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Background and procedural posture
Mr. Gary Curtis commenced an appeal in the Divisional Court from an order of Justice Bloomenfeld of the Ontario Court of Justice dated October 31, 2025. His notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal asserted that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction under s. 19(2) of the Courts of Justice Act on the basis that the order under appeal was a final order of a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice. At this stage, the underlying merits of Justice Bloomenfeld’s decision are not described in detail in the Divisional Court’s endorsement, and the focus of the decision is instead on jurisdiction and procedure. The matter came before Brownstone J. of the Divisional Court, sitting in writing, with Mr. Curtis self-represented and the Crown (His Majesty the King/Ontario) represented by counsel.
Initiation of rule 2.1.01 procedure
After reviewing the notice of appeal, Brownstone J. became concerned that the appeal was outside the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court and might therefore be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face. Relying on Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the judge directed the registrar to send Mr. Curtis a Form 2.1A notice that the court was considering an order under Rule 2.1.01(2). The registrar sent this notice on January 16, 2026, inviting written submissions from Mr. Curtis explaining why the proceeding should not be dismissed. The decision explains that Rule 2.1 is a “blunt instrument,” intended not for close calls but for cases where the frivolous, vexatious, or abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on its face, and that it is to be robustly applied to summarily weed out clearly abusive litigation through the court’s gatekeeping function.
Appellant’s response and objections to the process
Upon receiving the Rule 2.1 notice, Mr. Curtis responded immediately, asserting that he had filed an amended notice of appeal to correct clerical errors and maintaining that the Divisional Court, as part of the Superior Court of Justice, did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. He argued that any jurisdictional challenge should be brought by the respondent through a separate motion and that lack of jurisdiction could not properly be dealt with under Rule 2.1. He therefore objected to the Rule 2.1 process, asked that it be cancelled, and requested that a case conference be scheduled instead. He also indicated that he would be unavailable to respond within the original 15-day deadline and requested that the Rule 2.1 process be cancelled or put on hold while future dates for a case conference were canvassed. Mr. Curtis enclosed his amended notice of appeal with this correspondence.
Court’s directions and extension of time
The court responded by advising Mr. Curtis that the Rule 2.1 notice would not be cancelled and that any submissions he wished to make about jurisdiction or process should be set out in his written response to that notice. When he continued to object and to ask for a case conference, the court gave a further direction that it would not engage in ongoing correspondence and that all of his arguments had to be included in his response to the Rule 2.1 notice by the deadline. In recognition of his timing concerns, the court extended his deadline to file submissions to February 27, 2026. Despite this extension and the specific direction that he provide a copy of Justice Bloomenfeld’s decision, Mr. Curtis did not supply the underlying reasons for the order under appeal to the Divisional Court.
Request to transfer the proceeding to the Superior Court
On February 20, 2026, instead of delivering substantive submissions addressing jurisdiction or the Rule 2.1 concerns, Mr. Curtis sent the court a further communication. In it, he asked the Divisional Court to make an order transferring his file to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and to cancel the Divisional Court file. He asserted that the Superior Court was a more appropriate forum, claimed that court staff had given him incorrect information about the Divisional Court being a separate court, and took the position that the Rule 2.1 process had become “moot.” He requested that the transfer order be issued urgently by February 24, 2026. The Divisional Court then sought the Crown’s position on this request and noted that it still had not received the underlying decision being appealed, despite its earlier request. The Crown (Ontario) not only provided a copy of Justice Bloomenfeld’s decision to the court but also took the position that the Superior Court was indeed the proper appellate forum. However, Ontario emphasized that the appeal had to be pursued under the Criminal Code, the Criminal Proceedings Rules of the Superior Court, and the relevant consolidated practice directions for criminal proceedings in Toronto and provincially. The Crown argued that a transfer from the Divisional Court would improperly allow Mr. Curtis to circumvent these mandatory procedural and timing requirements, with which he had not complied, and that such a transfer would raise novel and potentially complex logistical issues. Ontario therefore urged the Divisional Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and to leave Mr. Curtis free to commence new proceedings properly in the Superior Court, including any necessary motion for an extension of time. Mr. Curtis disagreed with Ontario’s submissions and continued to request an order transferring the proceeding to the Superior Court.
No discussion of insurance policy terms
The decision is focused entirely on jurisdictional and procedural issues under the Courts of Justice Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Code regime, and related criminal practice directions. There is no discussion of any insurance policy, contractual policy wording, or specific policy clauses. Accordingly, there are no policy terms or clauses in issue analyzed in this judgment.
Ruling, outcome, and consequences
In the end, Brownstone J. concluded that transferring the matter to the Superior Court was not appropriate for the institutional and procedural reasons advanced by Ontario. The judge found that all parties agreed the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and that, in these circumstances, the appeal to the Divisional Court was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The proper course, the court held, was for Mr. Curtis to commence any new proceeding in the Superior Court in strict accordance with the applicable rules and practice directions, and to seek any necessary extension of time from that court. Mr. Curtis was left free to explain any delay by reference to his prior commencement of proceedings in the Divisional Court, but any decision about a new appeal would have to be made by the court with jurisdiction. On that basis, the Divisional Court dismissed Mr. Curtis’s appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because the court was “clearly without jurisdiction.” The successful party was the respondent, His Majesty the King (the Crown/Ontario). No monetary damages, costs, or other financial awards are specified or ordered in this decision, and the total amount granted in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from the judgment; it appears that no such monetary order was made.
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Appellant
Respondent
Court
Superior Court of Justice - OntarioCase Number
924/25Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
RespondentTrial Start Date