Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Central issue concerns whether the self-represented plaintiff, Jean-François Beaulnes, has the mental and physical capacity to manage and conduct his own medical malpractice lawsuit.
• Plaintiffs’ repeated references to Jean-François’ “poor psychological and mental condition,” severe disability, suicide attempts, and dependence on his parents raised a material question about litigation capacity and the propriety of his parents acting as de facto representatives.
• The court had to apply s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and the Substitute Decisions Act capacity tests, balancing privacy and autonomy against the duty to protect a potentially vulnerable litigant.
• A key evidentiary controversy involved whether disability documentation and tax-benefit status in British Columbia equated to litigation incapacity under Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court found they did not.
• The plaintiffs’ request for written-only, asynchronous participation—backed by medical evidence about pain-provoked speech and stress-induced collapse—was weighed against concerns about undue hardship, fairness of discovery, and the integrity of the civil process.
• Use of artificial intelligence tools by the plaintiffs in drafting litigation materials raised additional concerns about the reliability of written communications and the defendant’s right to fulsome, live examinations for discovery.

Background and parties

This case arises from a medical malpractice action brought in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by Jean-François Beaulnes and his parents, Pierre Beaulnes and Marie José Benoit, against dermatologist Dr. Melanie Pratt. The underlying claim alleges that Dr. Pratt’s misdiagnosis and prolonged mistreatment caused Jean-François profound and ongoing physical and psychological harm, with substantial financial and family-law consequences. The decision at issue is not a trial judgment on liability or damages. It is a procedural ruling on a defence motion for a capacity assessment under section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and a plaintiffs’ cross-motion seeking disability-related procedural accommodations and case-management directions.

Facts about the plaintiff’s condition and the litigation context

Jean-François is described as a formerly high-functioning young adult who hiked the Alps alone and successfully defended a complex master’s thesis in Botany in 2021. Over more than four and a half years of documented illness, he developed severe chronic maxillofacial pain and headaches, later compounded by significant lower-extremity pain limiting his mobility. These physical conditions are accompanied by generalized anxiety disorder, chronic pain, sleep deprivation, medication effects, and persistent fatigue, which together produce marked stress intolerance, particularly in adversarial, real-time settings. A central feature of his condition is pain-provoked speech limitation: speaking increases his pain, so sustained oral participation is medically difficult. His treating physician explains that even mild stressors can trigger severe reactions, including complete loss of muscle tone and overwhelming suicidal ideation, and that written, asynchronous communication is the least harmful mode for him.

The underlying medical malpractice claim and damages sought

Substantively, the lawsuit alleges negligence in medical care and treatment provided by Dr. Pratt at the Ottawa Hospital between September 2022 and September 2023. The plaintiffs plead that misdiagnosis and prolonged mistreatment caused long-term physical and emotional suffering and derailed Jean-François’ professional and social life. The damages claimed are extensive: $600,000 in general damages for pain and suffering, $500,000 in special damages for financial loss and career disruption, $300,000 under the Family Law Act for his parents’ emotional distress and financial burden, $500,000 in aggravated damages for intensified psychological and non-pecuniary harm, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages for alleged systemic failures in oversight of Dr. Pratt’s practice. These figures represent claimed amounts only; the court in this decision does not determine liability or award any of these sums.

Procedural history and emerging concerns about capacity

The procedural history created a sustained pattern of concern about whether Jean-François could manage litigation on his own. An initial statement of claim named Jean-François as the sole plaintiff and described Pierre as his “representative.” When the defendant’s counsel objected that a non-lawyer cannot represent him, the plaintiffs attempted to amend the pleading to add Pierre and Marie José as plaintiffs and described them as “primary caregivers.” Correspondence and case-conference memoranda went further: in an April 2025 case-management memo, the plaintiffs stated that Jean-François’ “poor psychological and mental condition” rendered him incapable of managing the proceeding, and they indicated Pierre held a power of attorney and intended to seek appointment as litigation guardian. Later, in September 2025 materials, the plaintiffs again asserted that he could not attend case conferences at all due to chronic pain, sleep deprivation and medication side effects. Throughout, Jean-François did not attend the two case conferences or the motion; instead, Pierre appeared and attempted to speak on behalf of all plaintiffs. At one conference, Dr. Pratt’s counsel proposed a capacity assessment, and Pierre initially agreed, subject to Jean-François’ own consent. Subsequent communications revealed that Jean-François vacillated—refusing, then conditionally accepting, then again refusing live assessment and insisting on a written, records-based or asynchronous process. During this same period, Pierre reported acute clinical deterioration, including interrupted suicide attempts and severe weight loss following receipt of a court endorsement.

Legal framework on capacity and party under a disability

The court applied section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, which allows an order for a physical or mental examination by a health practitioner where a party’s condition is in question. When another party raises the issue of mental capacity, an assessment order may only be made if a two-part threshold is met: (1) the allegation of incapacity must be relevant to a material issue in the proceeding; and (2) there must be good reason to believe there is substance to that allegation. The judge referenced leading authorities such as Abrams v. Abrams, Agyemang v. The Great-West Life, and other Ontario decisions that outline factors for ordering a compelled assessment, including the nature of the proceeding, the quality of evidence on capacity and vulnerability, the necessity of an assessment to decide the issues, potential harm if no assessment is done, urgency, and the wishes of the person to be examined. The court also relied on the Substitute Decisions Act framework, which defines mental incapacity for property management and decision-making as an inability to understand relevant information or to appreciate reasonably foreseeable consequences. Importantly, the court underscored that there is no concept of “global incapacity”: capacity is task- and context-specific. The ability required to self-represent in complex civil litigation is higher than that needed to manage property or even to give instructions to counsel. To self-represent, a litigant must understand the nature of the proceedings, the procedural choices required, the risks and consequences of those choices, and must be able to participate in key steps such as conferences, motions, discoveries, and trial.

Why capacity became a material issue in this case

The judge found that capacity was plainly relevant to a material issue because the plaintiffs themselves repeatedly asserted that Jean-François was incapable of managing the proceeding, could not participate in oral or live attendances, and depended on his parents to act on his behalf. The pleadings and case-conference materials described him as having severe psychological distress, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, and loss of independence, and expressly cast Pierre and Marie José as caregivers and de facto representatives. Additionally, Jean-François’ consistent absence from case conferences and the motion—despite rules requiring parties’ attendance—reinforced doubts about his ability to conduct the case in person. The plaintiffs attempted to rely on disability documentation (including a British Columbia disability tax status and a family physician’s note) as proof that no further assessment was needed. The court rejected this conflation, emphasizing that a disability finding for benefits purposes does not determine whether a person is a “party under a disability” for litigation capacity in Ontario. A person may have serious disabilities yet still retain capacity to understand and instruct in litigation. Conversely, if the person cannot meaningfully attend case conferences, motions, examinations or trial, they cannot act as their own counsel in a way compatible with the Rules. The judge also found it improper and unlawful for Pierre, a non-lawyer, to act as Jean-François’ representative in Superior Court without being appointed as litigation guardian and without having legal counsel, pointing to the Solicitors’ Act, the Law Society Act, and Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Balancing autonomy, privacy, and protection of a vulnerable litigant

In evaluating whether to compel a capacity assessment, the court recognized that such an order is a serious intrusion into personal privacy and autonomy. However, the jurisprudence directs courts to balance those rights against a duty to protect potentially vulnerable litigants and the integrity of the process. Here, the combination of: (1) the plaintiffs’ own statements that Jean-François is not capable of managing the proceeding; (2) his non-attendance at key steps; (3) evidence of mental health crises and physical limitations; and (4) Pierre’s unauthorized assumption of a representative role, provided more than speculation. It gave “good reason to believe” that Jean-François might lack the capacity to self-represent. Without an assessment, the litigation would remain stalled, and Jean-François’ rights could be harmed by either forcing him to proceed beyond his abilities or allowing his interests to be shaped by an unappointed, non-lawyer family member. The judge concluded that an assessment would protect Jean-François by clarifying whether he can direct the litigation himself, whether a litigation guardian and counsel are needed, and what accommodations may be appropriate.

The plaintiffs’ accommodation request for written and asynchronous participation

Alongside opposing a compelled assessment, the plaintiffs sought a broad procedural accommodation. They asked the court to recognize that the primary issue was a disability-related functional limitation affecting the format of participation, and to order that Jean-François’ role in the litigation proceed, to the greatest extent feasible, in a fully written and asynchronous manner. This would include written discovery (interrogatories or equivalent), written-only case-management and case conferences, and overall non-oral, non-live participation. The court acknowledged the constitutional and human-rights dimensions of disability accommodation. Drawing on section 15 of the Charter, Ontario’s Human Rights Code, and equality jurisprudence, the judge affirmed that persons with disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation of disability-related needs, up to the point of undue hardship, to secure meaningful access to justice. However, accommodation must not fundamentally undermine the fairness or workability of the legal process. The judge therefore framed a two-step inquiry: whether the requested accommodations would cause undue hardship, and whether they should be considered before or after a capacity assessment.

Why the requested accommodation amounted to undue hardship

On the evidence, the court accepted that Jean-François’ health conditions make live, oral participation extremely difficult, and that written, asynchronous communication is medically better tolerated. Nevertheless, it concluded that the specific accommodation sought—exclusive written and asynchronous participation for essentially all steps—would cause undue hardship. First, fairness and procedural integrity would be compromised in a complex medical malpractice action if there were no live oral submissions, no effective pre-trial or settlement conferences, and a trial conducted entirely in writing. Discovery, whose purposes include testing credibility, eliciting spontaneous answers, narrowing issues, and avoiding trial surprise, would be significantly weakened if all examination were conducted in writing and asynchronously, especially where the responding party may use drafting aids. Second, the court found it practically infeasible to run a full civil action in this format. The judicial and staff resources required to manage a purely written, asynchronous process for every motion, case conference, pre-trial, and trial were considered beyond what the system can reasonably provide, amounting to undue hardship. Third, the court noted evidence that the plaintiffs had used artificial intelligence (including large language models) to draft and edit their documents. While there is nothing inherently improper in using such tools for assistance, this fact heightened concern about replacing live testimony and questioning with written responses potentially shaped by AI. The defendant is entitled to a fulsome, human examination of the plaintiffs, without answers being effectively filtered or constructed by external drafting tools.

Prematurity of accommodation orders before capacity is clarified

Because the court ordered that a capacity assessment proceed, it considered the plaintiffs’ broad accommodation motion premature. The litigation is effectively on hold until the assessment is completed, and only then will the court know whether Jean-François has litigation capacity, needs a litigation guardian, or requires a modified accommodation regime. The judge emphasized that accommodation need not be an “all or nothing” written-only solution. Following the assessment, the parties are to return to a case conference where the court and counsel can explore more nuanced accommodations that balance the health-related limitations of Jean-François with the defendant’s procedural rights and the court’s resource constraints. If no agreed solution emerges, the plaintiffs may renew a more tailored accommodation motion informed by the assessor’s findings.

Disposition, case management, and outcome for the parties

In the result, the court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ cross-motion in large part. It ordered that Jean-François must attend and participate in a virtual capacity assessment with Dr. Regan Gale, a capacity assessor, on a mutually agreeable date before June 30, 2026. Recognizing his accommodation requests and medical evidence, the court directed that, to the extent possible, Dr. Gale should try to conduct the assessment in a manner that incorporates written and asynchronous elements, though not necessarily excluding all live interaction. The plaintiffs’ request that Jean-François be permitted to participate in the litigation solely through written and asynchronous formats was dismissed without prejudice, meaning it can be revisited after the assessment with a more targeted proposal. Their request for a transcript or audio recording of the October 6, 2025 case conference was denied, as conference recordings are treated like a judge’s personal notes and the official record is the written endorsement. Finally, the court deferred any detailed case-management timetable until after the assessment and directed that the parties schedule a case conference before the same associate justice once the assessor’s report is available. As this is a procedural ruling, no damages or costs are quantified or awarded. The successful party on this motion is the defendant, Dr. Pratt, who obtained the order compelling a capacity assessment and resisted the plaintiffs’ broad accommodation request. The decision does not fix any monetary award, costs, or damages in her favour, and the total amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from this ruling.