Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Default judgment was granted because Mr. Daniel Francis MacNeil did not file a defence after valid service of the amended statement of claim and expiry of the time to defend.

• Ownership of the fishing vessel Hydra Mariner by Mr. MacNeil at all relevant times was supported by Transport Canada registry transcripts and his own acknowledgment.

• The Canadian Coast Guard’s claim for costs of cleanup and containment of oil discharged from the Hydra Mariner led to payment by the Administrator in the amount of $1,642,100.96, including statutory interest.

• The Administrator relied on statutory subrogation under paragraph 106(3)(c) of the Marine Liability Act after compensating the Coast Guard, and on shipowner liability provisions in section 77 of the Act.

• Statutory interest under section 116 of the Marine Liability Act was used both in calculating the amount paid to the Coast Guard and in computing additional interest of $38,692.78 plus a daily rate of $183.55.

• The court remarked on the puzzling reliance on sister-ship in rem jurisdiction under subsection 43(8) of the Federal Courts Act in circumstances where the ship Charlotte A. Finn had not been served, but the motion and judgment were directed only against Mr. MacNeil.

Facts of the case
The judgment concerns an admiralty action in rem and in personam in the Federal Court, docket T-101-24, heard in Ottawa, Ontario, with reasons and judgment dated March 20, 2026, by the Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan. The plaintiff is the Administrator of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund, and the defendants are “The Owners and All Those Interested in the Ship Charlotte A. Finn” and Mr. Daniel Francis MacNeil. The motion before the court was a motion in writing for default judgment against Mr. MacNeil, brought under Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules.
The Administrator received a claim from the Canadian Coast Guard on January 5, 2023. The Coast Guard sought recovery of expenses relating to the clean-up and containment of oil discharged from the fishing vessel Hydra Mariner at Wright’s Cove, Nova Scotia. The discharge occurred on or about January 17, 2021. The claim was submitted under section 103 of the Marine Liability Act in the initial amount of $2,543,803.16. The Administrator is appointed pursuant to section 91 of the Marine Liability Act and administers the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund, including the power to sue to recover claims that are paid by the Fund in respect of oil pollution.
An affidavit from Mr. Ryan Gauvin, a lawyer employed by the Administrator, set out the history of the action and attached exhibits, including a report detailing the work done and the costs of that work and material. Mr. Gauvin deposed that the statutory mandate of the Administrator includes compensating expenses incurred relative to ship-source oil pollution incidents and the right to recover that compensation through a statutory right of subrogation after payment of a claim. He further deposed that steps were taken to contain the oil pollution threat and described work undertaken by the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard’s claim and the Administrator’s payment
After reviewing the Coast Guard’s claim, the Administrator determined that the Coast Guard was entitled to compensation in the amount of $1,339,930.08, together with statutory interest pursuant to section 116 of the Marine Liability Act. By letter dated February 14, 2025, the Administrator offered to pay the Coast Guard $1,339,930.08 plus statutory interest. By letter dated April 10, 2025, the Coast Guard accepted that offer. On April 22, 2025, the Administrator paid $1,642,100.96 to the Coast Guard, consisting of the principal amount of $1,339,930.08 and statutory interest in the amount of $302,170.88.
The judgment records that the Coast Guard advised Mr. MacNeil, as owner of the Hydra Mariner, of his potential liability in respect of the oil pollution threat and clean-up. The report attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Gauvin’s affidavit refers to communication from a Coast Guard duty officer with Mr. MacNeil, apparently on the day of the incident, and notes that Mr. MacNeil attended the site and boarded the Hydra Mariner. It further notes that on January 18, 2021, Mr. MacNeil presented a plan about removal of the Hydra Mariner, and that a “Notice of Intent” was delivered to him by email.

Ownership of the Hydra Mariner and the Charlotte A. Finn
Mr. Gauvin obtained a transcript of registration from Transport Canada with respect to the ownership of the Hydra Mariner on February 10, 2021, and an updated transcript on October 17, 2025. He deposed that these transcripts show that Mr. MacNeil became the sole registered owner of the vessel on February 25, 2016 and remained the registered owner until registration was suspended on March 20, 2025. Mr. Gauvin also deposed that on May 16, 2025 he spoke with Mr. MacNeil by telephone, and that Mr. MacNeil acknowledged his ownership of the Hydra Mariner in January 2021, at the time of the grounding.
The amended statement of claim pleads that “the Defendant Daniel Francis MacNeil is the registered owner of the Hydra Mariner” and that “he was the registered owner of that vessel the Hydra Mariner at all times relevant to this action.” The court accepted that the transcripts of registry attached to Mr. Gauvin’s affidavit are evidence of ownership and found that the Administrator had established that Mr. MacNeil was the “owner” of the Hydra Mariner at the time of the incident.
The amended statement of claim also describes another ship, the Charlotte A. Finn, as “a 25.73-metre fishing vessel of steel construction and 171.17 gross tons” and states that it is registered with Transport Canada under official number 323545. It pleads that Mr. MacNeil is also the registered owner of the Charlotte A. Finn and that, for the purposes of the action, the Charlotte A. Finn is a sister ship to the Hydra Mariner.

Procedural history and default
The Administrator commenced the action against “the Owners and All Others Interested” in the vessel Charlotte A. Finn and against Mr. MacNeil as owner of the Hydra Mariner. The statement of claim was issued on January 15, 2024 and was amended as of April 17, 2025 to reflect a change in the amount claimed. By order issued on April 28, 2025, Associate Judge Molgat validated service of the statement of claim as of on or before May 31, 2024 and provided that the time for filing a defence would run from the date of that order.
Rule 204(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Rules provides that when a statement of claim is served in Canada or the United States, a statement of defence shall be filed within 30 days of service of the statement of claim. A solicitor’s certificate of service was filed showing service of the amended statement of claim on Mr. MacNeil by mail sent on April 22, 2025. Mr. Gauvin deposed that as of November 4, 2025, the date of his affidavit, no defence had been filed by Mr. MacNeil.
The court’s review of the Index of Recorded Entries confirmed that no defence had been filed by Mr. MacNeil or any of the defendants, and that the amended statement of claim was served only on Mr. MacNeil. The judgment states that this is effectively an action in personam against Mr. MacNeil only, as owner of the Hydra Mariner. The court therefore identified the question as whether the Administrator had shown that default judgment should be entered against Mr. MacNeil.

Legal framework and statutory provisions
The judgment notes that entry of default judgment is a discretionary decision of the court and refers to Trimble Solutions Corporation v. Quantum Dynamics Inc. It also cites Chase Manhattan Corp. v. 3133559 Canada Inc. for the two-part test for default judgment: whether the defendant is in default of filing a defence and whether the plaintiff has provided evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to establish its claim.
Section 91 of the Marine Liability Act is quoted in the judgment for the definition of “owner.” In relation to any ship that is not subject to the specified international conventions, “owner” means the person who has, for the time being, either by law or by contract, the rights of the owner of the ship with respect to its possession and use. The court applied this definition together with the registry transcripts and Mr. MacNeil’s admission to conclude that he was the owner of the Hydra Mariner at the relevant time.
The judgment reproduces portions of section 77 of the Marine Liability Act, which impose liability on the owner of a ship for oil pollution damage from the ship and for certain costs and expenses incurred by specified persons in respect of measures taken to prevent, repair, remedy, or minimize oil pollution damage, to the extent that such measures and costs are reasonable, as well as for any loss or damage caused by those measures.
The court also quotes paragraph 106(3)(c) of the Marine Liability Act. That provision states that if a claimant accepts an offer of compensation from the Administrator, the Administrator is, to the extent of the payment to the claimant, subrogated to any rights of the claimant referred to in paragraph 106(3)(b). The judgment finds that an offer of compensation was made by the Administrator to the Coast Guard, that it was accepted, and that payment of $1,642,100.96 was made on April 22, 2025. On that basis, the court concludes that a subrogated claim arose in favour of the Administrator under paragraph 106(3)(c).
Section 116 of the Marine Liability Act, which authorizes the accrual of interest, is also referenced. The Administrator stated in written representations that interest had accrued on the initial payment made on April 22, 2025. The accrued interest between April 22, 2025 and November 5, 2025 was said to be $38,692.78, and the Administrator sought recovery of that amount and daily interest in the amount of $183.55 until payment of the claim.

Sister-ship in rem jurisdiction and the Charlotte A. Finn
Although the Administrator commenced the action in personam and in rem, naming the Charlotte A. Finn as a defendant, the judgment notes that there is no evidence that the statement of claim or the amended statement of claim was served on the Charlotte A. Finn. The court observes that, considering the 60-day time limit for service of a statement of claim set out in Rule 203 of the Federal Courts Rules, it is questionable whether the action against that defendant remains viable.
The plaintiff had pleaded that the Charlotte A. Finn is a sister ship to the Hydra Mariner for the purposes of the action and referred to subsection 43(8) of the Federal Courts Act, which extends in rem jurisdiction to sister ships. That subsection, reproduced in the judgment, provides that the Federal Court’s jurisdiction in rem may be exercised against any ship that, at the time the action is brought, is owned by the beneficial owner of the ship that is the subject of the action.
In its written representations, the plaintiff made reference to in rem jurisdiction in respect of sister ships and to the definition of sister ships for the purposes of subsection 43(8). The judgment notes that the plaintiff’s reliance on subsection 43(8) in the motion for default judgment is puzzling because the motion does not seek judgment against the Charlotte A. Finn and there is no evidence that this defendant was ever served. The court refers to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Westshore Terminals Limited Partnership v. Leo Ocean, S.A., which comments that until a ship is served with a statement of claim in rem and is arrested, the court’s jurisdiction in rem is not exercised. The judgment states that the sister-ship jurisdiction is an in rem jurisdiction and that the motion before the court concerns only Mr. MacNeil.

Findings on the evidence and default judgment
The judgment states that the Administrator has shown that clean-up work was done, as set out in Exhibit A to Mr. Gauvin’s affidavit. It further finds that an offer of compensation was made to the Coast Guard, that the Coast Guard accepted the offer, and that payment of $1,642,100.96, including statutory interest of $302,170.88, was made to the Coast Guard on April 22, 2025. As a result, the court holds that a subrogated claim arose in favour of the Administrator under paragraph 106(3)(c) of the Marine Liability Act.
On the question of default, the judgment confirms that no defence was filed by Mr. MacNeil or any of the defendants, despite service of the amended statement of claim and the running of the time to defend. Applying the two-part test for default judgment, the court concludes that Mr. MacNeil is in default of filing a defence and that the Administrator has provided evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to establish its claim.

Ruling and overall outcome
In the conclusion of the reasons, the court states that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, the lack of a defence, the applicable legislation, and the test for granting default judgment, it is satisfied that the Administrator has shown that judgment should be entered. The formal judgment then provides that the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is granted and that judgment is entered against the defendant, Mr. Daniel Francis MacNeil, in the amount of $1,680,793.74, being the amount of the principal claim and interest owing as of November 5, 2025. The judgment further orders that interest will accrue on the principal amount at the rate established pursuant to section 116 of the Marine Liability Act. The plaintiff did not seek costs, and the court awards none, noting that this is appropriate in light of the earlier comments about the invocation of subsection 43(8) of the Federal Courts Act. In summary, the Administrator of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund is the successful party, with judgment against Mr. MacNeil in the amount of $1,680,793.74 as of November 5, 2025, plus continuing statutory interest on the principal, and with no award of costs.