts, the participants, their purposes, or the concrete steps that would ground a claim of malice or improper motive. Even the reliance on Dr. Kozuch’s dissent presented evidentiary and legal hurdles: deliberative secrecy prevents compelling a panel member to testify about internal deliberations, s. 38(2) of the Veterinarians Act bars compelling College agents to testify or produce documents in civil proceedings, and dissenting reasons are not, in themselves, evidence of tortious conduct.

Assessment of individual torts and Charter claims

The judge analyzed the pleaded causes of action both collectively and individually. There is no recognized tort of “abuse of discretion,” and “constructive fraud” is an equitable doctrine tied to fiduciary or contractual relationships, which were not present. The common law tort of abuse of process requires four elements, including an improper collateral purpose and special damage, but the plaintiff had pleaded only that he was subject to a legal proceeding, omitting the remaining essential elements. Misfeasance in public office similarly demands deliberate unlawful conduct known to be likely to injure the plaintiff; again, the pleading offered only bare allegations without particulars. The malicious prosecution claim failed because disciplinary proceedings had not terminated in his favour overall (only the cat allegation was overturned) and because there were no concrete facts pleaded to support lack of reasonable and probable cause or malice. The conspiracy to harm claim lacked the basic particulars of who conspired, how, when, by what overt acts, and with what unlawful means or predominant purpose to injure. Negligent investigation and “negligent disclosure” could not proceed in any event because negligence-based claims were barred by the statutory immunity in s. 45(1). Claims framed as breach of statutory duty were also untenable because the provisions cited (including ss. 25 and 35 of the Veterinarians Act) do not create a private cause of action.

Charter-based allegations under ss. 7 and 11(d), claiming withholding of evidence, contradictions, bias through prosecutorial roles on various committees, lack of reasons, and obstruction of new evidence, were dismissed as attempts to relitigate matters that had been or could have been raised in the Discipline Committee, the Divisional Court, or before the HRTO. The court noted that the plaintiff had raised constitutional issues in earlier proceedings, that effective alternative remedies such as appeals and judicial review were available, and that Charter damages are not available where adequate alternative processes exist.

Defamation and publication of discipline outcomes

On the defamation claim arising from the College’s website, the court emphasized that s. 19 of the Veterinarians Act mandates publication of information about members, including their discipline history. The challenge, in substance, was to the College’s exercise of this statutory duty. Relying on analogous law from the legal profession context, the court held that where a regulator is statutorily authorized or required to publish discipline information, the publication itself will not ground a viable defamation action absent properly pleaded bad faith. Here, there was no express, particularized pleading of bad faith tied to the website entries, and no statutory private right of action to correct the register. The appropriate route would have been judicial review seeking correction or mandamus, not an action for damages in defamation.

Abuse of process and refusal of leave to amend

Beyond the specific defects of each claim, the court viewed the action as a whole as an impermissible collateral attack and an abuse of process. The plaintiff was attempting, through civil damages claims, to revisit and undermine outcomes of disciplinary and court proceedings where he had already been heard and had exhausted appeals. Given this fundamental problem, the court held that even allowing an amendment would not cure the defects. By the plaintiff’s own admission, he needed discovery to try to establish particulars, but the law requires material facts to be pleaded before an action may proceed to discovery, not the other way around. Consequently, the Statement of Claim against the College was struck in its entirety, and leave to amend was refused.

Claims against the Attorney General and the Minister of Agriculture

The court then addressed the motions brought by the Attorney General of Ontario concerning both the Attorney General and the Minister of Agriculture. Under s. 18 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA), a plaintiff seeking damages against the Crown must serve at least 60 days’ notice of claim before starting the proceeding. Section 8(5) of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act extends this regime to actions against the Attorney General. Failure to comply renders such an action a nullity from the outset. The plaintiff had issued and served his claim without giving the prior 60-day notice. Counsel for the Attorney General had offered to treat the existing claim as the required notice if the plaintiff discontinued the action and re-issued it after the 60-day period, but the plaintiff did not discontinue and did not commence a fresh claim. The court held that the statutory notice requirement could not be waived and that his non-compliant claim against the Attorney General was therefore a nullity.

As to the Minister of Agriculture, the plaintiff alleged failures to oversee veterinary services, to respond to systemic concerns raised by a group of visible minority veterinarians about the College’s discipline processes, and to intervene or reform the system, and he claimed vicarious liability for the College’s actions. The court found that these allegations did not plead the necessary elements of negligence or any other recognized tort. More fundamentally, s. 11(4) of the CLPA immunizes Crown officers, including ministers, from liability for policy decisions, and the definition of “policy matter” in s. 11(5)(c) squarely covers how a program or regulatory regime is structured, supervised, and controlled. The allegations against the Minister were about discretionary oversight and supervision of the College’s regulatory role, which fall within policy-level decision-making. Without specific pleading of bad faith (which was absent), those claims were barred. The vicarious liability theory failed as well, because there were no pleadings of an employment-type relationship or sufficient control over the College, and in any event a minister cannot be sued personally as if vicariously liable for other Crown actors.

Outcome and monetary consequences

Ultimately, the court granted both motions to strike. It struck the Statement of Claim as against all defendants—the College of Veterinarians of Ontario, the Attorney General of Ontario, and the Minister of Agriculture—without leave to amend, and dismissed the action in its entirety. The judgment did not fix a dollar figure for costs; instead, the judge directed the parties to exchange brief written submissions on costs according to a timetable, reserving the quantum of costs for later determination. The successful parties in this decision are therefore the defendants, and no damages or quantified costs were awarded in the judgment itself. As a result, the total monetary award in favour of the successful parties in this particular decision cannot yet be determined, because costs were left to be decided following written submissions and no sum is specified in the reasons.