Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The appeal concerns a GST assessment dated June 9, 2014 under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, showing a balance due of $15,773.97 and covering 18 reporting periods from February 1, 2010 to October 31, 2011.

• The appellant previously appealed this same assessment in Court file 2016-18(GST)I, then filed a notice of discontinuance on July 4, 2019; the Registry processed the discontinuance under subsection 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act and the case was closed.

• Evidence before the Court showed that the Agency did not issue any assessment to the appellant under the Act after June 9, 2014; on May 4, 2020 it only sent a statement of account showing amounts due arising from the assessment for periods between January 1, 2010 and October 31, 2011, and this statement of account is not an assessment or reassessment.

• Applying subsection 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act and the case law cited (including Scarola), the Court held that the notice of discontinuance was equivalent to a dismissal, so the earlier appeal from the assessment had already been dismissed and the appellant could not appeal the same assessment again; the respondent argued there was res judicata concerning the assessment.

• The appellant did not file written submissions as required by the Court’s November 5, 2025 order setting a peremptory January 12, 2026 deadline, and a management conference on November 4, 2025 had already proceeded in her absence; the motion was therefore decided on the written record and the respondent’s written observations only.

• The Court granted the respondent’s request, ordered that the appeal be cancelled, and did so without costs.

Background and facts of the case

Angélique Bouchard is the appellant and His Majesty the King is the respondent in Tax Court of Canada file 2025-621(GST)I. A request by way of written observations was submitted in Ottawa, Ontario, before the Honourable Judge Dominique Lafleur. The appellant did not appear, and the respondent was represented by Ms. Camille Bugel.

On June 9, 2014, the Quebec Revenue Agency (the “Agency”), on behalf of the Minister of National Revenue, assessed the appellant under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act (the “Act”) concerning the goods and services tax and sent a notice of assessment bearing the same date (the “Assessment”). The Assessment indicated a balance due of $15,773.97, consisting of a net tax calculation adjustment of $11,643.37, interest of $2,263.18, penalties of $1.50 and a prior balance of $1,865.92.

The Assessment covered 18 reporting periods (the “Reporting Periods”): from February 1, 2010 to February 28, 2010; March 1, 2010 to March 31, 2010; May 1, 2010 to May 31, 2010; June 1, 2010 to June 30, 2010; August 1, 2010 to August 31, 2010; October 1, 2010 to October 31, 2010; November 1, 2010 to November 30, 2010; December 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010; January 1, 2011 to January 31, 2011; February 1, 2011 to February 28, 2011; March 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011; April 1, 2011 to April 30, 2011; May 1, 2011 to May 31, 2011; June 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011; July 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011; August 1, 2011 to August 31, 2011; September 1, 2011 to September 30, 2011; and October 1, 2011 to October 31, 2011.

On September 14, 2015, after having opposed the Assessment, the appellant filed an appeal to the Court against the Assessment. That appeal became Court file 2016-18(GST)I. On July 4, 2019, the appellant filed a notice of discontinuance with the Court in that file. The respondent consented to the filing of the notice of discontinuance, without costs. The Registry processed the discontinuance in accordance with subsection 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act (the “TCC Act”) and the case was subsequently closed.

On May 4, 2020, at the appellant’s request, the Agency sent a statement of account showing the amounts due arising from the Assessment for reporting periods between January 1, 2010 and October 31, 2011. The evidence before the Court included an affidavit dated March 6, 2026 stating that the Agency did not issue an assessment to the appellant under the Act after issuing the June 9, 2014 Assessment, and that on May 4, 2020 the Agency only provided a statement of account.

On March 12, 2025, the appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court under the informal procedure concerning an assessment made under Part IX of the Act, the notice of which was allegedly issued on December 20, 2024, for the year 2020. The Court opened the present file, 2025-621(GST)I, and the respondent’s application was filed in that file.

Procedural history and the respondent’s motion

The respondent filed a motion (the “application”), notice of which was filed with the Court on June 13, 2025. In that application the respondent sought a judgment quashing, with costs, the present appeal brought by the appellant under the Act on the ground that the appellant had discontinued its previous appeal in respect of the same Assessment (file 2016-18(GST)I). In the alternative, the respondent sought an order permitting it to file the response to the notice of appeal within 60 days from the date of the order.

A management conference concerning the present appeal was held on November 4, 2025, in the absence of the appellant, even though the appellant had been duly notified of the conference. According to the Court order dated November 5, 2025, the appellant had until January 12, 2026 to serve the respondent and file written observations with the Court regarding the application, and this deadline was described as peremptory.

The appellant failed to file written observations within the prescribed time limit. As a result, the Court considered the application on the basis of the respondent’s written representations in the record, without an appearance by the parties. The reasons specify that any legislative provision referred to is a provision of the Act, unless otherwise stated.

Key legal framework and policy concepts

The Court’s analysis refers to subsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act and to case law on the effect of discontinuance and on the nature of an assessment. Article 16.2 of the TCC Act, as quoted in the reasons, provides that a party that has commenced proceedings before the Court may withdraw them at any time by written notice, and that such a discontinuance is equivalent to dismissal of the proceedings in question as of the date the Court receives the notice of discontinuance.

The respondent relied on this provision to argue that, because the appellant had withdrawn the appeal of the Assessment by filing a notice of discontinuance on July 4, 2019, subsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act applied. The respondent submitted that, by application of subsection 16.2(2), the appellant’s earlier appeal against the Assessment had already been dismissed, so the appellant could not appeal again to the Court against the same Assessment, given that a statement of account is not an assessment. The respondent argued that there was therefore res judicata concerning the Assessment, and that the present appeal must be cancelled.

The Court’s reasons also cite Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) v. De Stefano, 1993 CanLII 3934 (QC CA), stating that an assessment is “the examination of the taxpayer’s tax return and the determination of the corresponding tax, interest and penalties, as well as the amount of certain refunds.” The Court cites The Queen v. Interior Savings Credit Union, 2007 FCA 151, to describe what constitutes an assessment under the Income Tax Act, noting that the same principle applies in this case.

In addition, the Court refers to Canada (Attorney General) v. Scarola, 2003 FCA 157. The cited passage explains that, pursuant to subsection 16.2, a discontinuance constitutes a dismissal, that the appeal that is dismissed is an appeal on which a decision has been made and no longer exists, and that subsection 16.2(2) makes the filing of a notice of discontinuance a dismissal by interpretation analogous to an actual dismissal. The Court notes that, in Scarola, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the rule in section 172 of the Rules of the Tax Court of Canada (General Procedure) (the “Rules”), which allows the Court to set aside or vary judgments when the stated conditions are met, is also applicable to final judgments arising from subsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act.

Article 172 of the Rules is reproduced in the reasons. It provides that a judgment containing an error resulting from a slip or omission or that must be amended in relation to a question on which the Court has not ruled may be modified by the Court, and that, on application, a party may request the annulment or modification of a judgment due to fraud or facts that occurred or were discovered after it was rendered, a stay of execution of a judgment, or a remedy different from that which has already been granted.

The reasons also quote a passage (paragraph [15]) explaining that, under subsection 152(1) of the Income Tax Act, the Minister fixes the tax for the year and any interest and penalties payable, and that the taxpayer’s right to object to an assessment (subsection 165(1)) and to appeal to the Tax Court of Canada (subsection 169(1)) can only be exercised “for the purpose of canceling or altering the assessment.” The cited passage states that, unless the taxpayer is contesting the tax, interest and penalties fixed for the year, there is no appeal and no remedy available to the Tax Court.

Analysis and application to Ms. Bouchard’s appeal

The Court found that the evidence showed the Agency did not reassess after June 9, 2014 under the Act concerning the same Reporting Periods. The evidence also showed that no assessment was issued by the Agency on May 4, 2020. On that date, the Agency only sent a statement of account showing the amounts owed by the appellant under the Act. The reasons state that a statement of account does not constitute a reassessment because it does not result from a new review by the Minister of the return filed by the appellant and the determination of the corresponding tax amount.

The Court concluded that the Assessment that gave rise to the statement of account sent on May 4, 2020 cannot be appealed again, since the appellant withdrew the appeal of the Assessment on July 4, 2019. Under subsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act, withdrawal is equivalent to dismissal of the appeal.

Relying on Scarola, the Court emphasized that the dismissal provided for in subsection 16.2(2) of the TCC Act is final and equivalent to a judgment dismissing an appeal brought by a taxpayer. The reasons explain that a discontinuance, as a result of this provision, acquires all the attributes of a dismissal and has the same effect as a judgment by which the Court dismisses the appeal, and that in either case the Court’s powers are exhausted and the adjudicator is divested of jurisdiction, subject only to certain circumstances such as fraud or a power provided by law authorizing the decision-maker to retain or regain the lost power.

The Court then considered whether section 172 of the Rules could apply. It concluded that, in this case, the Court could not find that there had been fraud or that there had been facts which occurred or were discovered after the final judgment resulting from the filing of the notice of discontinuance by the appellant on July 4, 2019.

Because the filing of the notice of discontinuance on July 4, 2019 resulted in the Court being divested of jurisdiction over the Assessment appeal, the Court held that the appellant could not file a second appeal against the Assessment, since that appeal had already been dismissed.

Ruling and overall outcome

Judge Lafleur granted the respondent’s request and cancelled the appeal. The formal judgment provides that:

1. The request is granted and the appeal is cancelled;

2. All at no cost.

The reasons reiterate that, for these reasons, the request is granted, without costs, and the appeal is cancelled. The judgment is dated March 12, 2026, and references 2026 CCI 48, Court file number 2025-621(GST)I, under the style of cause ANGÉLIQUE BOUCHARD v. HIS MAJESTY THE KING.