Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Interpretation of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act and whether a passenger can be treated as “any other object” in a public transit collision exception.
• Determination of whether a sudden stop without impact constitutes a “collision” triggering statutory accident benefits for a bus passenger.
• Scope of entitlement to Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) for occupants of public transit vehicles where no external impact occurs.
• Use of the mandatory Ontario Automobile Owner’s Policy (OAP-1) to confirm the meaning of “object” in interpreting the Insurance Act.
• Adequacy of the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s reasons in applying principles of statutory interpretation without expressly citing all authorities relied on by the appellant.
• Characterization of the “no collision with any other object” finding as a question of law, limiting the scope of both appeal and judicial review.

Facts of the incident

Ms. Sandra Mohammed was riding on a Toronto public transit bus on November 3, 2022, when a fire truck with activated emergency lights travelled through an intersection ahead of the bus. The vehicle in front of the bus stopped, prompting the bus to brake abruptly. As a result of this sudden stop, Ms. Mohammed was thrown forward and alleged that she was injured when she came into contact with the interior of the bus. She claimed statutory accident benefits (SABS) for her injuries, asserting that the incident fell within the Ontario no-fault accident benefits regime.

Procedural history

Following the incident, Ms. Mohammed applied for benefits under O. Reg. 34/10: Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, from TTC Insurance Company Limited, the insurer for the public transit operator. TTC Insurance denied her claim, relying on the public transit exception in s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act. Ms. Mohammed brought an application before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT), where a preliminary issue hearing was convened to decide whether her claim was barred by that provision. The LAT dismissed her application, finding that s. 268(1.1) applied. It also later denied her request for reconsideration. Ms. Mohammed then pursued both an appeal (limited to questions of law) and an application for judicial review to the Ontario Divisional Court. After hearing her submissions, the Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the judicial review, with written reasons to follow, which are set out in the endorsement.

Statutory and policy framework

The dispute centred on the interpretation of s. 268 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, and its interaction with the SABS and the Ontario Automobile Owner’s Policy (OAP-1). Subsection 268(1) establishes the general rule that every motor vehicle liability policy is deemed to provide statutory accident benefits coverage to insured persons. Subsection 268(1.1), however, carves out a specific exception for public transit vehicles. It provides that, despite the general entitlement under subsection (1) and the SABS, no statutory accident benefits are payable in respect of an occupant of a public transit vehicle if, in the incident, the public transit vehicle “did not collide with another automobile or any other object.” The OAP-1 is a mandatory, prescribed policy form. The Tribunal referred to OAP-1 to help confirm its conclusion on the meaning of “object” in this statutory context, treating it as a relevant interpretive aid rather than a source that could override clear statutory language.

Tribunal’s interpretation and reasons

The central question before the LAT was whether the bus had “collided with another automobile or any other object” during the incident in which Ms. Mohammed was injured. It was undisputed that the bus did not strike another vehicle, the fire truck, or any obstacle outside the bus. The insurer’s position was that, because there was no external impact, the s. 268(1.1) public transit exclusion applied and barred SABS entitlement. Ms. Mohammed advanced the argument that she herself, as a person inside the bus, could be considered “any other object,” such that a collision occurred when her body made forceful contact with features of the bus interior during the abrupt stop. The Tribunal rejected that characterization. It concluded that the phrase “any other object,” when read in context, referred to something external to the public transit vehicle. On that reading, the bus did not collide with another automobile or any other object, and so the statutory exception applied to bar her claim. The Tribunal’s reasons focused on the wording of the provision, the ordinary meaning of “collide,” the structure of s. 268, and the supporting indication from OAP-1, ultimately finding that passengers inside the vehicle are not the “objects” contemplated by the exception.

Divisional Court’s analysis of statutory interpretation and reasons

On appeal, Ms. Mohammed argued that the LAT erred in law by not giving the words “any other object” their broadest possible meaning. Relying on the modern principle of statutory interpretation and decisions such as R. v. Barton, she contended that the legislature’s use of the unqualified expression “any other object” required an expansive reading that could include an occupant inside the bus. She further submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons were insufficient and that it improperly relied on OAP-1. The Divisional Court held that the standard of review on the appeal was correctness, as only questions of law could be raised. Applying that standard, the Court found no legal error in the LAT’s interpretation. It emphasized that the words “any other object” could not be read in isolation but must be understood in the context of the entire provision, which is concerned with collisions involving public transit vehicles. When read in that context, a collision between a bus and “another automobile or any other object” plainly contemplates another vehicle or external obstacle, not a passenger inside the bus. The Court noted that the purpose of s. 268(1.1) is to limit no-fault insurance obligations of public transit operators in certain situations, while still allowing injured passengers to pursue compensation through tort claims in court if benefits are unavailable. On the adequacy of reasons, the Court concluded that the Tribunal had squarely addressed the statutory wording and its context, focusing on the meaning of “collide” and “object.” An administrative decision-maker is not obliged to refer expressly to every authority cited by a party, so long as it engages with the core issues. The Court held that the Tribunal did exactly that, and Barton, decided in a different context with different legislative language, did not need to be specifically discussed. The Court also found no error in the LAT’s reference to OAP-1, given that the policy is prescribed by regulation and was used only to confirm, not to drive, the interpretation of the Insurance Act.

Outcome of the appeal and judicial review

In its disposition, the Divisional Court dismissed Ms. Mohammed’s appeal, confirming that the public transit exception in s. 268(1.1) applied and that she was not entitled to SABS for this incident. The Court also declined to exercise its discretion to judicially review the LAT’s decisions. It agreed with the respondents that the finding that the bus did not “collide” with Ms. Mohammed was not a factual determination but a legal interpretation of the statutory language, and that her judicial review application largely duplicated the arguments advanced on the appeal. As a result, the LAT decisions remained in place, and no accident benefits or damages were awarded to Ms. Mohammed. Instead, the successful party was TTC Insurance Company Limited, in whose favour the Divisional Court ordered that Ms. Mohammed pay costs of $5,000 on an all-inclusive basis, representing the total quantified monetary award in the proceeding.