Executive summary: key legal and evidentiary issues

• The appellant, a non-public servant, alleged "state-sponsored criminal actors" using advanced technologies caused him harassment, break-ins, threats, and loss of employment opportunities following a shareholder dispute.

• Only the CRA and RCMP fell within the Commissioner's jurisdiction under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, excluding all other named entities.

• Procedural fairness was not breached, as the appellant was given the opportunity to submit clearer allegations and responded with a lengthy email rather than relying on his personal website.

• The Commissioner reasonably characterized the appellant's allegations as arising from a private and personal matter rather than wrongdoing warranting a public interest investigation.

• New evidence introduced at appeal — including AI-generated responses and website collages about "cybertorture" — was accorded no weight by the Federal Court of Appeal.

• The Federal Court's costs award under Column III of Tariff B was upheld as a discretionary decision free of palpable and overriding error.

Background and the appellant's allegations

Nathan Kirk Dempsey, a private citizen who is not a public servant, filed a disclosure of wrongdoing with the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46. Dempsey claimed that after engaging in civil litigation arising from a shareholder dispute against the CEO of "a private sector company that supplies government agencies," he began experiencing what he described as "widespread disruptions" in his life. These disruptions allegedly included harassment, break-ins, threats, and the loss of employment opportunities. He attributed these events to "state-sponsored criminal actors" operating as part of a government program using "Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies," either in "a clandestine trial" or to "facilitate a retaliatory hate crime following a shareholder dispute." Dempsey named numerous organizations — including federal organizations, public bodies, courts, and municipal police forces — as complicit in what he called a "scandal."

The Commissioner's decision not to investigate

The Commissioner issued a detailed three-page decision declining to investigate Dempsey's allegations. First, the Commissioner determined that the Act applies only to wrongdoing in or relating to the "public sector," defined by reference to schedules under the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 and the Act itself. Of all the entities named by Dempsey, only the Canada Revenue Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police qualified as public sector entities under the Commissioner's jurisdiction. The Commissioner therefore had no authority to investigate allegations involving any of the other organizations. Turning to the CRA and RCMP allegations, the Commissioner found that these arose from Dempsey's personal situation pertaining to what appeared to be a private civil litigation and thus did not involve wrongdoing under the Act as defined in the jurisprudence. Applying the standard that the Act is meant to address wrongdoing "of an order of magnitude that could shake public confidence if not reported and corrected" and that poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the public service," the Commissioner exercised her discretion not to investigate, noting that the matters "should continue to be addressed through procedures available to deal with such concerns."

Judicial review at the Federal Court

Dempsey sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decision before the Federal Court, arguing it was unreasonable and procedurally unfair. In Dempsey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 245, the Federal Court dismissed the application. It upheld the Commissioner's jurisdictional analysis regarding entities outside the federal public sector and agreed that the allegations concerning the CRA and RCMP arose from a private and personal matter and that an investigation would not be in the public interest. On the procedural fairness argument — specifically Dempsey's contention that the Commissioner should have reviewed his personal website in full — the Federal Court found no breach. The Court held that the Commissioner did not have a responsibility to discern and assess the alleged wrongdoing from a large volume of materials on the website; rather, Dempsey had the evidentiary burden to set out a clear and cogent narrative in his disclosure.

The appeal before the Federal Court of Appeal

Dempsey appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, which heard the matter in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on March 24, 2026. Writing for a unanimous panel that included Justices Roussel and Pamel, Justice Heckman applied the established appellate framework: the Court effectively stepped into the shoes of the Federal Court and reviewed the Commissioner's decision afresh. On the standard of review, the Court confirmed that reasonableness was appropriate for the merits and, with regards to the procedural fairness claim, considered whether the appellant was given a right to be heard and the opportunity to know the case against him.

Procedural fairness and evidentiary burden

The Federal Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness. The Commissioner's analyst had clearly informed Dempsey that the Commissioner would not review the entirety of his personal website in an attempt to define the wrongdoings that he was alleging. She directed him to submit clearer and more precise allegations and — as conceded by Dempsey at the hearing of the appeal — specified no page limit. In response, Dempsey submitted a lengthy email. The Court held that he was afforded the right to be heard and exercised this right by providing an email submission.

Reasonableness of the Commissioner's discretion

At the appeal hearing, Dempsey narrowed his challenge. He did not take issue with the Commissioner's decision regarding the scope of her authority over the entities mentioned in his disclosure. His submissions focused exclusively on persuading the Court that there was a public interest in investigating the RCMP's conduct in failing to formally investigate his allegations of criminal activities, and that it was unreasonable for the Commissioner to characterize his allegation of wrongdoing against the RCMP as arising from his personal situation pertaining to the civil litigation. While insisting that the alleged criminal conduct and the civil litigation were distinct, Dempsey acknowledged at the hearing that they were "related." He also sought to introduce various documents, including AI-generated responses to queries regarding the use of "neurotechnologies" to "target" individuals, various pages from his website, and collages of online material alleged to illustrate instances of "cybertorture." The Court accorded these documents no weight, as they did not assist in determining whether the Commissioner delivered a decision that was procedurally fair or based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis justified in relation to the facts and law. Applying the considerable deference owed to the Commissioner's discretionary and factually suffused decision, the Court concluded that it was open to the Commissioner to characterize the allegations as arising from Dempsey's personal situation and to find that they did not reveal wrongdoing of a sufficiently serious nature such that the public interest required an investigation. The Commissioner's decision not to investigate was reasonable.

Costs and the overall outcome

Dempsey also challenged the Federal Court's decision to award costs to the respondent under the mid-range of Column III of Tariff B of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106. He argued that the Federal Court erred in failing to give effect to the parties' agreement that the successful party would be awarded costs in the amount of $1,000. The respondent submitted that it would claim only $990 in respect of costs and disbursements under the mid-point of Column III in Tariff B — $10 less than the $1,000 agreed to by the parties. The Federal Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with this discretionary costs determination. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety, with costs awarded in favour of the respondent, the Attorney General of Canada. No specific monetary amount for appeal-level costs was stated in the decision.