Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Alleged fraudulent spiritual/marabout scheme in which the defendant induced the plaintiff to transfer approximately $165,430 via multiple Interac transfers over one month.
• Use of a Norwich-type order to compel third-party financial institutions (Desjardins and Scotiabank) to disclose banking and identity information for unknown or uncertain account holders.
• Reliance on text message exchanges and website evidence to demonstrate prima facie manipulation, abuse of vulnerability and a potentially fraudulent stratagem involving “stars” and spiritual encounters.
• Characterisation of the defendant’s repeated promises to return the funds as potentially amounting, at first glance, to a deposit contract under article 2285 C.c.Q.
• Balancing the public interest in disclosure and fraud investigation against banking confidentiality and privacy interests, including temporary sealing and confidentiality of the court file.
• Satisfaction of all five jurisprudential criteria for granting a Norwich order, enabling the plaintiff to trace funds, identify ultimate wrongdoers and pursue recovery actions.

Facts of the case

The plaintiff, Ozdemir Duygu, alleges that she was manipulated and exploited by the defendant, Kalifa Diaby, in the context of an individual business known as “Professeur Noah Marabout Montréal.” The website for this business describes it as providing medium and sorcery-type services aimed at helping clients recover a lost love, here the plaintiff’s former partner. The plaintiff claims that the defendant used this spiritual service facade to convince her that certain rituals and purchases were necessary to restore her relationship. According to the plaintiff, between 30 December 2025 and 28 January 2026 she transferred a total of $165,430 to the defendant by way of multiple Interac e-transfers. The transfers were initiated from her Caisse Desjardins du centre-est de Montréal account and from her Scotiabank account in Laval, all directed to the same email address associated with “Noah.” The plaintiff contends that she was in a vulnerable emotional state and that the defendant exploited this vulnerability to orchestrate a scheme to obtain large sums of money. The communications between the parties reportedly took place by text messages and online; the plaintiff never met the defendant in person nor saw his face on camera, despite video calls. A bailiff later informed the plaintiff that the owner of the “Professeur Noah Marabout Montréal” website was the defendant, Mr. Diaby, linking him to the online spiritual service and the transfers at issue.

Alleged fraudulent scheme and evidentiary foundation

The key evidentiary elements supporting the plaintiff’s version of events consist of screenshots or records of text messages (piece P-4), banking transfer histories from Desjardins (piece P-3) and Scotiabank (piece P-5), and website materials (pieces P-1 and P-2). The text exchanges allegedly reveal detailed directions from the defendant (under the alias “Noah”) explaining that the plaintiff needed to send money to “buy stars.” Each “star” supposedly corresponded to a spiritual entity or force linked to the year of birth of the plaintiff and her ex-partner: $1,994 per star for the ex-partner, and $1,992 per star for the plaintiff. The defendant represented that these stars would collide emotionally with the ex-partner’s stars in the universe, provoking spiritual encounters that would reunite the couple. The court notes that, on a prima facie basis, these messages show extensive manipulation and a malicious, possibly fraudulent, stratagem. The banking records confirm that numerous Interac transfers were sent from the plaintiff’s accounts to the same email address over a short period, in amounts consistent with the scheme described. The plaintiff’s affidavit and supporting exhibits also indicate that she was contacted by Desjardins’ fraud department, which warned her that the account to which she was sending money was associated with a potential fraudster called “Noah,” raising further concerns about the legitimacy of the transactions.

Possible contractual characterisation and civil liability context

The plaintiff’s broader underlying action, beyond this interlocutory step, is framed as an application for annulment of contract, revendication of movable property (recovery of funds) and damages, with ancillary measures of Norwich relief and pre-judgment seizure. Within the text messages, the defendant repeatedly appears to promise that he will return the entire sum she sent, approximately $165,000. On a preliminary reading, the court considers that these assurances may be characterised, at first glance, as a deposit contract under article 2285 of the Civil Code of Québec, in which one party receives property of another and undertakes to return it. This contractual dimension supports the plaintiff’s theory that the funds remain her property and must be restored. At the same time, the factual matrix is grounded in alleged fraud and abuse of vulnerability: the plaintiff claims she was induced to pay for illusory occult services, relying on the defendant’s representations that they would repair her romantic relationship. The combination of possible contractual obligation to return the funds and alleged fraudulent inducement situates the dispute at the intersection of contract law, civil liability and consumer-type protection considerations.

Purpose and nature of the Norwich order

The specific hearing that produced this judgment concerned only the plaintiff’s urgent, modified application for a Norwich-type order and a pre-judgment seizure and revendication measure. After discussion with counsel, the plaintiff’s side chose to indefinitely postpone the requests relating to seizure and revendication of movables, leaving only the Norwich issue for determination. A Norwich order is described by the court as a procedural remedy allowing a party, even before commencing a full action, to obtain essential information held by a third party so as to identify an unknown wrongdoer. It is a form of pre-action disclosure or investigative injunctive relief, often directed at intermediaries such as banks or internet service providers. In this case, the real owner or holder of the bank accounts that received the funds remains uncertain from the plaintiff’s perspective. While the plaintiff believes the defendant is behind the scheme, only the financial institutions can definitively confirm who opened and controls the recipient accounts, what identification was provided, and where the funds went after they were received. Without this information, the plaintiff risks never being able to identify the true wrongdoer(s) or to trace the funds. The Norwich remedy is therefore central to enabling her to frame and pursue substantive recovery proceedings.

Application of the Norwich criteria and confidentiality measures

The court reviews and applies the five jurisprudential criteria for granting a Norwich order in Québec. First, there must be a real grievance or reproach against an unknown author of the alleged prejudice; here, the unknown or uncertain holder of the recipient accounts is clearly implicated in what appears, at a prima facie level, to be a malicious or fraudulent scheme against the plaintiff. Second, the person from whom information is sought must be connected in some way with the dispute; Desjardins and Scotiabank are directly involved as the institutions that processed the Interac transfers and hold the relevant account data. Third, this third party must be the only practical source of the requested information; the banks are effectively the sole repositories of reliable identity details, account numbers and transaction histories. Fourth, the applicant must compensate the third party for reasonable costs of compliance over and above ordinary legal costs; the plaintiff undertakes to pay such amounts if required. Fifth, the public interest in disclosure must outweigh any legitimate expectation of privacy; in the circumstances, the court finds this balancing clearly favours disclosure, given the apparent fraud and the need to ensure access to justice and proper identification of the responsible party or parties. In addition to the Norwich analysis, the court addresses confidentiality. Although civil proceedings are usually public, the judge recognises that temporarily keeping the file under seal and rendering the debates confidential is justified. The rationale is to prevent tipping off the defendant or any unknown account holder that the plaintiff is seeking banking information, which could lead to dissipation of funds or obstruction of the investigation. Accordingly, the court orders that the matter be placed under seal and that the debates remain confidential for 30 days from the order, subject to any later lifting of confidentiality by another Superior Court judge.

Scope of the disclosure and permitted use of information

The order compels the financial institutions to provide a detailed suite of information to the plaintiff’s lawyers within five days of receiving a written request. They must disclose the full account numbers of all bank accounts that received the plaintiff’s Interac transfers listed in pieces P-3 and P-5, together with the names of the account holders and the institutions where those accounts are held. They must also furnish all identification and information supplied by the defendant or actual account holders when opening those accounts, including identity documents and social insurance numbers. The banks are further directed to produce complete transaction records for the accounts between 28 December 2025 and 28 January 2026, whether dealings occurred in Canadian dollars, another currency or cryptocurrency. Finally, they must provide the most recent account statements, including current balances. The plaintiff is expressly authorised to use the information and documents obtained to trace the funds, to identify any party who received money from her or from the defendant(s), and to deploy that information in any legal proceedings aimed at recovering the funds and claimed damages. The order also authorises the plaintiff to seek the assistance of foreign banks, foreign courts and foreign tribunals to give full effect to the Norwich order, acknowledging that funds may have been transferred abroad or converted into other forms.

Outcome and implications for the parties

In the result, the Superior Court grants the modified application for a Norwich-type order and imposes a 30-day sealing and confidentiality regime while the banks comply and the plaintiff collects the necessary information. The institutions are ordered to keep the existence of the proceedings and the order confidential and not to disclose them to the defendant or to the true account holders, again to avoid compromising the plaintiff’s ability to trace and secure the funds. The decision resolves only the interlocutory Norwich relief; questions of contract annulment, repayment, damages and ultimate liability are reserved for future proceedings. Costs are left “to follow,” meaning they will be determined at a later stage, and no monetary award of any kind is made in this judgment. The successful party in this decision is the plaintiff, Ozdemir Duygu, who obtains the investigative and disclosure tools needed to identify the responsible parties and to consider recourse to domestic and foreign courts. However, no amount is yet ordered to be paid or recovered in her favour, and the total monetary award or costs in her favour cannot be determined from this order.