Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute centers on the validity of a construction legal hypothec registered by the contractor against the homeowners’ new residence, allegedly beyond the 30-day statutory deadline after the end of the works.
• Core evidentiary conflict concerns the factual determination of the “end of the works,” with competing documents pointing to different dates (inspection form, site cleanup dates, and a contractor’s certificate).
• Procedurally, the homeowners’ in-course motion is considered premature and irregular because it seeks a preliminary ruling on one of their own main conclusions without a supporting sworn declaration.
• The absence of a completed protocol of the instance and the lack of pleaded defences prevent the court from resolving a fact-intensive issue solely on the paper record.
• Jurisprudence confirms that the end of works is a question of fact reserved for the trial judge, and neither payment, reception without reserve nor a certificate of end of works is determinative on its own.
• The court rejects the motion with costs in favour of the contractor and its principal, leaving open the possibility of a later, properly supported motion to cancel the hypothec after discovery and examinations.

Background and parties

Philippe Laverdière and Stéphanie Richard are homeowners who retained Les Constructions Dominic Cyr inc., managed or represented by Dominic Cyr, to build their new residence. A dispute arose between them regarding the performance and completion of the construction contract. In the course of that dispute, the contractor registered a construction legal hypothec (hypothèque légale de construction) against the immovable to secure payment of its alleged claim. The homeowners responded by instituting an action seeking, among other things, damages and the cancellation (radiation) of the legal hypothec notice published by the contractor.

Construction of the residence and registration of the legal hypothec

The case stems from the construction of a new residential property for the homeowners. After substantial progress on the works, disagreements emerged regarding the completion, any remaining deficiencies, and payment. The contractor then caused a notice of legal hypothec of construction to be published against the property, relying on the provisions of Quebec law that allow builders and contractors to secure their claims if the notice is registered within a strict time limit following the end of the works. The homeowners contended that this deadline had not been respected, making the hypothec invalid on its face and subject to cancellation.

The homeowners’ in-course motion

Rather than waiting for trial on the merits, the homeowners brought an in-course motion (demande en cours d’instance) within their existing action. Through this motion, they asked the Superior Court to issue a preliminary ruling on one of the key conclusions of their own originating application: the immediate cancellation of the legal hypothec notice. They argued that the materials already in the record, without any need for oral evidence, demonstrated that the hypothec had been registered more than 30 days after the end of the works and was therefore invalid. They also suggested that, if the court considered an inquiry necessary, a separate hearing with evidence could be scheduled specifically to determine the date of completion of the works.

Procedural requirements and article 101 C.p.c.

The judge characterized the motion as unusual, because it asked the court to pre-decide one element of the plaintiffs’ own main claim by way of a mid-proceeding application. The court thus turned to article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs motions made in the course of an instance. Under that provision, a motion in the course of a proceeding may be oral or written, but where it relies on facts that are not already in evidence in the file, it must be in writing and supported by a sworn declaration. The judge noted that the homeowners’ in-course motion was not accompanied by any sworn declaration, even though the key facts they were relying on—especially the date of the end of the works—were not established by prior testimony in the file. This procedural defect contributed to the court’s conclusion that the motion was premature and irregular.

Evidence and competing dates for the end of the works

The central evidentiary dispute related to when the construction works actually ended, because the validity of the legal hypothec turned on whether it was registered within 30 days after that date. The homeowners pointed to several documents already filed with the court. They relied in part on a detailed list of work performed by an individual associated with the contractor, Denis Cyr, indicating that on 18 and 19 August 2025 he was on site only to collect garbage, suggesting that real construction work had ceased earlier. They also relied on a pre-reception inspection form dated 23 December 2025, in which 30 May 2025 was indicated as the date of the end of the works. However, that same form expressly acknowledged that some works remained to be completed and that the pre-inspection was accepted with reservations, which undermined the certainty of 30 May 2025 as the definitive end date. In response, the defendants produced their own documentary support: a certificate of end of works dated 5 January 2026, which, from their perspective, marked the legally relevant date for purposes of the 30-day hypothec registration window. These conflicting documents highlighted a factual controversy rather than a clear, uncontested record.

The legal framework for determining the end of the works

The court referred to established Quebec Court of Appeal jurisprudence, particularly the decision in Entrepôt International Québec, s.e.c. c. Protection incendie de la Capitale inc., which interprets article 2110 of the Civil Code of Québec. That provision defines “end of works” as the moment when the work is executed and in a condition to serve in accordance with its intended use. Under that case law, the determination of the end of the works is a question of fact that must be left to the trial judge. Neither the reception of works without reservation, nor the making of payment, nor the issuance of a certificate of end of works is, by itself, determinative. All circumstances must be weighed, and the factual context must be explored in evidence. This reinforces that the point of departure for prescription periods, and by analogy the time limit for registering a legal hypothec tied to the end of the works, cannot be reduced to a simple, uncontested documentary date.

Why no immediate cancellation of the legal hypothec was ordered

Given this framework, the court emphasized that determining the exact date on which the works ended could not be done reliably on a cursory review of scattered documents without explanations from the parties. There was no protocol of the instance yet filed, which meant that the procedural roadmap was incomplete and the defendants’ defences had not been formally disclosed. In that context, the judge held that asking for the cancellation of the hypothec at this early stage—on the basis of a paper record alone and without affidavits or prior examinations—was inappropriate. The court therefore rejected the request to cancel the hypothec in the context of this in-course motion. Importantly, the judge did not rule out that the issue might be resolved before the full damages trial. The judgment notes that, once the protocol is completed, it could provide for examinations, and if the resulting evidence is sufficiently clear, the homeowners might renew a properly supported in-course motion to seek cancellation of the hypothec before the trial on the merits.

Rejection of a separate evidentiary hearing and overall outcome

The homeowners alternatively asked the court to schedule a distinct hearing with an inquiry solely on the question of cancelling the legal hypothec. The judge declined this request as well, reasoning that it was premature to carve out a separate evidentiary process before the protocol of the instance had been agreed upon and without first using the standard mechanisms of discovery and examinations that might clarify the facts. At this stage, the court found no justification to depart from the ordinary procedural sequence. In the result, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ in-course motion in its entirety, with judicial costs against them. The successful parties in this decision are the defendants, Les Constructions Dominic Cyr inc. and Dominic Cyr. No damages or specific monetary amounts were adjudicated in this interlocutory judgment; only costs were awarded, and the exact amount of those costs cannot be determined from the judgment.