Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Sherry Haas's application for a business permit to buy, dismantle, and sell end-of-life vehicles on her Rural-zoned property was denied by the Town of Baie Verte, which classified the operation as a "Scrap Yard" — a non-permitted use in the Rural zone.

• The Central Newfoundland Regional Appeal Board upheld the Town's denial, confirming the proposed business aligned more closely with a Scrap Yard than a Solid Waste disposal operation.

• Classification of the proposed activity as a Scrap Yard versus Solid Waste was found to be a purely factual determination, rendering it non-appealable under section 46 of the Urban and Rural Planning Act.

• Even applying the "palpable and overriding error" standard, the Board's factual finding was supported by evidence and consistent with the ordinary dictionary meaning of "scrapyard."

• Haas's conflict of interest argument — that the Town itself deconstructed motor vehicles and sold components at its waste disposal facility — was rejected because any potential zoning violation by the Town does not allow Haas to ignore her own property's zoning.

• Reliance on the Town's Environmental Protection Act Certificate of Compliance was deemed irrelevant, as such a certificate is not legislation or regulation and does not compel the Town to permit scrap yard activities in any particular zone.

Background and facts of the case
Sherry Haas sought a business permit from the Town of Baie Verte to operate a business at 17 Harborview Terrace, located in the Town's "Rural" zone. The proposed operation involved purchasing end-of-life motor vehicles, stripping them of valuable components — most notably catalytic converters, which Haas indicated represented over 90% of the profit in the entire business transaction — as well as removing batteries, tires, and wheels for resale. The remaining vehicle hulks would then be sold to a contractor who would come to the property, crush the vehicles on site with a mobile crusher, and then remove the crushed vehicles from the property.
Haas characterized the business as a "Solid Waste" and "recycling/disposal" operation, which is a discretionary permitted use in the Rural zone under the 1985 Town of Baie Verte Development Regulations. The regulations listed examples of Solid Waste uses as "Solid Waste Disposal, Sanitary Landfill, and Incinerators." However, in August 2021, the Town denied the permit on the basis that the proposed activity constituted a "Scrap Yard," defined by reference to examples such as "Car Wrecking Yards, Junkyards, and Scrap Dealers." Under the 1985 regulations, there is no zone that would allow the development of a Scrap Yard.

The appeal to the Regional Board and then to the Supreme Court
Haas appealed the Town's decision to the Central Newfoundland Regional Appeal Board. The Board reviewed the proposed activities and confirmed the Town's decision that the business was a Scrap Yard and, as it is not a permitted use, the Town cannot issue a business permit. Haas then appealed the Board's decision to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. She had originally appealed the Board's decision when counsel acted for her, but she ultimately appeared on her own behalf. She was accompanied by her spouse, who is also involved in the business.

The standard of review and the factual nature of the classification
Justice Alexander MacDonald addressed the threshold question of whether the Board's classification of the operation was a factual decision or one of mixed fact and law. Under section 46(1) of the Urban and Rural Planning Act, 2000, S.N.L. 2000, c. U-8, an appeal to the Supreme Court lies only on a question of law or jurisdiction. Drawing on the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, and Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, Justice MacDonald found that deciding whether Haas's proposed activities constituted a Scrap Yard or a Solid Waste disposal yard was a question of fact alone, with no extricable legal question of principle at stake. As such, Haas could not appeal this decision. Even if she could, the Board's conclusion would survive scrutiny under the highly deferential "palpable and overriding error" standard. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Benhaim v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, "palpable" means an error that is obvious, and "overriding" means an error that goes to the very core of the outcome of the case. Justice MacDonald found the Board's conclusion was not obviously wrong: it was supported by the evidence and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word, with the Collins English Dictionary defining a "scrapyard" as "a place where old machines such as cars or ships are destroyed and where useful parts are saved." He also noted that it does not matter that Haas hired someone else to crush the vehicles, as Haas cannot thwart the zoning by subcontracting any or all the prohibited activities.

The conflict of interest argument
Haas argued that the Town deconstructed motor vehicles and sold components in a similar type of operation at its waste disposal facility, which was also in a Rural zone. Haas contended the Town ran a similar business when it rejected her application and did so to end Haas as a competitor in the catalytic converter business. Justice MacDonald rejected this argument, noting there was no evidence before him that the Town was a competitor, and the Town's counsel confirmed it was not. Critically, the court held that even if the Town's activities violated zoning, this does not allow Haas to ignore her own property's zoning. Haas also alleged in her appeal factum that the Town's Volunteer Fire Department stored end-of-life vehicles at the "Fireman Training Ground." Justice MacDonald rejected this argument on the same basis.

The Environmental Protection Act Certificate of Compliance
Haas further argued that the Town's decision was inconsistent with a Department of Environment and Climate Change Certificate of Compliance issued under the Environmental Protection Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. E-14.2. Section 10 of that approval states that "Areas shall be allocated and signs posted designating separate areas for the disposal of wrecked vehicles, scrap metals, construction debris, white goods, household waste materials, and other approve waste." Justice MacDonald found this irrelevant, reasoning that a Certificate of Compliance is not legislation or regulation, and that the Province may or may not allow municipalities to dispose of wrecked cars — but this does not either restrict the Town's ability to control activities in zones or compel it to accept wrecked cars in its disposal site.

Ruling and outcome
Justice MacDonald dismissed all three grounds of appeal, finding that the Board committed no legal error. The appeal was dismissed in favour of the Town Council of Baie Verte. Sherry Haas was ordered to pay the Town its costs on a column three basis under the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1986, S.N.L. 1986, c. 42, Sch. D. No specific monetary amount for costs was stated in the decision.