Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Plaintiff sought to disqualify defence counsel based on alleged conflicts of interest, including claims of “extraordinary commercial duress” and purported professional misconduct.
• The court emphasized the strong principle that parties should not be deprived of counsel of choice absent compelling, well-founded reasons.
• Allegations of conflict and threats of personal litigation against defence counsel were found to be unfounded and ultimately abandoned by the plaintiff during the hearing.
• The timing and manner of the plaintiff’s change in position, including failure to advise the defendants or the court before the motion, weighed into the court’s decision on costs.
• The court treated the motion as a misuse of party and judicial resources, warranting a costs sanction but not rising to the level justifying substantial indemnity.
• Costs were fixed against the plaintiff to promote efficient and orderly administration of justice and deter similar procedural misuse.

Background and facts of the dispute

The case arises from an employment dispute between the plaintiff, Natassia Hakim, and her former employer, Pfizer Inc. and Pfizer Canada ULC (together, Pfizer). Ms. Hakim commenced an action on May 27, 2025, alleging wrongful dismissal, among other claims, after the termination of her employment with Pfizer. She is self-represented in the litigation, while Pfizer is represented by the law firm Norton Rose Fulbright Canada (NRFC) and counsel Joseph Cohen-Lyons.
In the course of the ongoing action, Ms. Hakim brought a motion seeking two forms of procedural relief. First, she asked the court to disqualify NRFC and Mr. Cohen-Lyons as counsel of record for Pfizer. Second, she requested the appointment of a case management judge under Rule 77 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure to oversee any transition of counsel and manage the litigation schedule going forward. The defendants opposed the motion. Counsel for LawPro attended on a watching brief, prepared to answer any questions from the court about professional liability or related issues.
The plaintiff’s motion materials, including her motion record, factum, reply affidavit and reply factum, were largely devoted to the attempt to remove NRFC and Mr. Cohen-Lyons as Pfizer’s lawyers. The defendants’ responding materials similarly focused on defending against the disqualification request. There was no determination of the underlying wrongful dismissal claim in this decision; the endorsement deals solely with this procedural motion and the associated costs.

Allegations regarding conflict of interest and conduct of counsel

In her written materials, Ms. Hakim argued that the disqualification of defence counsel was “necessitated by a structural breakdown in the administration of justice,” which she said arose because counsel’s professional independence had been undermined by “extraordinary commercial duress.” She further indicated that she had served a “Notice of Intent to Sue” on defence counsel, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and bad faith litigation. In her view, these steps created an additional conflict of interest that should have prevented NRFC and Mr. Cohen-Lyons from continuing to act for Pfizer.
At the hearing, however, the plaintiff significantly moderated her position. She acknowledged that the relief she had requested might be “extreme,” and she explained that the motion had been brought out of frustration with what she perceived as a deadlock and conflict situation. By the time of argument, she no longer actively pursued the disqualification remedy and primarily sought case management instead. Nonetheless, this shift in position was not communicated to the defendants or the court in advance, including in the Confirmation Form filed before the motion date.
The court reaffirmed the well-established principle that parties should not be deprived of their chosen counsel unless there is good cause, and that courts must exercise a high degree of restraint before interfering with a litigant’s choice of lawyer. Applying that principle, the associate justice found that the alleged conflict of interest was “clearly without foundation” and had, in any event, been belatedly abandoned by the plaintiff at the hearing. The motion to disqualify counsel was therefore dismissed, with the court expressly rejecting the plaintiff’s theory of conflict, including her reliance on threats of personal litigation against defence counsel.

Case management and timing of further procedural steps

On the issue of case management, Pfizer did not oppose the idea in principle. However, the defendants argued that such an order would be premature because another important motion—their motion to strike portions of the plaintiff’s claim—had been argued on January 20, 2026, and the decision on that motion had not yet been released.
The court accepted this timing concern. Rather than immediately appointing a case management judge, the associate justice directed that a case conference should be scheduled once the decision on the defendants’ motion to strike is released. At that future case conference, the parties and the court can address next steps in the litigation and determine whether formal case management is necessary. Until that conference is held, the court ordered that the plaintiff shall bring no further motions. This restriction was designed to stabilize the procedural posture of the case and prevent piecemeal motion practice while a key ruling is still outstanding.

Costs of the motion and the court’s assessment of conduct

The central remaining issue in the endorsement concerned costs. The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $25,372.84. They argued that they had been forced to devote significant resources to a motion that was ultimately withdrawn mid-hearing, and that the motion was inappropriate from the outset because it advanced a complex but unfounded theory of conflict and included threats of personal litigation against their counsel.
The court reviewed the governing principles on substantial indemnity costs, noting that such awards are generally reserved for situations involving “reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.” While the associate justice described the plaintiff’s conduct in bringing the motion as “problematic,” it was not found to meet the high threshold required for substantial indemnity. The court therefore declined to award the full amount sought on that elevated scale.
However, the court was clear that some level of cost sanction was justified. Considerable time and expense had been incurred by the defendants in preparing to respond to the disqualification motion, only for the plaintiff to abandon her primary relief at the hearing. The decision characterizes the plaintiff’s approach as bringing a motion out of frustration, seeking “extreme” relief, and attempting to manufacture a conflict by threatening legal action against opposing counsel. The court regarded this as a misuse of both the defendants’ resources and the court’s own resources. The plaintiff’s own email to defence counsel, stating that she would not concede the matter “under threats of cost awards” and that she had the “resources and the resolve to see this through,” further demonstrated that she was aware of the potential for adverse costs yet elected to proceed.
In exercising its broad discretion over costs under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court emphasized that fixing costs is not a mechanical process but must aim at an amount that is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The associate justice also underscored that costs can serve as a tool to further the efficient and orderly administration of justice, including deterring improper or wasteful motion practice. Balancing all of these considerations, the court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants at $10,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid within 60 days.

Outcome and implications for the parties

There is no discussion in this decision of insurance policy terms or specific contractual clauses beyond the reference to the underlying wrongful dismissal claim. The endorsement is confined to procedural and costs issues arising from the plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion to remove defence counsel and her related request for case management. The merits of the employment claim, any entitlement to damages for wrongful dismissal, and any other substantive remedies are left for separate determination in the main action and in the pending motion to strike.
In terms of outcome, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Norton Rose Fulbright Canada and Mr. Cohen-Lyons, kept Pfizer’s chosen counsel in place, directed that a case conference be arranged after the defendants’ motion to strike is decided, and barred the plaintiff from bringing further motions before that conference. The successful party on this motion was Pfizer Inc. and Pfizer Canada ULC, and the court ordered the plaintiff to pay total costs in the amount of $10,000 (inclusive of HST and disbursements) in favour of the defendants.