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Background and factual context
The dispute arises within a Quebec housing co-operative, Coopérative d’habitation La Fraternité Micheloise. The claimant, Ntumba Kalala, was previously an administrator and member of the co-operative’s finance committee. On 23 November 2024, the co-operative held an extraordinary general meeting (AGE), overseen by representatives of the Société d’Habitation du Québec and the Fédération de l’Habitation Coopérative du Québec. At this AGE, a new board of directors (conseil d’administration, or CA) was elected, which had the effect of ending Ms. Kalala’s mandate as an administrator and replacing her on the finance committee. Ms. Kalala did not personally attend the AGE but was represented by her adult daughter.
In the months following the meeting, there were exchanges about the transfer of files from the outgoing to the incoming board. Difficulties in that transition led, in early May 2025, to a disciplinary measure: the co-operative suspended Ms. Kalala for three months as a member. Separate from this internal governance issue, Ms. Kalala also filed an administrative complaint with the Société d’Habitation du Québec in January 2025, which was rejected in February 2025 without further judicial recourse.
The judicial proceeding and relief sought
On 1 May 2025, a little over five months after the contested AGE, Ms. Kalala served a “Demande introductive d’instance” framed as a judicial review (pourvoi en contrôle judiciaire). She sought, among other things, annulment of the 23 November 2024 extraordinary general meeting, enforcement of what she described as “collective resolutions,” and various remedial orders. These included holding a new extraordinary general meeting and electing a new board of directors.
The core of the claim was that the November 2024 AGE was tainted by procedural and voting “irregularities.” In her originating application, she listed various alleged problems—such as a lack of transparency in voting, refusal to verify eligibility, and errors in the membership list—but she did not set out specific, concrete facts explaining what occurred, how it breached a rule of law or the co-operative’s internal regulations, or how it affected her rights.
The defendant’s motion to dismiss
The co-operative responded with a motion to dismiss the judicial review under articles 168(2) and 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It argued that:
– The proceeding was untimely because a reasonable delay for instituting a judicial review is about 30 days from knowledge of the impugned act, and more than five months had elapsed between the AGE and service of the proceeding
– The application was manifestly ill-founded and doomed to fail because it lacked the necessary factual underpinnings to support the drastic remedy of annulling a general meeting
– The proceeding was abusive and ought to attract sanctions, including reimbursement of extrajudicial legal fees
In support of its position on timeliness and abuse, the co-operative pointed to the fact that the minutes of the 23 November 2024 AGE had subsequently been ratified by the co-operative’s annual general meeting in June 2025, and to the discretionary, exceptional nature of judicial review remedies.
Assessment of timeliness and admissibility
The court began by recalling that a motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it is clear that, taking the alleged facts as true, the law indisputably does not support the relief claimed. In the context of judicial review, Quebec courts generally expect such proceedings to be brought within about 30 days of the impugned decision or act, unless exceptional circumstances justify a longer delay. The longer the delay, the heavier the claimant’s burden to justify it.
Here, more than five months passed between the AGE of 23 November 2024 and the service of the judicial review on 1 May 2025. The originating application did not allege any exceptional circumstances justifying this delay. In a later written response opposing the motion to dismiss, Ms. Kalala referred to a trip and to her efforts to pursue an administrative complaint with the Société d’Habitation du Québec, but the court found these explanations insufficient. She had already returned to Montreal by mid-December 2024, had filed her administrative complaint in January 2025 and received a negative decision in February 2025, yet still waited until May 2025 to initiate judicial review.
The court also noted that debates over the transfer of files between boards and the disciplinary suspension imposed in May 2025 did not amount to exceptional circumstances justifying the delay in attacking the validity of the November 2024 meeting. Her later assertion that she had been searching for lawyers was also unpersuasive, as those efforts appeared to post-date the filing of the judicial review itself.
Deficiencies in factual pleadings and evidentiary foundation
Beyond timeliness, the court emphasized the lack of factual substance in the originating application. While the claimant enumerated “irregularities” such as non-transparent voting and refusal to verify eligibility, she did not allege precise facts explaining what occurred, which specific provisions of the co-operative’s by-laws were violated, or how the alleged conduct undermined procedural fairness or her substantive rights.
This omission was particularly problematic given that the AGE had taken place under the supervision of external representatives from the Société d’Habitation du Québec and the Fédération de l’Habitation Coopérative du Québec, and that the minutes of the meeting had later been ratified at the co-operative’s June 2025 annual general meeting. In that context, the court held it could not simply accept as proven what were essentially legal conclusions or characterizations—“irregularities,” lack of transparency, and so on—without detailed factual support. Even taking the sparse factual allegations at their highest, the application could not logically support the requested legal remedy and was therefore destined to fail.
The court further questioned the practical utility of the judicial review. A new board of directors was set to be elected in November 2026, meaning that by the time any judicial review might run its course, the challenged board’s mandate would likely already have expired. Given the discretionary nature of judicial review, this significantly undermined the justification for court intervention.
Finding of irreceivability and dismissal
After weighing the nature of the act attacked (the AGE), the nature and alleged seriousness of the irregularities, the length and justification of the delay, and the claimant’s conduct, the court concluded that:
– The judicial review had been instituted outside a reasonable time frame
– No exceptional circumstances justified the delay
– The originating application lacked precise and sufficient factual allegations capable of sustaining the requested remedies
– The proceeding was effectively without practical utility
On this basis, the court held that the application was tardy and irrecevable and granted the co-operative’s motion to dismiss.
Abuse of procedure and sanctions
The court then addressed whether the proceeding was abusive within the meaning of article 51 C.p.c. It stressed that the threshold for a finding of abuse is high but, in this case, considered it to be met. In the court’s view, the proceeding was marked by an absence of substantial factual allegations, yet it mobilized the demanding vehicle of judicial review. The context also troubled the court: the claimant, who had not personally attended the contested AGE, instituted the proceeding five months later, in the midst of a separate conflict culminating in her three-month suspension as a member. The court found that she could not instrumentalize judicial review for personal ends rooted in that conflict.
The court also invoked the principle of proportionality in litigation. Even assuming the alleged irregularities could be proven, the judicial review was largely devoid of practical effect, given the temporary nature of the current board’s mandate and the scheduled November 2026 elections. Continuing the proceeding risked creating unjustified instability in the co-operative’s governance, hindering the normal functioning of the board and consuming judicial resources out of proportion to any realistic benefit.
Taken together, these factors led the court to conclude that the judicial review constituted an abuse of procedure. As a remedial measure, and given proof of the extrajudicial fees incurred, the court ordered Ms. Kalala to reimburse the co-operative’s extrajudicial legal costs in the amount of 6,429.32 $.
Misuse of artificial intelligence and additional monetary penalty
A notable aspect of the decision concerns the claimant’s use of artificial intelligence tools to draft parts of her written contestation. The co-operative’s lawyer discovered that several decisions cited in her brief simply did not exist, and that a co-operative named as a party in one supposed precedent was fictitious. Similarly, references to articles 173 to 177 of the Civil Code of Québec—which deal with emancipation—had no connection to the issues in the case and appeared to result from AI-generated “hallucinations.”
The court characterized the filing of a judicial document containing fictitious case law and irrelevant statutory references as an “important breach” of the proper conduct of the proceeding. Even in the absence of any intent to deceive, such a document undermines the integrity of the judicial process and forces both the opposing party and the court to undertake unnecessary verification work. The court relied on article 342 C.p.c., which allows it to order a party who commits an important breach to pay a just and reasonable compensation covering the other side’s professional legal fees, having regard to the gravity of the breach and the prejudice suffered.
In this case, the court imposed an additional sum of 500 $ payable by Ms. Kalala to the co-operative. This amount was calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the misconduct while remaining proportionate to the circumstances and compensating the co-operative for the time its counsel spent checking the fictitious authorities and provisions cited in her document.
Overall outcome and financial consequences
In its operative conclusions, the court granted the co-operative’s motion to dismiss the action seeking annulment of the extraordinary general meeting and related remedial orders, declared the originating application irrecevable, and formally rejected it. It also declared the proceeding abusive and awarded the co-operative 6,429.32 $ in extrajudicial legal fees, plus a further 500 $ under article 342 C.p.c. as compensation for the important procedural breach linked to the AI-generated filing. In addition, the judgment was rendered “with costs,” but the standard taxed court costs are not specifically quantified in the decision.
Taken together, the decision confirms the defendant, Coopérative d’habitation La Fraternité Micheloise, as the successful party. The court ordered a total specified monetary award of 6,929.32 $ in its favour (6,429.32 $ in extrajudicial fees plus 500 $ in additional compensation), with any further court costs to be determined through the usual taxation process, so the precise global total including all costs cannot be determined from the judgment alone.
Plaintiff
Defendant
Court
Quebec Superior CourtCase Number
500-17-133859-259Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
$ 6,929Winner
DefendantTrial Start Date