Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Scope of the Tribunal administratif du Québec’s exclusive jurisdiction over expropriation indemnities versus the residual jurisdiction of the Superior Court for civil fault-based claims
• Characterization of the owner’s claim as seeking a “full and complete” expropriation indemnity under art. 952 C.c.Q. and s. 6 of the Québec Charter, and whether such a parallel remedy exists outside the LCE regime
• Allegations that the City abused its expropriation powers and acted in bad faith (including strategic timing and information withholding) giving rise to extra-contractual civil liability under art. 1457 C.c.Q.
• Distinction between damages that are part of the LCE expropriation scheme (including procedure-related harms) and damages arising from independent civil faults such as reputational harm and abuse of power
• Impact of the absence of a prior challenge to the right to expropriate under s. 17 LCE on the owner’s ability to pursue fault-based civil claims about pre-expropriation conduct
• Procedural management issues, including refusal to stay the Superior Court proceedings pending the TAQ decision and partial granting of the City’s declinatory exception

Background and facts of the dispute

6168191 Canada ltée, operating Camping Donald, owned and ran a campground on the territory of the City of Mirabel in Québec. In 2024, the City served an expropriation notice on the company in order to acquire the campground lands (“the Lots”) for public purposes under the new Loi concernant l’expropriation (LCE 2023). The owner challenged the indemnity offered by Mirabel before the Tribunal administratif du Québec (TAQ), which has been assigned exclusive jurisdiction by statute to fix and determine the payment of expropriation indemnities, including the various heads of compensation set out in the LCE such as market value, re-establishment, and specific categories of damages directly caused by expropriation. In parallel with this administrative proceeding, the campground owner filed a civil action in the Superior Court of Québec. It claimed that Mirabel’s conduct before and during the expropriation process caused it additional losses and violated its property rights and fundamental rights. The claim therefore overlapped expropriation law, municipal public powers, extra-contractual civil liability, and constitutional protections of property.

The owner’s claims in Superior Court

In its amended introductory motion, the owner advanced three main categories of relief. First, it sought a sum “to be determined” representing the difference, if any, between the highest of (i) civil damages under art. 1457 C.c.Q. for the City’s alleged wrongful conduct and (ii) the “just and prior” expropriation indemnity it claimed under art. 952 C.c.Q. and s. 6 of the Québec Charter, and the expropriation indemnity that would ultimately be fixed by the TAQ. Second, it claimed additional damages for other losses to its operations allegedly caused by Mirabel’s conduct, again in extra-contractual liability under art. 1457 C.c.Q. Third, it claimed $100,000 (to be determined) in Charter damages under s. 49 of the Québec Charter for alleged intentional and illicit interference with its protected rights. The owner’s core theory was that the new LCE, as applied by the TAQ, might not ensure “full and complete” indemnification as understood under art. 952 C.c.Q. and s. 6 of the Charter. It argued that the legislator had not ousted those provisions and that a residual or complementary remedy remained before courts of general jurisdiction to “top up” any shortfall between what the TAQ awards and what a full indemnity should be under civil law and the Charter.

Legislative framework and jurisdictional structure

The judgment reviews the key legislative texts to frame the jurisdictional question. Section 6 of the Québec Charter guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of property, subject to limits provided by law, while s. 49 offers a direct remedy and punitive damages for illicit and intentional interferences with Charter rights. Article 952 C.c.Q. provides that an owner may only be compelled to cede property by way of expropriation carried out according to law for a public purpose and in return for a just and prior indemnity. Article 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure confirms the Superior Court as court of general jurisdiction, competent in first instance unless another body is given exclusive jurisdiction by statute. The Tribunal administratif du Québec is created by the Loi sur la justice administrative, which specifies that, absent contrary legislation, it exercises its jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other tribunal. In the real estate field, its “affaires immobilières” section decides, among other things, “the fixing of indemnities resulting from expropriation of immovables or real rights.” The LCE 2023 implements the expropriation framework mandated by art. 952 C.c.Q. and the Charter. It defines the procedure, the different heads of indemnity (such as market value, re-establishment, loss of net profit, and procedure-related inconveniences), and expressly assigns the power to fix both provisional and final indemnities to the TAQ. Its preamble underlines that the law “establishes the rules applicable to the instance in fixing the expropriation indemnity” and “attributes to the Tribunal the power to fix a complementary provisional indemnity and a definitive indemnity” as well as certain damages.

The City’s declinatory exception and the owner’s response

Mirabel invoked a declinatory exception, asking the Superior Court to decline jurisdiction and refer the owner’s entire claim to the TAQ. It argued that the “essence of the dispute” concerned the quantum and components of the expropriation indemnity, a matter placed squarely within the TAQ’s exclusive competence. The owner, by contrast, argued that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction on two fronts. First, it claimed that art. 952 C.c.Q. and s. 6 of the Charter still operated independently of the LCE, allowing it to seek a full indemnity directly in Superior Court if the LCE-based indemnity set by the TAQ was not “complete.” Second, it asserted a separate claim in civil liability (art. 1457 C.c.Q.) for bad-faith and abusive conduct by the City in the way it managed the project, the regulatory changes, and the expropriation process, including alleged reputational harm and lost business opportunities. The owner also asked the Superior Court to stay its civil proceedings until the TAQ rendered a final decision on the expropriation indemnity, to avoid inconsistent determinations and duplication.

Alleged wrongful conduct by the City

The civil fault allegations against Mirabel were detailed and went beyond the mere act of expropriating. The owner claimed that for years the City had collaborated with it on a mixed residential, commercial and institutional development project for the campground lands and then “changed its tune” to use expropriation powers strategically to acquire the Lots at a reduced price. It asserted that Mirabel withheld critical information from the owner about the Community Metropolitan of Montréal (CMM)’s decisions to include the Lots within the metropolitan perimeter and hence within Mirabel’s urbanization perimeter. According to the owner, the City intended to develop the properties residentially itself—internal planning apparently contemplated 422 housing units on about 9.6 hectares—while presenting the expropriation publicly as being for “natural” or conservation uses to depress the indemnity basis. The owner further alleged that the City deliberately delayed negotiations and the formal expropriation process until after the new LCE 2023 came into force, because that statute reduced some indemnity components compared to the prior regime. It claimed the City then advanced indemnity positions before the TAQ that ignored the development potential authorized by the CMM and previously pursued by Mirabel. Finally, the owner complained that Mirabel’s public communications about the camping operations and closure caused significant operational disruption during the 2024 season and damaged Camping Donald’s reputation, contradicting earlier assurances that the season would not be disturbed.

No parallel “top-up” remedy under art. 952 C.c.Q. and the Charter

On the first major issue—whether there exists a separate remedy in Superior Court to “complete” or adjust upwards the expropriation indemnity beyond what the LCE and TAQ process provide—the Court rejects the owner’s position. It holds that the LCE is the legislative instrument by which the legislator fulfills its obligation to regulate expropriation and to give effect to the Charter and civil law requirements of a just and prior indemnity. The Charter and art. 952 C.c.Q. protect against expropriation without law or without an indemnity, but they do not, in themselves, create distinct, free-standing causes of action or new heads of compensable damage outside the statutory expropriation scheme. Because the legislator has given the TAQ exclusive jurisdiction over the “fixing and payment of any indemnity due as a result of expropriation,” there is no two-step model where the TAQ makes a first LCE-based award and the Superior Court then adds extra amounts in the name of a fuller civil-law or Charter indemnity. Determining what is “just” in this context is entrusted entirely to the TAQ applying the LCE’s comprehensive rules. On that aspect of the owner’s claim, the Superior Court therefore declares itself incompetent and refers those indemnity-based demands to the TAQ.

Charter protection of property and jurisdiction

The owner also tried to anchor Superior Court jurisdiction in the Québec Charter, arguing that because the LCE does not contain an express “notwithstanding” or override clause, its application must remain subject to Charter scrutiny, allowing a full judicial remedy where compensation is allegedly incomplete. The Court accepts that s. 6 Charter rights apply but concludes that, in an expropriation carried out under a valid law, those rights are realized through that statute. The LCE is the mode of implementation of the Charter-protected property right in the expropriation context. The absence of an override clause does not, by itself, generate a parallel, residual jurisdiction for the Superior Court to recalculate or supplement the expropriation indemnity already within the LCE-TAQ scheme. In other words, the Charter does not carve out a second indemnification track in addition to the one entrusted exclusively to the TAQ.

Civil fault claims under art. 1457 C.c.Q. and their distinct nature

The Court draws a crucial distinction between disputes over the components of the expropriation indemnity itself (which belong to the TAQ) and claims that the City committed separate civil faults in the exercise of its broader powers and dealings with the owner. On this second front, the Court emphasizes that the LCE and the TAQ’s mandate do not immunize a municipality from civil liability where it abuses its powers, acts in bad faith, or harms reputation or economic interests through misconduct distinct from the lawful act of expropriating. The TAQ’s jurisdiction concerns the fixing of statutory indemnities, including certain defined heads of damage directly caused by expropriation and, in specific circumstances, procedure-related inconveniences. It does not extend to deciding whether the City has violated its extra-contractual obligations under art. 1457 C.c.Q. or to determining causation and quantum for such independent civil wrongs. Because the owner’s pleadings allege such faults—abusive timing of expropriation to capture value, misleading conduct about intended uses of the land, withholding of regulatory information, and damaging public statements—the Superior Court confirms that, at least at the preliminary stage, it is materially competent to hear those claims. Questions about whether distinct damages can be proven and whether they overlap with LCE heads of indemnity go to the merits, not jurisdiction.

Effect of not contesting the right to expropriate under s. 17 LCE

Mirabel argued that because the owner did not use s. 17 LCE, which allows an expropriated party to contest the expropriator’s right and seek annulment of the expropriation notice in Superior Court within 30 days, it was now barred from recovering damages related to the pre-expropriation process. Section 21 LCE then permits parties, where annulment is granted, to claim from the TAQ damages “resulting from the expropriation procedure.” The City maintained that any alleged bad faith or improper motives should have been raised in that statutory challenge, and that the TAQ should exclusively handle any resulting damages. The Court, however, distinguishes between two types of prejudice. Damages that “result from the expropriation procedure” within the meaning of ss. 17 and 21 LCE, and are linked to an annulled expropriation notice, fall under the TAQ once the Superior Court has annulled the notice. But that mechanism does not extinguish or pre-empt civil claims for separate administrative or operational faults by the City that are not limited to the procedure itself. The fact that the owner did not seek annulment might later be relevant to issues such as mitigation of damages, but it does not deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction over the pleaded art. 1457 C.c.Q. claims.

Request for a stay of the civil proceedings

The owner had asked for a stay (sursis) of the Superior Court action until the TAQ renders a final judgment on the expropriation indemnity. The Court refuses this request. It notes that its decision has confirmed jurisdiction only over a specific and narrower portion of the claim—namely, the distinct civil fault allegations—and that the record does not provide sufficient information on the expected length or timing of the TAQ process. Given that the alleged faults involve the conduct of City officials and elected representatives, it is important that the Superior Court proceedings move forward on those aspects. The judge therefore declines to suspend the civil case and instead issues case management directions, including requiring the owner to file a further amended motion specifying the amounts claimed and extending the time limit for inscription for trial and judgment to mid-June 2026.

Outcome, successful party, and monetary consequences

In this incidental judgment on the declinatory exception and stay request, the Court partially grants the City of Mirabel’s declinatory motion and dismisses the owner’s request for a stay. It declares that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims framed as a right to a “complete” expropriation indemnity under art. 952 C.c.Q. and s. 6 of the Québec Charter, and refers those indemnity-driven claims to the TAQ. At the same time, it confirms that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims based on distinct civil faults of the City under art. 1457 C.c.Q., subject to clarification of the amounts claimed, and orders the owner to amend accordingly. Costs are reserved (“frais à suivre”), and no indemnity amount, damages, or specific costs are fixed at this stage. Overall, the City of Mirabel emerges as the more successful party in this interlocutory round—prevailing on the core jurisdictional issue and on the refusal of a stay—while the owner preserves a narrowed path to pursue civil fault claims in Superior Court. The total monetary award, including damages and costs in favor of any party, cannot yet be determined because neither the TAQ indemnity nor the Superior Court damages have been adjudicated.