Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Admissibility of a late-filed affidavit by Mr. Coulombe, challenged as untimely and irrelevant to the narrow issue of relief from default
• Request to reopen the evidentiary record based on alleged new documents about unpaid rent and the pharmacies’ financial condition, and whether they met the strict criteria for a réouverture d’enquête
• Determination of whether the defendants’ one-day delay in filing their defence was justified by a “cause raisonnablement admissible” tied to their former lawyer’s workload and personal circumstances
• Assessment of whether the defence, filed one juridical day late, was sufficiently detailed and serious rather than generic, frivolous, or manifestly doomed to fail
• Consideration of alleged procedural bad faith and abuse by the defendants and whether it could justify refusing relief from their default to plead
• Overall balancing between procedural discipline and the defendants’ right to a full defence, including whether striking the defence would be disproportionate and irreparably prejudicial

Factual background and business relationship

The dispute arises out of a long-standing 50/50 business partnership between pharmacists Jean-François Coulombe and Nicholas Bergeron. Each holds 50% of the shares of Nicholas Bergeron, Jean-François Coulombe Pharmaciens inc. (NBJFCPi), which operates two pharmacies. They are also involved in related corporations, 9136-0735 Québec inc. (9136) and 9171-0525 Québec inc. (9171), referred to collectively as “the Société.” After roughly two decades of joint ownership, the parties decided to unwind their partnership. They reached an agreement in principle under which Mr. Bergeron would buy the assets and shares held by Mr. Coulombe. However, major disagreements soon emerged over the implementation of this separation transaction, the handling of the pharmacies’ funds, and the financing for the buyout. These disagreements escalated into competing oppression-type proceedings (“redressement en cas d’abus de pouvoir ou d’iniquité”) and multiple interlocutory motions before the Superior Court of Québec.

Initial oppression proceedings and interim arrangements

On 16 October 2024, the plaintiffs (Coulombe and related parties) filed a main application for oppression and safeguard orders. They alleged that Mr. Bergeron was using the jointly owned pharmacies to support the development of Groupe Aldéa inc., a banner of independent pharmacies, contrary to Mr. Coulombe’s wishes. They also claimed that funds were being transferred improperly from the Société to Aldéa; that there was an impermissible “confusion” of distinct corporations; that there was no tangible proof of Bergeron’s financing; and that the Société was becoming unduly indebted. In addition to the oppression relief, the plaintiffs sought safeguard measures, including an order to cease collaboration with competing businesses in the same field as the Société. On 16 December 2024, the parties and counsel signed an “Entente intérimaire et transaction” to govern their relationship until the hearing on the merits. The court endorsed this interim agreement, ordered compliance, and scheduled the merits hearing, effectively turning the interim arrangement into a court-enforceable framework for the parties’ conduct.

Counterclaim, cross-proceedings and the appointment of a receiver

On 27 February 2025, the defendants (Bergeron and his companies) responded with a counter-application for oppression and safeguard orders. They alleged that, despite the interim agreement, Mr. Coulombe had systematically refused to cooperate or provide information reasonably required by Mr. Bergeron, and that Coulombe had carried out unauthorized bank transfers from the pharmacies’ accounts. Due diligence allegedly revealed an unauthorized transfer of $1.4 million from 9171 to a corporation owned by Coulombe (JFC 76 inc.). The defendants sought orders to prevent Mr. Coulombe from transacting in the bank accounts of 9136 and 9171, to secure access to accounting information, and, on the merits, to compel Coulombe to sell NBJFCPi’s assets to Bergeron. On 5 March 2025, the defendants also filed an application for homologation of a transaction. Meanwhile, on 11 March 2025, the plaintiffs brought another application seeking authorization to bring a derivative action in order to protect the pharmacies from what they claimed was Bergeron’s strategy of driving them into insolvency to avoid buying out Coulombe’s shares at fair market value. That same day, they pursued a pre-judgment seizure of the accounts of Nicholas Bergeron Pharmacien inc. (NBPi) and Pharmacie Nicholas Bergeron inc. (PNGi).

Safeguard orders and the road to receivership

On 12 March 2025, the court heard the main oppression application and the homologation request. Relying in particular on article 452 of the Business Corporations Act, the judge issued safeguard orders designed to stabilize the pharmacies’ finances. These included directing that all revenues from the St-Remi and Pointe-aux-Trembles pharmacies be deposited into specified Desjardins accounts for 9171, 9136 and NBJFCPi, and requiring two signatories for any withdrawals or expenditures above $3,000 from those accounts, for a fixed period. The court’s reasons were critical of Mr. Bergeron’s position that he could channel all pharmacy revenues through new companies he alone owned, even though he had not yet paid Coulombe for his shares, describing this stance as unreasonable and troubling. Following these orders, the defendants applied on 31 March 2025 for an order to facilitate execution of the judgment and to suspend part of its effects, arguing that they could not comply with the first conclusion. On 1 April 2025, the plaintiffs amended their pre-judgment seizure motion to seek appointment of an interim receiver (séquestre intérimaire). On 2 April 2025, the court appointed a receiver to administer the assets of NBPi, 9136, 9171 and NBJFCPi, including the two pharmacies, and authorized seizure before judgment of NBPi and PNGi’s bank accounts at the National Bank.

Further procedural complexity and the defence-filing deadline

In April 2025, both sides continued to reshape their pleadings and seek management orders on various financial and administrative issues. The plaintiffs repeatedly amended their main application, adding claims and joining the Ordre des pharmaciens du Québec as a mis en cause. Both parties filed case management notices addressing operational matters for the pharmacies and the litigation. On 22 April 2025, the court issued management orders that, among other things, required the defendants to communicate and file their defences and a modified counterclaim by 30 May 2025. This court-imposed deadline to plead, however, was not designated as a strict or peremptory deadline; under article 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only time limits expressly qualified as “de rigueur” require proof of an actual impossibility to act earlier.

The missed deadline and competing procedural motions

On 2 June 2025, the plaintiffs filed a notice to have the case inscribed for judgment by default on the basis that the defendants had failed to file their defence within the delay set by the 22 April 2025 management order. That same day, the defendants filed a detailed “Énoncé sommaire des moyens de défense” for Bergeron and his companies, thereby filing their defence one juridical day after the deadline. On 6 June 2025, the defendants brought a formal motion to be relieved from their default to plead. They accepted that they had missed the date, but argued that the delay was non-strict, that they had a serious defence and that there existed a “cause raisonnablement admissible” explaining the delay. Their position was supported by a sworn statement from their former lawyer, who practised alone without support staff. He attested that he had been overwhelmed by approximately 120 pre-trial “pré-engagements” from plaintiffs’ counsel and had worked many hours with Mr. Bergeron to respond, while also dealing with the emotional burden of the imminent birthday of his late father and taking time on 30 May 2025 to be with family and visit the grave. He completed the defence and served and filed it on 2 June 2025. The plaintiffs opposed the motion vigorously. They argued that the defendants had repeatedly disregarded court orders; that the excuse based on workload and a family anniversary was frivolous and implausible; that the defence was generic, manifestly unfounded and without realistic chance of success given the lack of any concrete financing proposal to buy out Coulombe; and that the defendants’ conduct amounted to flagrant bad faith and an abuse of judicial resources. An oral hearing on the default-relief motion and the plaintiffs’ objections was held on 14 August 2025.

The late affidavit and the motion to reopen the inquiry

Before addressing the merits of the default-relief request, the court had to rule on two additional evidentiary points raised by the plaintiffs. First, Mr. Coulombe had provided a sworn declaration dated 13 August 2025—essentially on the eve of the hearing—covering the pharmacies’ financial situation, staffing, a possible relocation of one pharmacy and his personal financial capacity. This affidavit had not been prior-noticed, disclosed, or justified in terms of lateness, and it did not truly address the narrow procedural question before the court (relief from default and the nature of the defence). The defendants objected to its production. The judge upheld the objection, finding the affidavit both untimely and irrelevant to the specific issue to be decided, and refused to admit it into evidence. Second, on 18 September 2025, after the August hearing, the plaintiffs asked the court via letter to reopen the inquiry so they could file additional documents, including correspondence with the receiver, a lease, a bill, and a further application by the receiver concerning assistance of the court and additional conclusions. They characterized the pharmacies’ situation as lamentable, claiming rent arrears and financial distress. The defendants responded formally by letter dated 22 September 2025, objecting to any reopening on the basis that the plaintiffs had not respected the strict jurisprudential criteria for a réouverture d’enquête: new evidence must have been unknown at trial, impossible to discover with due diligence, and likely to have a decisive impact on the decision. The court agreed with the defendants. It held that no proper judicial motion supported by affidavit had been filed; the plaintiffs had relied only on informal letters and attachments. The receiver’s motion they invoked was dated 25 June 2025, several weeks before the 14 August 2025 hearing, so it could not qualify as truly “new” evidence that was unknowable with reasonable diligence. The plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved ignorance of the rent-arrears evidence or any practical impossibility of acting earlier. The judge concluded that the proposed documents would shed no useful light on the narrow question of whether the defendants should be relieved of the default to plead, and therefore refused to reopen the inquiry.

Legal framework for relief from default

Turning to the merits of the default issue, the court began with article 84 C.C.P., which distinguishes strict deadlines (délai de rigueur) from ordinary procedural time limits. Only the former can be extended upon proof of an actual impossibility to act earlier. By contrast, for non-strict deadlines, the court may extend the time and relieve a party from the consequences of default if it “estime nécessaire” to do so. The jurisprudence identifies two cumulative criteria for relief where a defendant has missed a non-strict deadline to file a defence: (1) a summary showing that the delay is due to a “cause raisonnablement admissible” rather than mere cavalier disregard; and (2) the immediate production of a defence that appears, at first sight, to be serious, without requiring the court to fully adjudicate the merits at this preliminary stage. The court also emphasized that dismissal of an action, defence, or counterclaim is an ultimate procedural sanction with potentially serious and irreparable consequences if it leads to permanent loss of substantive rights. Appellate authority cautions that judges must exercise “grande prudence” and remember that behind a negligent lawyer there is often a client who may not deserve the summary rejection of their claim or defence if the prejudice to the other side can be avoided or cured without injustice.

Assessment of the cause for delay

The judge accepted the explanation given by the defendants’ former lawyer as an adequate “cause raisonnablement admissible” for a one-day delay. The evidence showed that he was a solo practitioner without support staff, facing an unusually heavy burden from roughly 120 pre-engagement requests, and that he nonetheless dedicated many hours with Mr. Bergeron to provide substantial responses. This workload, taken at face value and uncontradicted by cross-examination, reasonably explained that finalizing the defence slipped by one juridical day. The additional context of the emotionally significant anniversary of his late father’s birth, while not determinative on its own, further reinforced that the delay stemmed from human—not strategic—factors. The court held that such a modest lapse, rooted in an overburdened counsel’s error, did not offend the conscience of the court or undermine the principles of civil justice. Importantly, the judge refused to impute the lawyer’s lack of perfect diligence to the defendants in a way that would strip them of their right to a full defence, especially where no significant prejudice to the plaintiffs flowed from a one-day delay. The court therefore found that the first criterion—existence of a reasonably admissible cause—was met.

Seriousness and sufficiency of the defence

On the second criterion, the court noted that the defence was filed and notified on 2 June 2025, one juridical day after the 30 May 2025 deadline, and comprised 87 paragraphs. It addressed, with specificity, the general factual background, the alleged lack of information from Mr. Coulombe, the significance of the property at 651 Notre-Dame in Saint-Remi, and the legal and factual grounds on which the defendants sought, among other things, dismissal of the main application. The court found that the pleading could not fairly be labelled generic, frivolous or abusive. It went beyond simply denying the plaintiffs’ allegations or asserting in conclusory terms that the main application lacked merit. Instead, it provided a detailed factual narrative and a coherent legal thesis responsive to the core issues in dispute. On this basis, the judge concluded that the defence was “serious” in the sense required by the jurisprudence and clearly surpassed the threshold of a purely generic or legally empty pleading.

Allegations of bad faith and supposed futility of the defence

The plaintiffs’ argument that the defendants acted in bad faith—by disobeying earlier court orders, abusing procedures, and steering the pharmacies toward bankruptcy—did not persuade the court to deny relief. While the judge had criticized aspects of Mr. Bergeron’s conduct in an earlier March 2025 judgment, he had not found procedural abuse or sanction-worthy misconduct at that time, and those observations predated the April management order setting the defence deadline. Moreover, the overall record showed a highly contentious, fact-heavy dispute where each side accused the other of serious wrongdoing. In such a context, and without a full evidentiary record at trial, the court considered it inappropriate to refuse relief from default on the basis of contested allegations of abuse or bad faith. The plaintiffs also argued that the defence was doomed because Bergeron lacked concrete financing to buy out Coulombe, pointing in particular to a letter of intent expressly described as being for discussion purposes only and not a binding loan offer. The court declined to pre-judge the entire merits of the litigation on this narrow point. Whether the defendants’ financing and overall transaction plan were viable, and whether the alleged failures in providing due diligence information changed that assessment, were matters to be resolved at trial based on complete evidence. A preliminary reading of the defence did not reveal any fatal flaw or irremediable lacuna that would justify treating it as hopeless at this stage.

Outcome of the decision and its practical effect

In the result, the court ruled entirely in favour of the defendants on the procedural issues raised in this specific judgment. It upheld their objection to the late affidavit of Mr. Coulombe and refused to admit it into evidence. It rejected the plaintiffs’ request to reopen the inquiry to file new documents related to rent arrears and the receiver’s actions, holding that the request did not meet formal or substantive requirements. Most significantly, the judge granted the defendants’ motion to be relieved from their default to plead, accepted the filing of their summary defence dated 2 June 2025, and struck (radié) the plaintiffs’ inscription for judgment by default. Costs were reserved “frais de justice à suivre,” meaning that no cost order was quantified at this stage and would be dealt with later or with the merits. There is no monetary award, damages figure, or specific cost amount granted in this judgment. The successful parties in this decision are the defendants/demandeurs reconventionnels—namely Nicholas Bergeron, Nicholas Bergeron Pharmacien inc. and Pharmacie Nicholas Bergeron inc.—and the court does not order any specific sum in their favour; the total monetary award and costs cannot be determined from this decision alone because no amounts are fixed in the reasons or conclusions.