Executive summary: Key legal and evidentiary issues

• Acrimonious intra-strata corporation dispute over the validity of resolutions purportedly passed at a September 27, 2025 Special General Meeting replacing the strata council and executive.

• Leave to appeal was sought for two discretionary adjournment orders (November 26 and December 10, 2025) that paused the petition hearing pending the outcome of a further SGM.

• Most terms of the impugned orders were found unappealable because they did not determine procedural or substantive rights.

• Allegations of judicial bias—including claims the chambers judge departed from a judicial role and harbored partiality—were unsupported on the record and not pressed in oral submissions.

• The applicant's request for the Court of Appeal to act as a court of first instance and hear an unresolved Supreme Court application was deemed procedurally and substantively misconceived.

• Pursuing the appeals would undoubtedly delay final resolution of a proceeding already much delayed since the hearing on November 26, 2025.

Background of the strata corporation dispute

This case involves an acrimonious governance conflict within Strata Plan BCS 3495, a strata corporation in British Columbia. Two factions within the strata corporation clashed over the validity of resolutions replacing the strata council and executive, purportedly passed at a Special General Meeting held on September 27, 2025. The applicant, seeking leave to appeal, maintained that the resolutions were valid and represented the people it said were validly appointed at the meeting. The respondents included The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3495 (Residential Section) and Prosprise Realty Corp., a management company that sides with the Strata Respondent. The applicant commenced proceedings by a petition filed in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on October 14, 2025.

The initial injunction and hearing schedule

On October 27, 2025, Justice Francis (then of the Supreme Court) granted the applicant a temporary injunction barring the ousted Strata Council and Residential Executive members from further providing any instructions or otherwise acting on behalf of any facet of the Strata Corporation. Both respondents were also barred from purporting to represent the Strata Corporation. Justice Francis further ordered that annual general meetings scheduled by the respondents to take place in October should not take place until the matters in the petition were resolved, with the petition set for a one-day hearing on November 26, 2025.

The November adjournment order

The petition came on for hearing before Justice Coval on November 26, 2025, as contemplated by Justice Francis's order. In the course of the hearing, the respondents asked that the hearing be adjourned to be continued after a fresh special general meeting recently requested by a representative of the Strata Respondent had taken place. Justice Coval identified three considerations: the record was very large and more time than was presently available would be required to complete the hearing; scheduling difficulties would prevent the continuation from taking place in December and even possibly in January; and, perhaps most importantly, the petition might become moot as a result of the further SGM that had been requested. The judge agreed to the adjournment. He also observed that the injunction pronounced by Justice Francis essentially put the applicant's counsel and executive, and its preferred property manager, in control on an interlocutory basis, and that he did not consider that deciding the petition in advance of the SGM would assist in addressing any questions as to its validity or the validity of any resolutions to be passed. The adjournment was ordered pending the outcome of the SGM demanded by Mr. Zhou on November 17, 2025, under SPA 43(1).

The December order and escalating litigation

On December 1, 2025, the applicant filed a notice of application in the Supreme Court seeking to forestall the holding of a special general meeting until matters raised in the petition were resolved. In the same notice of application, the applicant sought an order that a principal representative of the Strata Respondent be found in contempt. On December 10, 2025, the parties appeared before Justice Coval, who adjourned the applicant's application pending the outcome of the Special General Meeting, directed the parties to exchange position letters and determine a timetable for delivery of materials and hearing dates, and awarded costs of that appearance to the Residential Section respondent.

Representation dispute at the appeal hearing

A notable procedural issue arose at the appeal hearing before Justice Gomery on March 10, 2026. There was an issue as to who was entitled to speak for the Strata Respondent. Two lawyers attended. Mr. Ghani had represented the Strata Respondent in the court below and filed an appearance to the notices of appeal, continuing to take instructions from the opposing faction who wished to oppose the applications. Ms. Douglas had filed notices of change of representation and acknowledged that she took instructions from persons allied with the applicant, with instructions to take no position in opposition to the applications. In order that both sides would be heard, Justice Gomery granted Mr. Ghani standing to speak in opposition to the applications.

The applicant's grounds and the court's analysis

The applicant advanced arguments centered on mootness, judicial bias, abuse of process, and jurisdictional concerns. It submitted that the judge erred in his reasoning regarding mootness, arguing that the judge assumed the holding of a further SGM would resolve matters when it would not. The bias argument was that the judge departed from a judicial role in attempting to mediate, and then in jumping upon the respondents' proposal for an adjournment when it became apparent that the parties would not settle. The applicant speculated that the judge had recently decided a judicial review application involving some of the same parties and "may have possessed a desire to equalize the scorecard." The applicant did not press the bias argument in oral submissions. The applicant also sought, remarkably, orders that the Court of Appeal should hear, as a court of first instance, its notice of application filed on December 1, 2025, receive full affidavit materials, fix deadlines, and grant it the relief sought.

Justice Gomery applied the four-part test from Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, 2000 BCCA 326, for granting leave to appeal a limited appeal order, examining whether the points on appeal were of significance to the practice, whether they were of significance to the proceeding, whether the appeal was prima facie meritorious or frivolous, and whether the appeal would unduly hinder the progress of the action. On each factor, the applicant fell short. The arguments raised no novel legal points, as the legal principles pertaining to mootness and bias are well established. The bias allegation was unsupported on the record, and the applicant's memorandum of argument referred to a transcript that had not been filed and indulged in inappropriate speculation as to the judge's thinking and motives. The adjournment decisions were highly discretionary, and the standard of review on an appeal from an adjournment decision is highly deferential. The proposed appeal was characterized as frivolous.

Ruling and outcome

Justice Gomery dismissed all applications. Leave to appeal both the November 26, 2025 and December 10, 2025 orders was denied. Most terms of those orders were found not to constitute appealable orders because they did not determine procedural or substantive rights. Even assuming the orders were appealable, granting leave would not have been in the interests of justice. The stay applications and the request for the Court of Appeal to hear the unresolved Supreme Court application were likewise dismissed. Justice Gomery noted that even a division of the Court is limited to making orders on applications that were properly before the court below, and the application filed on December 1, 2025 was never heard by the British Columbia Supreme Court and was not the subject of a substantive order, meaning this Court would lack jurisdiction to decide it. Had leave been granted, Justice Gomery stated he would have refused a stay, finding that consideration of the balance of convenience favours the respondents under the RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) test. The respondents were the successful party; costs of the December 10, 2025 appearance were awarded to The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3495 (Residential Section) by the court below. No specific monetary amount was determined or ordered by the Court of Appeal in this decision.