Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Adequacy of the Statement of Claim as a pleading, including its structure, length (64 pages), and compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Absence of paragraph numbering in large portions of the Claim, hindering the Defendants’ ability to respond precisely to allegations.
• Failure to allocate the $450,000 global damages claim among distinct heads of damages, contrary to Rule 25.06(9)(a).
• Inclusion of extensive evidentiary detail, repetitive chronology, and “schedules” and “appendices” that plead evidence rather than concise material facts.
• Prejudice to the Defendants’ right to know the case to meet and to frame a Defence, necessitating a motion to strike under Rule 25.11.
• Appropriate scale and quantum of costs where a self-represented plaintiff ignores repeated, reasonable requests to cure pleading defects but does not act vexatiously or oppressively.

Background and parties

The case arises out of a work relationship between the plaintiff, Natassia Hakim, and Pfizer Canada ULC, with Pfizer Inc. named as the parent corporation. Ms. Hakim was engaged by Pfizer Canada ULC from July 12, 2022, until her termination on April 22, 2025. She says she effectively worked as a de facto employee, providing project management services across Pfizer’s commercial, digital, and medical affairs portfolios in Canada and the United States, reporting to managers in both countries and earning $130,000 annually. Following the end of the relationship, she commenced an action against Pfizer Canada ULC and Pfizer Inc. claiming constructive dismissal, harassment, failure to accommodate, and misclassification as an independent contractor. She sought general, specific, and punitive damages totalling $450,000 under various heads, including constructive dismissal, misclassification, aggravated/moral damages, loss of income and future earnings, and punitive damages. At this stage, the merits of those substantive claims were not adjudicated; the decision deals solely with a procedural motion concerning the sufficiency of her pleading.

Procedural history and motion to strike

Ms. Hakim served her Statement of Claim on May 27, 2025. The Defendants filed a Notice of Intent to Defend but held off on delivering a Statement of Defence, instead engaging in extensive correspondence between June 3 and August 1, 2025. In that correspondence, defence counsel identified specific deficiencies in the Claim and asked Ms. Hakim to amend it to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff did not amend. The Defendants then brought a motion under Rules 25.02, 25.06(1), 25.06(9)(a), and 25.11 to strike the Claim with leave to amend, or alternatively to strike particular portions (page 3 and pages 18–64, the “Impugned Pages”) with leave to amend. They argued that the pleading’s form and content—its lack of paragraph numbering, failure to particularize heads of damages, and extensive evidentiary narrative and repetition—made it impossible to respond meaningfully. Ms. Hakim, self-represented, resisted the motion. She maintained that the Defendants’ objections were matters of form over substance and that her Claim contained enough information for Pfizer to understand the case it had to meet and to file a Defence. She also argued that Pfizer’s decision not to file a Defence was a delay tactic, and her correspondence shows she focused heavily on pressing for settlement and even noted default rather than redrafting her pleading.

Pleading rules and structural defects in the Claim

The court framed the central issue as whether all or part of the Claim should be struck with leave to amend due to non-conformity with the Rules governing pleadings. First, Justice Somji addressed Rule 25.02, which requires pleadings to be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, with each allegation in a separate paragraph so far as practicable. The Claim ran to 64 pages, but paragraph numbers appeared only on pages 4 to 18; the balance lacked any paragraph numbering. The judge found that this omission prejudiced the Defendants’ ability to respond accurately, as they could not easily identify or reference specific allegations.

Second, the judge considered Rule 25.06(9)(a), which requires that where damages are claimed, the amount claimed for each claimant in respect of each claim be specified. Ms. Hakim pleaded a global sum of $450,000 for multiple heads of damages—constructive dismissal, misclassification, aggravated and moral damages, loss of income and future earnings, and punitive damages—without breaking down the total by category. The court held that this failure to allocate amounts to each head of damages breached the Rule and undermined the Defendants’ ability to understand their monetary exposure and to respond, particularly if liability were later established and damages for each theory of recovery needed to be assessed.

Third, and most substantially, the court applied Rule 25.06(1), which requires a concise statement of material facts, not the evidence by which those facts will be proved. Drawing on authorities such as Cerqueira v. Ontario, PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, Steadfasts Inc. v. Dynacare Laboratories, and Mudrick v. Mississauga Oakville Veterinary Emergency Professional Corporation, Justice Somji emphasized that pleadings should set out the “skeleton” of the case—clear, brief, material facts organized in a rational way—rather than a fully detailed evidentiary narrative. The Claim, however, was found to be difficult to follow and not a concise statement of material facts. Instead of clearly identifying each cause of action, its legal elements, and the supporting material facts in summary form, the pleading recounted Ms. Hakim’s employment history in granular, chronological detail interspersed with headings, some of which (such as “Pregnancy Loss”) were more about impact than about legally recognized causes of action. The court noted that while pregnancy loss could be relevant to damages or the impact of harassment or discrimination, it is not itself a tort and would be better placed under a damages heading rather than presented as a standalone “cause” in the pleading structure.

Evidentiary detail, repetition, and schedules/appendices

The court held that paragraphs 18 to 64 of the Claim improperly pleaded evidence rather than material facts. Those paragraphs set out meticulous chronologies of events, including dates, times, and the contents of conversations and telephone calls with managers and human resources staff. The judge found that such detail belonged in affidavits or at trial, not in a Statement of Claim whose role is to outline, at a high level, how the plaintiff says she was discriminated against, harassed, or misclassified. In addition, the Claim suffered from unnecessary and confusing repetition; for instance, the Plaintiff’s start date at Pfizer appeared on multiple pages. This repetition undermined the requirement that pleadings be concise and to the point.

The decision also scrutinized extensive schedules and appendices attached to the Claim. Schedule A (Factual Narrative Summary of Events and Escalations) and Schedule B (Cross-Border Governance Failures, Whistleblower Retaliation, and Oversight Breakdown) largely duplicated allegations from the body of the Claim but in different formats and with added detail. Appendices B, C, and D similarly contained chronological logs and summaries of harassment and retaliatory conduct, as well as categories of supporting evidence, effectively functioning as fact-laden supplements. Appendix A (Misclassification Indicators Summary) went into minute detail rather than offering a concise summary integrated into the main pleading. Schedule C, dealing with jurisdiction and common employer facts, mixed material that properly belonged in the jurisdictional portion of the Claim with argument that should be reserved for submissions. Compounding the structural problem, none of the schedules or appendices had paragraph numbers, which the court described as making them “almost impossible” to respond to.

Justice Somji stressed that neither defendants nor the court should have to pick through an unwieldy, repetitive, and evidentiary pleading to distill the real issues and material facts; that work should be done by the pleading party. While the court acknowledged that the threshold for striking a claim for deficient particulars is high and should be reserved for clear cases, this Claim met that threshold because its sheer length, structure, level of evidentiary detail, and lack of numbering collectively hindered any meaningful response.

Self-represented status, conduct of the parties, and impact on the motion

The court expressly recognized that Ms. Hakim was self-represented and might not be familiar with pleading rules. However, it found that she had been repeatedly and clearly informed of the deficiencies and given ample opportunity to correct them. Some issues—such as adding paragraph numbers or removing schedules that were not meant to be pleaded on—were straightforward fixes that she still did not undertake. Defence counsel, aware of her self-represented status, pointed her to the applicable Rules and case law and explained that a proper amendment would allow them to file a Defence and avoid a motion to strike. They also indicated they would vacate the motion date and not seek costs if she amended in time. Despite this, she did not amend.

The court rejected her contention that the Defendants were simply using non-compliance as a delay tactic. Instead, the judge found that the Defendants acted appropriately in raising clear, rule-based concerns about the Claim’s format and content at an early stage and in attempting to resolve the issue without a motion. While Ms. Hakim had access to counsel, she chose only to keep lawyers “on standby” for settlement or mediation purposes and expressly stated she would not retain them merely to deal with what she viewed as delay or “gamesmanship.” The judge noted that her conduct showed a single-minded focus on negotiating resolution and threats to seek default judgment rather than on rectifying clear pleading issues. This approach, the court concluded, contributed materially to the need for the motion and to delays in the progress of the action.

No insurance or contractual policy terms in issue

Unlike many employment disputes involving insurance benefits or specific contractual policy wordings, this decision does not turn on interpretation of an insurance policy, employee handbook, or particular contract clauses. The only “policy”-type provisions discussed are the procedural rules governing pleadings and costs in civil litigation: Rules 25.02, 25.06, and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (which govern form and content of pleadings and the power to strike) and Rule 57.01(1), along with section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act (which govern the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs). The analysis of these rules focuses on how far a plaintiff must go in clearly organizing and limiting their pleading to material facts, how specific they must be in assigning dollar amounts to different heads of damages, and under what conditions a defective Claim should be struck with leave to amend.

Costs analysis and the court’s exercise of discretion

On costs, the court noted the general principle that the successful party on a motion is presumptively entitled to costs and that costs on a partial indemnity basis are the norm unless there are very strong reasons—such as oppressive or vexatious conduct—to award substantial indemnity or another elevated scale. The Defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, pointing to the Plaintiff’s refusal to cure admitted and obvious defects despite repeated requests. They presented a costs outline showing total motion costs of $37,299, including legal fees of $33,132 and disbursements of $493, and asked for $33,639 on a substantial indemnity basis. Lead counsel, a 16-year call, billed at $450/hour, while a six-year call junior billed at $354/hour, with 57 hours spent across preparation of motion materials and factum, client communications, and settlement discussions.

Justice Somji accepted that the work and rates were generally reasonable given the length and complexity of the Claim and the necessity of carefully navigating a dense and evidentiary pleading. However, while the Plaintiff’s failure to amend on straightforward issues justified an elevated award, the judge declined to characterize her conduct as oppressive or vexatious given her self-represented status and apparent focus on settlement rather than on strategically driving up costs. As a result, the court awarded increased, but not full substantial indemnity, costs—fixing fees, HST, and disbursements in the global amount of $25,000 payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.

Outcome and implications

In the result, the court granted the Defendants’ motion under Rule 25.11 and struck the entire Statement of Claim, not just the impugned pages, but with leave to amend within 30 days. The Defendants were directed to deliver a Statement of Defence within 30 days after receiving the Amended Claim. The court also encouraged both sides to develop a litigation timetable to avoid further delays. Importantly, this ruling does not determine whether Ms. Hakim was constructively dismissed, harassed, discriminated against, or misclassified; it only determines that her original pleading was procedurally deficient and must be redrafted. Pfizer Inc. and Pfizer Canada ULC are the successful parties on the motion, and the court ordered Ms. Hakim to pay them fixed costs in the amount of $25,000, which is the only quantified monetary award made in this decision.