Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Application of the constitutional open court principle to a workers’ compensation appeal involving sensitive medical information
• Threshold for anonymization under the Sherman / Dagenais-Mentuck-Sierra Club framework, including proof of a “serious risk” to an important public interest
• Sufficiency of the evidentiary record where the appellant alleges stigma, disability-related harm, and professional prejudice but offers only generalized assertions
• Characterization of anonymization of the style of cause as an impairment of openness requiring the same rigorous test as publication bans or sealing orders
• Recognition that parties cannot waive the public’s right to court openness even when the respondent does not oppose anonymization
• Exercise of appellate discretion to dismiss the motion yet award no costs, consistent with longstanding practice in workers’ compensation matters

Background and procedural history

The proceeding arises out of a workers’ compensation dispute in New Brunswick. Maureen Bell appealed a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal made under the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act. The Tribunal’s underlying decision concerns her entitlement within the provincial workplace injury and compensation regime, but the Court of Appeal’s reasons addressed here relate only to a preliminary motion, not the merits of the compensation appeal itself. In the Court of Appeal, Ms. Bell acted on her own behalf, while the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission was represented by counsel. The motion was heard on February 26, 2026, before Justice Robichaud of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, and the decision on the motion issued on March 16, 2026.

The anonymization motion and relief requested

Ms. Bell brought a motion asking the Court of Appeal to permit her to proceed under initials only in the style of cause and in all publicly accessible materials in the appeal. She requested an order that her full name not appear in any published decision or online database arising from this proceeding, except where necessary for internal court administration. In support of the motion, she advanced several grounds. She emphasized that the appeal record and submissions contained extensive and sensitive medical information, including detailed discussions of her health, symptoms, treatment history and disputed diagnoses. She argued that public linkage of this material with her full name would expose her, as a person with a disability, to serious and disproportionate harm, including stigma and professional prejudice. She also asserted that her livelihood depends heavily on public trust and online searchability, and that permanent indexing of detailed medical findings under her full name would inflict irreparable and unnecessary harm unrelated to the legal issues on appeal. Finally, she characterized the order sought as narrow and proportionate, limited to initials in the style of cause, and invoked the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and to order anonymization where required in the interests of justice. Importantly, Ms. Bell clarified that she was not asking for a publication ban, a sealing order, or anonymization of the entire record. Her request focused on the style of cause and the way the Court of Appeal’s decisions would be published. The Commission, as respondent, did not oppose the motion.

Evidence filed in support of the motion

The evidence consisted primarily of Ms. Bell’s own affidavit, which largely reiterated the grounds set out in her notice of motion. The affidavit did not describe the specific nature of the medical information in the record, did not detail the particular disability or disabilities at issue, and did not identify her profession or how exactly her professional reputation and career would be damaged. The Court noted the absence of concrete evidence regarding the precise nature of the alleged serious risk: there were assertions that she could face stigma and professional prejudice, but those assertions were not supported by tangible particulars. The affidavit therefore left the Court with a generalized claim of sensitivity and harm rather than an evidentiary foundation showing how disclosure would strike at her core dignity or biographical core.

The open court principle and governing legal framework

Justice Robichaud began the legal analysis by situating the motion within the constitutional open court principle. Relying on Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), the Court stressed that openness of court proceedings is tied to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. Openness permits the public and the press to access information about the courts, thereby fostering transparency, accountability and informed public debate. The reasons then drew extensively on Sherman Estate v. Donovan. In Sherman, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. The public is generally entitled to attend hearings, consult court files and report on proceedings, even though this can cause inconvenience or embarrassment to the individuals involved. That discomfort is not, on its own, enough to justify limits on openness. The Supreme Court in Sherman also restated the test for discretionary orders that limit court openness—such as publication bans, sealing orders, orders excluding the public, or redaction and anonymization orders. To obtain such an order, an applicant must show, first, that court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; second, that the order is necessary because reasonably available alternatives cannot mitigate that risk; and third, that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects. This high threshold is designed to preserve the strength of the open court presumption.

Anonymization as an impairment of openness

The Court treated anonymization of a party’s name as a real, though sometimes limited, impairment of the open court principle. Justice Robichaud pointed to case law indicating that even “minimal” restrictions, such as substituting initials for a party’s name, still interfere with public access to complete information and must therefore be justified under the same strict test that applies to more extensive measures. The reasons referred to decisions emphasizing that, absent legislation specifically limiting openness in particular contexts, discretionary orders such as publication bans, confidentiality orders and anonymization must satisfy the Dagenais / Mentuck / Sierra Club / Sherman framework. The Court also underscored that the public’s right to open courts cannot be waived by the litigants. Even though the Commission did not oppose the anonymization request, that lack of opposition did not reduce the burden on Ms. Bell or alter the constitutional dimension of the issue. The open court principle belongs to the public at large, not to individual parties who might wish to trade it away or agree to confidentiality for their own reasons.

Privacy, dignity and the serious-risk requirement

Justice Robichaud then examined whether Ms. Bell had demonstrated the required “serious risk” to an important public interest, with privacy and human dignity being the interests invoked. Sherman recognizes that privacy can amount to an important public interest where disclosure of sensitive personal information would strike at the individual’s core identity—the so-called “biographical core”—and where dissemination would amount to an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in the name of openness. However, Sherman also emphasizes that applicants cannot rely on unsubstantiated assertions; they must provide evidence showing that the information is so sensitive that, in the circumstances, disclosure would seriously endanger this dignity-based privacy interest. Drawing on authorities such as Rhyno v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society and Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court reiterated that “bald assertions” with “no tangible proof” of serious risk are insufficient to justify limiting openness. Judges require a convincing evidentiary foundation before exercising discretion to grant bans or anonymization.

Failure to establish the first part of the Sherman test

Applying this framework, Justice Robichaud concluded that Ms. Bell had not met the threshold requirement under Sherman. While she asserted that the record contained extensive medical information and that disclosure linked to her name would cause stigma, disability-related harm and professional prejudice, she did not provide specific evidence about the nature of the medical conditions, how precisely disclosure would strike at her biographical core, or how her profession and livelihood would realistically be affected. The Court was not supplied with evidence of particular vulnerabilities or circumstances that would transform ordinary privacy concerns into a dignity-based public interest rising to the level of a serious risk. As a result, the first part of the Sherman test—showing that court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest—was not satisfied. Because this threshold was not met, Justice Robichaud found it unnecessary to proceed to the second and third stages of the analysis (necessity and proportionality). Without proof of a serious risk, there was no basis to depart from the strong presumption of open courts.

Policy terms or statutory clauses

Although this case arises from a workers’ compensation context governed by the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act, the Court of Appeal’s reasons on the motion do not turn on specific insurance policy terms or particular statutory benefit clauses. The judgment does not dissect or interpret individual compensation provisions, nor does it set out the details of the underlying claim, such as the type of workplace injury, wage-loss benefits, medical aid or permanent impairment awards at issue. The focus remains squarely on the open court principle, privacy and the test for anonymization in appellate proceedings, rather than on the substantive compensation regime or any specific coverage clauses.

Disposition, successful party and monetary outcome

In the result, Justice Robichaud dismissed Ms. Bell’s motion for anonymization. The style of cause remains under her full name, and any decisions arising from the appeal will not be anonymized on the record available to the public. Consistent with the Court of Appeal’s longstanding practice in workers’ compensation matters, no costs were awarded on the motion. The Court also invoked section 24(2) of the Official Languages Act to authorize publication of the decision first in English and subsequently in French. From a practical outcome perspective, the successful party on this motion is the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, because the relief sought by Ms. Bell was refused. However, the Court made no order for damages, compensation, or costs in favour of the Commission in connection with this motion. The total monetary amount ordered in favour of the successful party is therefore $0, and based on this motion decision alone, any compensation amounts at stake in the underlying workers’ compensation appeal cannot be determined.