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Background and factual context
Dr. Nicole Tenn-Lyn was a physician with privileges to practice in the emergency department at Trillium Health Partners (Trillium) from July 2006. Her initial and subsequent reappointments were made under Trillium’s Professional Staff By-Law and section 36 of Ontario’s Public Hospitals Act (PHA), which empowers hospital boards to appoint physicians, attach hospital privileges, and revoke, suspend, or refuse to reappoint members of the medical staff. Over time, Trillium began receiving what it described as a “significant volume of” complaints about Dr. Tenn-Lyn’s ability to work with others in a cooperative and professional manner. These complaints concerned her interactions with colleagues, patients, and families, and were later catalogued in detail in the decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB). In March 2016, relying on its authority under section 36 of the PHA, Trillium decided not to reappoint Dr. Tenn-Lyn and to suspend her existing privileges. This decision led to multiple internal and external proceedings, all of which ultimately went against her.
Hospital proceedings and HPARB decision
Following the initial decision not to reappoint, the matter was brought before Trillium’s Medical Advisory Committee (MAC). In September 2016, the MAC heard presentations from Dr. Dante Morra (then Chief of Staff) and Dr. Eric Letovsky (then Chief and Medical Director of the Emergency Department). Dr. Morra moved that the MAC recommend that Dr. Tenn-Lyn not be approved for reappointment for the next year and that her privileges be suspended for the remainder of the current year. The MAC adopted those recommendations, issuing reasons that referred to her “propensity to be untruthful,” lack of insight into fundamental problems with how she conducted herself, and “overwhelming evidence” of a persistent inability to act with integrity, professionalism, courtesy and self-awareness. Dr. Tenn-Lyn then exercised her statutory right to a hearing before a panel of Trillium’s board of directors under sections 37(6) and (7) of the PHA and the hospital by-laws. In March 2017, the board accepted the MAC’s recommendations, finding that she showed “no trend toward improvement,” had “consistently” failed to meet Trillium’s Code of Conduct and policies, and exhibited “clear evidence of a pattern of inappropriate behaviour” marked by serious communication failures. The board rejected her assertion that Trillium had failed to corroborate allegations and her position that she maintained mostly respectful relationships with colleagues.
Pursuant to section 41 of the PHA, Dr. Tenn-Lyn appealed the board’s decision to HPARB. HPARB held a 12-day de novo hearing in October 2017 and May 2018. At HPARB, she advanced broad allegations: that Trillium had a pattern of unfairly handling complaints against her; that complaints had been fabricated or solicited by a small group of nurses; that her own complaints of bullying and harassment were ignored; and that the emergency department was a high-stress and sometimes toxic workplace. She also alleged that physician administrator Dr. Edward (Ted) Everson had verbally and physically abused and threatened her years earlier at another hospital (University Health Network), and that this history coloured how complaints about her were handled at Trillium.
In February 2020, HPARB dismissed her appeal. It confirmed Trillium’s decision to refuse reappointment and to suspend her privileges, citing three core findings: (1) she failed to meet the criteria for reappointment because she could not communicate, work with, and relate to colleagues, patients, and families in a cooperative and professional manner as required by the hospital’s Code of Conduct, by-laws, and policies; (2) her inability to collaborate with emergency department staff created a risk to patient safety and delivery of care; and (3) she demonstrated a failure to improve despite coaching and multiple interventions. HPARB observed that she gave contradictory evidence about key meetings, accepted administration evidence that there had been many unsuccessful attempts to help her improve, and concluded that her behaviour undermined teamwork and jeopardized patient care. It expressly preferred Dr. Everson’s evidence to her account regarding the alleged harassment and threats, finding that the alleged incidents did not occur.
Divisional Court appeal and closure of the statutory process
Dr. Tenn-Lyn then exercised her right of appeal to the Divisional Court under sections 43(1) and 43(3) of the PHA. The appeal was heard in November 2021 and decided in November 2022. The Divisional Court dismissed her appeal in detailed reasons, holding that HPARB’s findings were supported by “overwhelming evidence” that she had serious professionalism issues in her workplace relations, that her conduct was “seriously disruptive to the workplace,” and that her strategy of asserting that colleagues were lying and superiors were acting in reprisal was a “failing strategy.” The Court also rejected her reprisal theory regarding Dr. Everson, upholding HPARB’s rejection of her allegations. After this loss, she did not seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the PHA process came to an end, leaving the HPARB and Divisional Court determinations final.
The civil action and causes of action asserted
While the PHA proceedings were underway, Dr. Tenn-Lyn commenced this parallel civil action. She issued a Notice of Action in August 2018 (after the HPARB hearing but before HPARB’s decision), followed by a Statement of Claim in October 2018 and an Amended Statement of Claim in April 2024, to which Trillium consented without prejudice to its right to move to strike. In this civil suit, she sued Trillium and three physician administrators—Drs. Everson, Letovsky and Morra—over how complaints and issues were investigated and managed, how her suspension and non-reappointment were handled, and whether Trillium breached its express and implied contractual obligations arising from her medical staff appointment.
The pleaded causes of action were wide-ranging. She alleged bad faith in contractual performance, asserting that the defendants acted in bad faith in investigating and deciding complaints, manufactured or solicited “unfounded and false” complaints, and created inaccurate, unwarranted reasons to justify suspending and not renewing her privileges. She claimed breach of contract, contending that Trillium failed to train staff adequately in its policies, failed to ensure compliance, failed to provide unbiased investigations free from conflict, and allowed the MAC and board to rely on inaccurate information to cause her to lose privileges. She advanced a negligence claim based on similar factual allegations, including alleged failures in oversight, supervision, and complaint handling by the individual physician administrators. She also pleaded conspiracy, asserting that the individual defendants agreed and conspired to injure her professional reputation and livelihood by orchestrating her loss of privileges through intentionally flawed investigations and failure to raise or investigate her own complaints. Finally, she alleged discrimination based on race and gender contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, saying she was singled out, treated more harshly, and denied fair investigation of her bullying and harassment complaints.
Her damages claim was substantial. She sought $10 million for breach of contract, honest contractual performance, negligence, and conspiracy, $1 million in aggravated and/or punitive damages, $1 million for mental suffering, and $1 million for breach of the Human Rights Code. She alleged loss of past and future income, loss of opportunities, emotional and mental distress, and reputational damage, stating that the loss of privileges significantly restricted and reduced her medical practice and irreparably harmed her career and reputation.
New factual elements: workplace reports and systemic concerns
The Amended Statement of Claim introduced new factual allegations not in the original pleading. Among them was the assertion that the individual defendants knew of and participated in widespread bullying, disruptive and exclusionary behaviour, and inconsistent rule enforcement in the emergency department, and that they withheld this information from investigators.
Two external reports featured prominently. First, an environmental scan and report by Anne Grant, retained by Trillium to examine workplace concerns among unit coordination assistants (non-clinicians) in the emergency department. According to the pleading, that report identified significant workplace issues: an extremely negative atmosphere, malicious gossip, exclusionary and disrespectful behaviour, bullying and disruptive conduct. Dr. Tenn-Lyn alleged that Trillium actively kept Ms. Grant’s findings confidential and did not share them with investigators or decision-makers, thereby concealing relevant context about the work environment.
Second, the pleading referred to an inspection report by Dr. Jeffrey Turnbull, appointed by the Ministry of Health under section 18 of the PHA. His inspection followed joint letters from groups of Trillium physicians in late 2021 and mid-2022 complaining of administrative abuse of power, harassment and intimidation, interference with investigations, toxic culture, lack of transparent investigations, and alleged misuse of privileges processes, including threats of CPSO reporting and public shaming. Dr. Turnbull’s report, delivered in fall 2022 and released in early 2023, recommended, among other things, searches to replace Drs. Morra and Letovsky, measures to raise quality-of-care concerns without fear of retaliation, formal culture-and-morale assessments, and review of the Professional Staff Code of Conduct and policies. However, his ability to make findings was limited because he obtained inadequate information: concerned physicians declined to speak due to fear of retaliation, and the report ultimately made no concrete findings on specific allegations, including none about Dr. Tenn-Lyn.
Key legal framework: abuse of process and the PHA as a complete code
The defendants brought a motion under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to permanently stay or dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. Their core argument was that the civil claims were a collateral attack on the final outcome of the PHA privileging process. They contended that the issues in the civil action had been, or could have been, fully raised and litigated before the MAC, the hospital board, HPARB, and the Divisional Court, and that allowing the civil action to proceed would improperly relitigate matters already decided.
Justice Parghi reviewed the doctrine of abuse of process as a flexible tool to prevent proceedings that are unfair to the point of offending the interests of justice, grounded in principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. The doctrine is broader than formal issue estoppel or res judicata and can apply not only when the same issues were actually decided in an earlier proceeding, but also when they could and should have been raised there. Relitigation may be exceptionally permitted where the earlier process is tainted by fraud or dishonesty, or where fresh, previously unavailable evidence conclusively impeaches the original result, or fairness otherwise demands a new hearing.
A central plank of the analysis was prior case law treating the PHA process as a “complete code” for physician privilege disputes. Drawing on decisions such as Talwar v. Grand River Hospital and Beiko v. Hotel Dieu Hospital, Justice Parghi noted that HPARB’s jurisdiction over appeals from privileging decisions, and the subsequent statutory right of appeal to the Divisional Court, form a comprehensive regime. Courts have consistently held that civil claims which amount to collateral attacks on HPARB decisions are barred by issue estoppel and/or abuse of process, especially where HPARB has upheld a hospital’s decision not to renew or to revoke privileges. Conversely, where HPARB or the courts ultimately rule in favour of the physician, damages claims in civil court may be viable, because the privileging issue has been resolved in the physician’s favour. Here, however, every stage had gone against Dr. Tenn-Lyn.
Application of abuse of process to the pleaded claims
Justice Parghi concluded that the Amended Statement of Claim was an improper attempt to relitigate HPARB’s decision and the Divisional Court’s affirmance. The entire factual and legal thrust of the claim was inextricably tied to Trillium’s decision to suspend and not renew her privileges and the handling of complaints underpinning that decision. Her own damages pleading confirmed this link, as she directly tied her alleged losses to the loss of hospital privileges. Those are precisely the matters fully canvassed and decided in the PHA proceedings, including in a lengthy de novo HPARB hearing.
On a more granular level, the court found that the core allegations in the Amended Statement of Claim either had already been advanced and rejected in the PHA process or could and should have been raised there. Allegations that Trillium fabricated or solicited false complaints, that administrators and nurses acted in bad faith, and that investigations were biased and flawed were addressed by HPARB when it evaluated the complaints’ credibility, the hospital’s conduct, and the fairness of its internal processes. HPARB found “overwhelming evidence” of a significant volume of complaints demonstrating her inability to work cooperatively and professionally and preferred the evidence of hospital administrators about their dealings with her and the steps taken to help her improve.
Similarly, complaints that her bullying and harassment concerns about particular nurses were ignored were raised with HPARB, which by upholding Trillium’s decision effectively rejected those claims and vindicated Trillium’s stance. Allegations of threats and pressure related to filing a complaint against Dr. Everson and improper investigation of the 2008 incidents had also been canvassed before HPARB, which expressly preferred Dr. Everson’s account and found that the alleged harassment incidents did not occur; the Divisional Court upheld these findings on appeal.
The court further held that complaints about the qualifications and good faith of third-party investigators retained by Trillium, and about allegedly inaccurate information provided to them, fell within the continuum of events culminating in the privileging decision and thus should have been raised fully in the PHA process. Dr. Tenn-Lyn in fact made submissions regarding those investigations at HPARB; she could have pursued any critiques of the investigators’ competency and impartiality there. Allowing such issues to be re-opened in civil court would undermine the finality of HPARB’s determinations.
On the discrimination claim, the court emphasized that there is no free-standing common law tort of discrimination. Human Rights Code allegations can only be pursued if tethered to a viable underlying cause of action properly before the court. Because all of the plaintiff’s substantive claims were barred as an abuse of process, the discrimination count could not survive on its own. Moreover, HPARB and the Divisional Court had already rejected her broader narrative that she was treated unfairly and suffered reprisal; to the extent the discrimination claim rested on the same narrative, it was likewise a relitigation attempt.
Treatment of later workplace reports and alleged fresh evidence
Dr. Tenn-Lyn argued that the Grant and Turnbull reports constituted new evidence that justified an exception to the presumption against relitigation, invoking Supreme Court of Canada guidance that fresh, previously unavailable evidence which conclusively impeaches earlier results can make relitigation necessary to preserve the credibility of the adjudicative process. Justice Parghi rejected this contention.
The Grant report arose from a workplace environmental scan focused on unit coordination assistants in the emergency department—non-clinical staff. While some participants commented about the broader emergency team, the scan was not by, for, or about physicians and made no findings about Dr. Tenn-Lyn or specific incidents involving her. The report identified general cultural issues, such as negative atmosphere and problematic behaviours, but it did not address the physician-specific interactions at the heart of the privileging dispute. The factual matrix of the PHA proceedings and of the civil claim, by contrast, centred on Dr. Tenn-Lyn’s own conduct, the numerous complaints against her, and Trillium’s responses. The court noted that, in any event, workplace culture issues had already been raised by her in the PHA proceedings, where she argued she was being bullied, harassed, and subjected to reprisals within a toxic environment. HPARB and the Divisional Court did not accept those arguments, and the Grant report, even accepting its findings at face value, did not alter the core matrix or directly undercut the specific conclusions about her conduct.
As for the Turnbull inspection report, the court emphasized its temporal and substantive distance from the privileging dispute. The inspection occurred more than five years after she left Trillium and was based on complaints by unnamed physicians about administration and systemic issues. Dr. Turnbull was unable to substantiate the allegations due to lack of cooperation from fearful physicians and, accordingly, did not make findings about any specific individuals, including Dr. Tenn-Lyn. The report mainly offered forward-looking recommendations on governance, culture, and process. At most, it suggested that some unnamed physicians shared concerns similar to those she had previously raised regarding administration and procedural fairness, but those concerns had already been fully argued and rejected in the PHA proceedings and were not substantiated by Turnbull. The report therefore did not change the underlying factual matrix or impeach the earlier results in the way required to justify relitigation.
Systemic and procedural considerations
Justice Parghi also underlined practical and systemic concerns. A trial of the civil action would largely replicate the PHA record: the same documents, the same witnesses, and the same issues about conduct, professionalism, and workplace interactions. This duplication would consume significant time and resources and risk inconsistent findings, undermining confidence in the adjudicative system. Given that the PHA provides a comprehensive and specialized mechanism for resolving physician privileging disputes—including multi-stage internal review, a specialist tribunal (HPARB), and judicial oversight by the Divisional Court—allowing a losing party to rerun the dispute in civil court would erode the integrity of that regime.
In this light, the court found that the PHA process had run its course, with determinations consistently unfavourable to Dr. Tenn-Lyn. She was bound by those results. To permit a collateral civil attack premised on the same relationships, facts, and subject matter—merely repackaged as contract, tort, and human rights claims—would be contrary to the integrity of the law and the legislative scheme.
Outcome, successful party, and monetary consequences
In the result, Justice Parghi granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the action as an abuse of process under rule 21.01(3)(d). Having determined that the civil proceeding could not be used to relitigate matters already decided under the PHA framework, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether the action was vexatious or to rule on the alternative relief sought under rules 25.11(b) and (c). The successful parties in this decision are Trillium Health Partners and the individual physician defendants, whose position that the civil action should be barred prevailed entirely. On monetary consequences, the court did not make any determination of damages in favour of Dr. Tenn-Lyn; her substantial damages claim was effectively extinguished when the action was dismissed. With respect to costs, the court did not fix a specific amount in this endorsement, instead directing the parties to attempt to agree within 30 days and reserving the possibility of brief written submissions if they could not do so. As a result, no concrete, quantifiable monetary award or costs figure in favour of the defendants can be determined from this decision.
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Superior Court of Justice - OntarioCase Number
CV-18-00604404-0000Practice Area
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Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
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