Executive summary: key legal and evidentiary issues

• Cheryl Anderson's application for a stay of enforcement pending appeal was dismissed for failing to meet the low merits threshold under the RJR-Macdonald test.

• The trial judge found that Anderson repudiated her lease and licence agreements with Double M Construction Ltd. through persistent nonpayment of the lease balance and annual licence fees.

• Defamation claims brought by Myles Murtack and Bill Powell were upheld, with $7,500 in damages awarded to each, based on Anderson's allegations of sexual predation and pedophilia in a tight-knit community.

• Anderson's credibility was severely undermined, with the trial judge characterizing her affidavits as "replete with speculation and unattributable hearsay" that were "incapable of proof."

• Special costs were awarded against Anderson due to reprehensible conduct, including threatening the Supreme Court scheduling manager, belligerence toward the judge and counsel, and filing pleadings without evidentiary foundation.

• Only a limited stay of the vacant possession order was granted to March 31, 2026, acknowledging the difficulty Anderson will have in relocating, while all other terms of the trial order remained enforceable.

Background and the parties' contractual relationship

This case arises from a protracted dispute between Cheryl Anderson and Double M Construction Ltd., doing business as Owl's Nest RV Resort, along with individual respondents Myles Murtack, Bill Powell, and Joan Powell. The property at the centre of the dispute is a privately-owned campground located 15 minutes outside Cranbrook, British Columbia, which contains numerous RV sites and five serviced cabin sites. On November 25, 2015, Anderson and Double M entered into an agreement described as an "Offer to Lease Hold RV Lot" for $65,000, entitling Anderson to occupy a cabin on the property. Anderson paid a $5,000 deposit, leaving a balance of $60,000. She indicated at the time the Lease was entered into that she would pay the balance when her property in Alberta was sold. She paid a further $25,000 in July 2016 but never paid the remaining balance. The Lease was subject to an annual licence described as the "Purchase Lot Lease," which allowed Anderson to use the lot and access services in exchange for an annual fee of $2,500. The relationship between the parties became acrimonious soon after the Lease and Licence were entered into.

The lease and licence terms at issue

The contractual framework consisted of two interconnected agreements. The Lease required Anderson to pay a total of $65,000 for the leasehold interest in the cabin. The Licence, operating as an annual agreement, allowed Anderson to use the lot and access resort facilities in exchange for the $2,500 annual fee. A critical issue at trial was Anderson's failure to comply with her payment obligations under both agreements. The trial judge found that Anderson failed to pay the Licence fee in all but one of the years she resided at Owl's Nest RV Resort and also defaulted on her obligation to pay the balance of the Lease price for the cabin. These payment failures were ultimately found to constitute repudiation of her contracts with Double M, and Anderson forfeited her interest in the cabin.

Lengthy procedural history and multiple applications

Anderson commenced the action in September 2018, and the matter wound through a series of applications before multiple judges over several years. Before Justice Douglas, Anderson filed a series of applications seeking wide-ranging relief, including summary disposition of the claims and counterclaims, a restraining order against the three individual respondents, an order prohibiting the respondents from slandering or defaming her, orders for monetary payments, and an order allowing her to serve written interrogatories in lieu of discovery. Justice Douglas dismissed most of the relief sought by Anderson, including her application to deliver interrogatories. With respect to the respondents' application, Justice Douglas concluded that Anderson's amended notice of civil claim was "lengthy, confusing, and prolix" and that it contained "irrelevant statements, unsupported assertions, and alleged claims with no factual or legal foundation." She struck the claim in its entirety but gave Anderson leave to amend her pleadings only to particularize certain claims that were not bound to fail, including breach of contract, trespass, nuisance, breach of privacy, and destruction of property. Subsequently, before Justice Morellato, Anderson made serious allegations against counsel for the respondents, which led to an adjournment and a separate claim against the lawyer. That claim was eventually dismissed in its entirety by Justice Gaul on April 4, 2024.

The summary trial before Justice MacNaughton

After considerable delay occasioned by the described applications, the parties set down applications to determine the issues in dispute by way of summary trial under Rule 9-7. Justice MacNaughton, in reasons indexed at 2026 BCSC 53 and spanning 268 paragraphs, dismissed all of Anderson's claims and allowed the respondents' counterclaims. The judge was highly critical of Anderson's credibility and reliability as a witness, finding that her evidence consisted of self-serving narratives without admissible proof, and that her affidavits were "replete with speculation and unattributable hearsay which are incapable of proof." The judge found that Anderson's "whole case" was based on the contention that "everything [the defendants] have done is fraudulent…everything," even though she had not established fraud, and notably, Justice Douglas did not give Anderson leave to proceed with a case in fraud. Anderson's claim that on February 12, 2017, two employees of Double M willfully damaged her property by using the shovel of a backhoe to collapse a garage shelter she had built, allegedly damaging her rare collector Mercedes Benz automobile and a motorboat stored inside, was rejected. Justice MacNaughton accepted the evidence of two Double M employees who denied any willful destruction and found Anderson's claims of intentional damage to be entirely speculative, concluding it was more probable that the shelter collapsed due to the heavy accumulation of snow on a flat roof. Anderson's further claim that the respondents had deliberately cut off her water, sewer, and electricity for over six months was also rejected, as contradictory evidence presented by Double M was found to be credible, reliable, and unrefuted by Anderson. Both parties' cross-applications for vexatious litigant declarations under s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act were dismissed, though the judge noted that the time spent on the proceedings was "wholly disproportionate" to the amount in dispute and that Anderson's conduct unnecessarily and inappropriately prolonged the proceedings.

Defamation findings and damages

The trial judge found that Murtack and Powell had proved the necessary elements supporting their claims in defamation. The defamatory statements involved allegations of sexual predation and pedophilia, which the judge noted were serious, were made in a tight-knit community where the respondents do business, and were made by Anderson, who showed no remorse. Damages of $7,500 were awarded to each of Murtack and Powell. The judge declined to award punitive damages.

The appeal court's stay analysis and ruling

Anderson applied to the British Columbia Court of Appeal for a stay of enforcement pending appeal. Justice Butler assessed the application under the RJR-Macdonald three-part test, which requires the applicant to demonstrate: that there is a serious question to be tried, that they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is refused, and that the balance of convenience favours granting the stay. The Court found that Anderson was unable to satisfy even the low merits threshold, characterizing her appeal arguments as a proverbial "house of cards" with "virtually no chance of success." Her claims of procedural unfairness were without any support in the record; she had been given every opportunity to advance her claims throughout the proceedings, was able to tender substantial evidence across the various applications, and was able to rely on all 10 of her previously filed affidavits at the summary trial. Anderson herself took the position before Justice MacNaughton that the case was suitable and appropriate for determination by summary trial, did not examine any of the respondents for discovery, and did not apply for cross-examination. Her challenges to the trial judge's factual findings were, at best, directed at the weight given to evidence by the trial judge, which is not a basis on which the Court of Appeal could interfere with the trial decision. While the Court acknowledged that the harm Anderson would suffer if a stay was denied was significant, it noted she was not in the position of a residential tenant but a party to commercial agreements for the use and occupation of property who had remained in possession without making payments as required. The balance of convenience clearly favoured the respondents: the dispute had taken more than seven years to reach judgment, Anderson had failed to make the contractual payments found to be owing and indicated she had no ability to do so, and if a stay were granted, the respondents would continue to be impacted by Anderson's disruptive conduct towards employees and residents. The respondents, Double M Construction Ltd. and the individual defendants, were the successful parties, with Anderson ordered to pay a total of $15,000 in defamation damages ($7,500 each to Murtack and Powell), special costs, and to deliver vacant possession of the cabin. The exact total amount including special costs could not be determined from the decisions. Acknowledging the difficulty Anderson will have in relocating, the Court granted a stay of the vacant possession order only, extending the deadline to March 31, 2026, while no other term of the trial order was stayed.