Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Characterization of Argus’s third-party claim against Maersk as a true recourse action (recours récursoire) falling within article III(6 bis) of the Hague-Visby Rules.
• Determination that Canadian maritime law and the Marine Liability Act (Loi sur la responsabilité en matière maritime – L.R.M.M.), including the Hague-Visby Rules, govern prescription and liability for the missing cargo seal.
• Application of the one-year limitation period under article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, and the extent to which this deadline can be exceeded for recourse actions.
• Assessment of whether Part 2 of the L.R.M.M. establishes solidarity and contribution rights between successive or combined carriers such as Argus (road) and Maersk (sea).
• Evaluation of Maersk’s argument that the Hague-Visby regime is a complete code that excludes solidarity and any legal link between separate carriers under distinct contracts.
• Consideration of whether the alleged loss (destruction of cargo due to a missing regulatory seal) constitutes a single damage event or distinct damages attributable separately to Maersk and Argus.

Background and facts of the dispute

Consco Foods Inc. imported marrow bones from CEMO GmbH in the Netherlands and arranged for the goods to be carried to Montreal. Together, Consco and CEMO retained Maersk A/S to perform the maritime leg of the journey, transporting the container by sea from the Netherlands to the Port of Montreal under a bill of lading (connaissement). For the inland segment, Consco hired Argus Transport Canada Inc. to move the container by road from the Port of Montreal to Consco’s inspection facility in Montreal. The dispute arises out of the handling of the container seal and the regulatory implications of its apparent absence upon delivery. On 2 October 2023, Argus took possession of the container at the port and delivered it to Consco’s facility. Upon arrival, Consco observed that the regulatory seal required for the container was missing. According to Consco, the absence of this seal meant that, under applicable regulatory requirements, it could not distribute or sell the imported marrow bones. Consequently, Consco destroyed the goods over several days in early November 2023, treating the entire shipment as unsaleable as a direct result of the missing seal.

Initial claim by Consco against Argus

On 10 April 2024, Consco commenced proceedings against Argus, seeking damages for the loss of the consignment and its associated lost profit. Consco alleged that Argus committed a civil fault by failing to verify the presence of the regulatory seal before taking custody of the container at the Port of Montreal, contrary to what Consco characterized as the standard practice in the transportation industry. The core of Consco’s claim was that Argus should not have accepted the container, or should have detected and reported the missing seal, and that its failure to do so led directly to the regulatory prohibition on sale and the subsequent destruction of the goods. At this point, Consco’s action was directed solely against Argus in its capacity as the inland carrier, with no direct claim yet advanced against Maersk in the Quebec proceedings.

Argus’s forced intervention and recourse claim against Maersk

On 24 March 2025, Argus brought Maersk into the litigation through a declaration of forced intervention (intervention forcée) and an appeal in warranty, effectively seeking recourse in contribution or indemnity. Argus alleged that the seal was already missing when the container was discharged from Maersk’s vessel at the Port of Montreal. On that basis, Argus asserted that the loss must have occurred while the container remained in the custody and control of Maersk during the maritime leg. If Consco’s damages were caused by the missing seal, Argus maintained that Maersk, as ocean carrier, should ultimately bear full responsibility for the loss. The intervention in warranty thus sought to shift liability, in whole or in part, from Argus to Maersk, treating Maersk as the true party responsible for the condition of the cargo upon discharge and delivery at the port.

Maersk’s prescription objection based on the Hague-Visby Rules

Maersk responded by applying to have Argus’s intervention dismissed as prescribed. Relying on article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, as incorporated into Canadian law through the Marine Liability Act (L.R.M.M.), Maersk argued that any action based on loss or damage to cargo shipped by sea must be brought within one year of delivery or the date when the goods should have been delivered. As the container had been delivered on 2 October 2023, Maersk contended that the one-year limitation expired on 2 October 2024. Argus’s claim, filed on 24 March 2025, fell outside that window and, in Maersk’s view, was therefore time-barred. Maersk further asserted that the Hague-Visby Rules operate as a comprehensive and uniform code for cargo claims, leaving no room to import domestic concepts such as solidarity or recourse between successive or combined carriers. In Maersk’s analysis, it was bound to Consco under the bill of lading for sea carriage, while Argus was bound to Consco under a separate road-transport contract. Other than involving the same cargo, these were two distinct contracts, and there was no legal bond between Maersk and Argus that could support a recourse claim in warranty.

Characterization of the applicable legal framework

The Court began by confirming that Canadian maritime law governs the dispute, given that the damage alleged relates to a container shipped by sea under a bill of lading from the Netherlands to Montreal and the condition of cargo upon discharge from a vessel. The Federal Courts Act recognizes that claims for loss or damage to goods carried by sea under a bill of lading fall within Canadian maritime law, and the Constitution assigns navigation and shipping to federal legislative competence. The Marine Liability Act, in turn, incorporates the Hague-Visby Rules as having force of law in Canada for international carriage of goods by water between contracting states, a category that includes the Netherlands-to-Canada voyage. Under article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier and the ship are generally discharged from all liability unless suit is brought within one year of actual or scheduled delivery of the goods. However, the Court noted that article III(6 bis) expressly addresses recourse actions, providing that such actions may be brought even after expiry of the one-year period, so long as they are filed within the time determined by the law of the forum and subject to a minimum of three months from the date the recourse claimant paid the underlying claim or was served with process. In addition, the Court emphasized that Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act introduces a modern statutory regime for allocation of liability in Canadian maritime law. That regime sets out rules on proportionate fault, solidarity, and recourse among multiple parties whose fault contributes to a maritime loss, and is much broader than the earlier, more limited collision provisions in the former Canada Shipping Act.

Solidarity, recourse and the role of Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act

Against Maersk’s contention that the Hague-Visby Rules are a complete code that excludes solidarity and recourse between carriers, the Court examined how the Rules interact with Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act. The Rules, while originally designed to promote uniformity, are silent on certain issues such as how liability is shared among successive or combined carriers, and whether solidarity or contribution rights exist between them. This silence has led commentators and courts to rely on domestic law to address questions of inter-carrier recourse. The Court referred to academic commentary characterizing the Rules as a minimum framework of liability from which parties may not contractually derogate to lessen the carrier’s obligations, but to which additional protections and structures may be added by domestic legislation. The Marine Liability Act, adopted in 2001, fills precisely such a gap. Part 2 applies broadly to claims under Canadian maritime law and “any other rule of law in Canada” related to navigation and shipping. It establishes that, where loss is attributable to the fault or negligence of two or more persons or ships, each is liable in proportion to their fault, and—subject to specified exceptions—those at fault are solidarily liable to the party suffering the loss, with rights of compensation among themselves in proportion to their fault. It further provides that a party entitled to contribution or indemnity may bring the other responsible parties into any proceeding before a competent court or tribunal, and that this recourse is itself subject to a separate prescription period of one year running from the date of judgment or settlement, and cannot be dismissed for failure to comply with a limitation period or time-bar. The Court concluded that this Part 2 recourse mechanism is a statutory recourse action in Canadian maritime law, with all the attributes of a contribution claim, and that it must prevail over provincial civil law rules in situations squarely governed by federal maritime legislation.

Qualification of Argus’s claim as a recourse action

The central issue then became whether Argus’s forced intervention against Maersk truly constituted a “recourse action” within the meaning of article III(6 bis) of the Hague-Visby Rules and Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act. The Court held that it did. Even assuming, as it must at this preliminary stage, that the allegations in Argus’s pleading are true, Argus’s claim is essentially that Maersk’s fault during the maritime leg—allowing the regulatory seal to be lost while the container remained in its custody—caused the same damage for which Consco is suing Argus. The nature of the loss alleged is a single commercial harm: the value of the destroyed marrow bones and the profit Consco could not earn because the product could not be marketed without a proper seal. The Court rejected Maersk’s suggestion that these were “distinct damages” attributable to separate events. If the missing seal is the cause of loss, and that loss crystalized when Consco was forced to destroy the cargo, then the injury is, in substance, the same whether imputed to Maersk, Argus, or both. On that basis, the Court found that Argus’s third-party claim has all the hallmarks of a recourse action: it is directed at a party whose alleged fault underlies the same loss at issue in the main action, seeks contribution or indemnity rather than an independent damage award, and is recognized and structured by Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act.

Interaction of limitation periods and timing of the recourse claim

Having characterized Argus’s intervention as a recourse action, the Court turned to prescription. It agreed that, for a direct action against Maersk by a cargo interest such as Consco, the standard one-year period under article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules would apply, starting from the date of delivery—2 October 2023—and expiring 2 October 2024. If Argus’s claim were treated as a direct cargo claim, it would indeed be prescribed. However, because article III(6 bis) expressly permits recourse actions to be brought beyond that one-year window, provided they comply with the law of the forum and a minimum three-month buffer, the applicable limitation for Argus’s recourse is instead found in Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act. Under that statute, the one-year period for contribution or indemnity begins not at delivery of the goods, but at the date of the judgment in the main proceedings or the date of a settlement (transaction). As no judgment has yet been rendered in Consco’s principal action against Argus, the recourse prescription period has not even begun to run. Moreover, the statute specifies that contribution claims cannot be dismissed for non-compliance with a prescription or time-bar, reinforcing the idea that the recourse mechanism is protected from the primary carriage limitation rules in order to preserve fair allocation of liability between jointly responsible maritime actors. Considering that Argus filed its intervention in March 2025, before any judgment on the main action, the Court characterized the recourse as “anticipatory” and clearly timely under the federal maritime prescription regime.

Outcome and implications of the ruling

On the basis of this analysis, the Court held that Canadian maritime law applies, that the Hague-Visby Rules, as implemented through the Marine Liability Act, impose a one-year limitation for direct cargo claims but expressly allow recourse actions to be governed by the domestic law of the forum, and that Part 2 of the Marine Liability Act provides a comprehensive statutory framework for solidarity, fault apportionment, and recourse among multiple parties at fault. The Court concluded that Argus’s intervention in warranty against Maersk is a valid recourse action under this regime and is not prescribed, as it was filed before any judgment or settlement in the principal proceeding and falls within the anticipated timing contemplated by the statute. The motion by Maersk A/S seeking dismissal of the forced intervention and recourse claim was therefore rejected, with costs, ensuring that Argus may continue to pursue contribution or full indemnity from Maersk at trial if Consco succeeds in its action. As this judgment deals solely with the procedural viability of the recourse claim and not with the merits or quantum of Consco’s damages, there is no determination of the total monetary award or damages at this stage; the only financial direction in the judgment is that Maersk’s motion is dismissed with judicial costs in favour of Argus, but the exact amount of such costs and any eventual damages award to Consco cannot be determined from this decision.