Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Characterization of the lot rental and cottage arrangement as either a “rental unit” under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (RTA) or a commercial tenancy under the Commercial Tenancies Act (CTA).
• Interpretation of statutory definitions relating to “land lease home,” “land lease community,” and the s. 5(a) RTA exemption for seasonal or vacation accommodation in a campground or cottage establishment.
• Assessment of the permanent, residential-style features of the cottage (structure, utilities, septic, taxes, insurance) versus the operator’s description of Remi Lake as a purely seasonal campground.
• Consideration of the parties’ course of dealing, including historic occupancy, annual renewals, and financial obligations (property taxes, utilities, maintenance) to determine the predominant purpose of the tenancy.
• Treatment of a late, self-represented affidavit filed by the respondents after cross-examinations, balancing fairness, admissibility rules, and its use as argument rather than evidence.
• Determination of jurisdiction and remedy: whether the Superior Court can adjudicate the dispute or must remit all tenancy-related issues to the Landlord and Tenant Board under the RTA’s exclusive-jurisdiction provisions.

Facts of the case
Remi Lake Holiday Bay is a privately operated campground in the Township of Moonbeam that has been in operation for approximately 45 years. It is owned and operated by the applicant, Lynn Larabie, in her capacity as estate trustee for her late parents’ estates. She and her brother both have interests in the estate and in the business. Within the park, there are rental lots used either for portable trailers or for fixed “private cabins” or cottages.
The respondents, Cheryl Crickard and Luc Bellemare, became involved with the property when they purchased a cottage located on Lot 46 from an independent owner, Armande Bernard, under a “Bill of Sale without warranty” dated May 29, 2021. Bernard owned the cottage structure but leased the lot from Remi Lake. The applicant knew about and approved the sale.
Before closing their purchase, the respondents had the septic system inspected by an employee of Remi Lake, who confirmed it met health unit standards. The applicant was aware of this inspection and that the system was compliant.
The cottage itself is a permanent structure, built around 1960. It is affixed to Lot 46 along with three sheds and an outhouse. It has two bedrooms plus an additional bedroom in the porch, a kitchen and dining area, and indoor bathroom facilities with a toilet and shower. It has running water, electricity and a deck attached to the exterior.

The lot rental arrangement and contract terms
Prior to buying the cottage, the respondents entered into a written rental arrangement for Lot 46 with the applicant on May 25, 2021. The governing paperwork is a “Seasonal Contract (LOC) & Appendix A” together with several incorporated documents: a 2021 registration form and seasonal contract, 2021 rules and regulations for private cabin owners, 2021 guidelines for private cabin sales, a health unit contact sheet, and general park rules. The contract was a standard-form document prepared by or for the applicant; the respondents had no role in drafting.
The contract is a hybrid: it contains terms that apply to trailer sites and others that apply only to fixed cabins. For trailers, the rules emphasize portability and temporary occupation—trailers must be roadworthy, retain wheels, and cannot have permanent attachments or fixed decks. Any departure from that is prohibited so they remain removable.
In contrast, the “rules and regulations for private cabin owners” expressly assume a permanent structure owned by the occupant. They contemplate the need for municipal building permits for repairs or improvements, proof of approved septic or holding tanks, and even the use of a real estate agent when selling. These rules state that Remi Lake is a private seasonal campground “covered under the Commercial Tenancy Act” and describe the lease as a seasonal contract renewed annually at management’s discretion, with a non-transferable and non-refundable lease.
The contract specifically reserves to the park the right not to accept a new cabin owner as a tenant. When a cabin is sold, the sale attracts a $750 park “selling fee” and the park has a right of first refusal. The documentation also provides that if a cabin changes hands without written permission from the owner (L.C. Larabie), the buyer will not receive a seasonal lease and must remove the cabin by a specified date.
Shortly after the contract was signed, the respondents received invoices that set out their financial obligations. These included: a balance of 2021 lot rent identified as an increase linked to the change of ownership; a one-time park selling fee; and the 2022 seasonal lot rent, which was broken down into base rent, municipal tax administration fee, water charges, potable water testing, and estimated municipal taxes. These charges were over and above what the former owner, Bernard, had already paid for 2021. The respondents paid the invoiced sums in two instalments at the end of May 2021.
The financial obligations attached to the lot and cottage were multi-layered. The respondents were responsible not only for annual lot rent but also for municipal property taxes on their lot (collected and administered by Remi Lake for a fee), their own hydro costs, maintenance of their septic system, and year-round insurance on the cottage even though the park was formally “closed” during winter months. These obligations extended well beyond a short seasonal window.

The attempted eviction and procedural background
On June 18, 2021, shortly after the purchase and contract execution, the applicant served the respondents with an N12 “Notice to End Your Tenancy” under the Residential Tenancies Act. The N12 cited her intention to occupy the cottage herself for at least one year and set an eviction date of June 17, 2022. Despite having invoked the RTA by using the N12 form, the applicant later took the position in this application that the RTA did not in fact apply to the arrangement.
On June 22, 2021, the applicant refused to accept part of the respondents’ payments, refunding a portion and indicating that Lot 46 was not available for the 2022 season and that the respondents’ lawyer should contact her. Later written communications in July 2021, March 2022 and May 2022 advised the respondents that their contract would expire in May 2022 and that they were to remove the cottage and personal property from Lot 46 by mid-June 2022, failing which they might be liable for property taxes.
The cottage, however, remained in place on Lot 46 at the time of the hearing of this application.
The proceeding came before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to resolve a threshold question: was the lot rental and cottage arrangement governed by the RTA or the CTA? This issue was critical because, if the RTA applied, the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) would have exclusive jurisdiction over the tenancy, and the Superior Court could not determine the substantive landlord–tenant dispute.

The preliminary evidentiary issue: late affidavit evidence
Before turning to the tenancy question, the court addressed a procedural matter. After cross-examinations on affidavits had been completed, the self-represented respondents filed an additional affidavit by Cheryl Crickard in November 2024. Under the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, a party cannot file further affidavit evidence for use at a hearing after cross-examinations without consent or leave of the court.
The court applied the standard factors for permitting late affidavits: relevance; whether they respond to matters raised on cross-examination; whether admitting them would cause non-compensable prejudice; and whether the party offers a reasonable explanation for not adducing the material earlier. The new affidavit canvassed issues such as historic occupancy of the cottage and other properties at Remi Lake, the services connected to the cottage, zoning of Remi Lake and surrounding lands, and fencing at the property. It also contained some hearsay and argument, and had been drafted in a factum-like style without legal representation.
The judge found that much of the new material either was inadmissible (for example, hearsay that did not comply with affidavit rules) or could and should have been provided earlier when the respondents were represented by counsel. While admitting it would not cause irreparable prejudice, refusing leave would not significantly prejudice the respondents because most of the evidence would not be admissible in any event. Accordingly, the court declined to admit the affidavit as evidence. However, recognizing that the document functioned like a factum, the judge treated it as written argument: she was prepared to consider its legal submissions and references to evidence already properly in the record, but not any new inadmissible facts.

The legal issue: applicability of the RTA versus CTA
The main legal issue was whether Lot 46 and the cottage fell within the RTA’s regime or whether the arrangement was exempt and properly characterized as a commercial tenancy under the CTA. The CTA expressly does not apply where the RTA governs a tenancy.
The court undertook a statutory interpretation exercise grounded in the RTA. It examined the key defined terms—such as “land lease home”, “land lease community”, “rental unit” and “residential complex”—and the broad remedial purpose of the RTA, which is to protect residential tenants, including those who lease land on which they own a dwelling. The RTA is designed in part to give security of tenure and related protections to tenants occupying such premises.
The applicant relied heavily on the statutory exemption in s. 5(a) of the RTA, which excludes “living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period” in various types of resort or campground settings, including cottages, cabins, campgrounds and trailer parks. The argument was that Remi Lake is a seasonal campground catering to vacationers; the contract documents repeatedly referred to the CTA and described the leases as seasonal, non-transferable and subject to annual renewal at the park’s discretion.
The judge emphasized that parties cannot contract out of the RTA by labelling an agreement as governed by the CTA. The court, like the LTB, must look beyond the “outward form” and examine the real substance and pattern of activities associated with the property. This includes: the physical nature of the accommodation; the financial arrangements; the duration and continuity of occupation; the services and obligations assumed by the occupants; and the operator’s treatment of the property over time.

Why the cottage and Lot 46 were found to be governed by the RTA
In analyzing the Remi Lake documents and surrounding circumstances, the court drew a sharp distinction between true seasonal trailer arrangements and the cottage arrangement on Lot 46. For trailers, the rules required the units to remain on wheels, be roadworthy and easily removable, and prohibited permanent decks or structures. This design supported a model of temporary, transient camping use consistent with the s. 5(a) exemption.
By contrast, the cottage arrangement was different in kind, not just in degree. The court found that the cottage was a permanent residential-style dwelling owned by the tenants, complete with bedrooms, a kitchen, a full bathroom, running water, electricity and an attached deck. The respondents fully furnished the cottage at their own expense, were responsible for their own hydro and septic servicing, and had to insure the dwelling year-round. They were also responsible for paying municipal property taxes on the lot for the full year, with the applicant collecting and administering those taxes. These obligations were imposed in addition to the annual lot rent and related campground charges.
The judge found that such significant, ongoing financial commitments—property taxes, utilities, insurance and capital maintenance of a permanent dwelling—are inconsistent with purely transient, vacation-style occupancy. Rather than a short-term recreational stay, the arrangement was more akin to a land lease home in a land lease community, falling squarely within the RTA’s concept of a “rental unit” used as rented residential premises.
The court also examined the historic treatment of the cottage and the applicant’s own dealings with the previous owner, Bernard. Evidence showed that Bernard had been in arrears for several years but remained in occupation under repeated annual arrangements, and the applicant went so far as to assist her in reducing the property’s assessment to lower taxes. This pattern suggested a long-term, ongoing occupation rather than a strictly seasonal, vacation tenancy that could be easily non-renewed without consequence.
Further, an email from the applicant to the respondents in May 2021 warned them to read all of the private cabin rules “very carefully” before they “commit” and stressed that they could not add structures or siding because this would increase property taxes. The judge reasoned that such a warning made sense only in the context of an anticipated long-term occupancy where the purchasers were investing in a dwelling they expected to use and maintain for years—not a few months of seasonal camping. The evidence also showed that the applicant deliberately required incoming cabin buyers to prepay the following year’s rent to ensure they could meet ongoing annual obligations, again consistent with an ongoing residential-type tenancy.
The applicant argued that Remi Lake’s closure during winter months and its policy that tenants could access the park only on a pre-authorized, limited basis during that time supported the view that the accommodation was seasonal and exempt under s. 5(a). The judge rejected this as determinative. She noted that some obligations, like property taxes and insurance, continued year-round, and the contract did not absolutely prohibit off-season access, but left it to the owner’s discretion. Even if the park itself operated seasonally, the nature of the cottage and the tenants’ obligations made Lot 46 “markedly different” from the typical resort or campground accommodations contemplated in the s. 5(a) exemption.

Outcome and implications for the parties
After weighing the statutory framework, the contract documents and the evidence about how Lot 46 and the cottage were used and managed, the court held that the lot was a “rental unit” within the meaning of the RTA. The rental relationship and the associated contract were therefore governed by the RTA and not by the CTA.
Because the RTA applied, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate substantive landlord–tenant issues between the parties. Under s. 168(2) of the RTA, the Landlord and Tenant Board has exclusive authority to decide all applications and matters arising under the Act. The judge therefore concluded that any relief either party wishes to pursue in relation to the respondents’ tenancy must be sought before the LTB, not in this application.
In procedural terms, the court declined to admit the respondents’ late affidavit as evidence but did consider it as written argument. The judge noted that there was already an outstanding costs order from a December 6, 2024 endorsement in a parallel proceeding, and that the costs of this particular application remained to be determined. She directed the parties to arrange a Rule 50.13 conference with her to settle next steps and returned the matter to the civil assignment court list to ensure scheduling oversight.
In this decision, the successful party on the main issue is the respondents, Cheryl Crickard and Luc Bellemare, because the court accepted their position that the Residential Tenancies Act applies and that the dispute belongs before the Landlord and Tenant Board rather than under the Commercial Tenancies Act. However, the reasons do not specify any dollar amount of damages, compensation or costs awarded in their favour, and the total monetary award or costs ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from this decision.