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Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction v. Procureur général du Québec

Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

  • Jurisdiction of the Superior Court to suspend the operation of a decree’s expiry clause under articles 34 and 49 C.p.c. is central to the relief granted.
  • Characterisation of the requested safeguard as a stay of the effects of article 17.01 of the Decree, rather than a judicial renewal or rewriting of the Decree, frames the Court’s intervention.
  • Assessment of urgency where the applicants’ own internal governance delays contributed to the last-minute filing is carefully scrutinised but ultimately accepted.
  • Evaluation of serious or irreparable prejudice focuses on the potential disappearance of the Comité conjoint, liquidation of its assets, and loss of more advantageous working conditions for approximately 1,099 workers and 2,000 retirees.
  • Balance of convenience analysis turns on the absence of evidence that the government or other stakeholders oppose renewal, and on the limited public impact of a short extension.
  • Scope and duration of interim relief is a key issue, with the Court trimming the requested 45-day suspension to 10 days to allow a more complete debate on the merits.

Facts of the case

The dispute arises from the imminent expiry of the Décret sur l’industrie de la menuiserie métallique de la région de Montréal (the Decree), which governs working conditions in the metal joinery industry in the Montreal region. Article 17.01 of the Decree provides that it remains in force until 30 November 2025. The Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction and the Comité paritaire d’installation d’équipements pétroliers du Québec, which oversee the Decree’s application and enforcement, brought an urgent motion before the Superior Court on 28 November 2025. Their concern was that, if the Decree expired as scheduled, the joint committee could effectively cease to exist and its assets might need to be liquidated, while workers and retirees would lose the more advantageous conditions of employment established by the Decree. The applicants explained that a request to renew the Decree had to be sent first to the Minister of Labour. Internal divisions within the Comité conjoint’s board of directors delayed that process: some employer-side representatives had long advocated not renewing the Decree, and the board president—linked to the Association de la construction du Québec, which opposed renewal—refused to sign the renewal request. The majority of the board nevertheless favoured renewal and eventually realised that the president’s signature was not legally required. The request could instead be submitted in the names of members representing the majority of the board. This workaround led to the renewal request being sent to the Minister only in the days immediately preceding the Decree’s scheduled expiry. Against this backdrop, the applicants sought court intervention to prevent a legal vacuum and operational disruption before the government could decide on the renewal request.

Nature of the application and relief sought

The applicants filed a Demande introductive d’instance seeking both safeguard orders (ordonnances de sauvegarde) and declaratory relief. At this preliminary stage, they asked for a 45-day safeguard order declaring that all effects, rights and obligations arising from the Decree would continue “as if the Decree had been renewed in its entirety.” They also sought a declaration that the Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction remained duly constituted and could continue exercising its statutory rights, remedies and powers under the Loi sur les décrets de convention collective and the Decree. Substantively, their request operated as a stay: they asked the Court to suspend the effects that would otherwise flow from the coming into force of article 17.01 of the Decree, which fixes the 30 November 2025 expiry date. By staying the application of this expiry clause, the Decree’s scheduled end would not take effect, and its legal regime—including the role and existence of the joint committee—would temporarily continue.

Position of the Attorney General and jurisdictional challenge

The Attorney General of Québec opposed the safeguard order on two principal grounds. First, he argued that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief because, in substance, it would amount to the Court stepping into the shoes of the government to renew or amend a regulatory decree. The Attorney General stressed that it is not the role of the courts to replace the executive branch in exercising the power to adopt decr­ees or to modify their terms. Second, he challenged the existence of urgency, contending that any urgency was self-created by the applicants’ delay in filing the renewal request with the Minister and in bringing their motion before the Court. The Court rejected the jurisdictional objection. It accepted that courts cannot assume the government’s regulatory function or rewrite decrees. However, it found that the general supervisory powers of the Superior Court under article 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, combined with the broad remedial authority in article 49 C.p.c., allow the Court to intervene in exceptional situations. Article 49 expressly states that courts may render appropriate orders “pour pourvoir aux cas où la loi n’a pas prévu de solution,” enabling the Court to bridge unforeseen gaps in the legal framework. The judge distinguished the present case from the Federal Court decision in 9101-9380 Québec Inc. c. Canada (Agence des douanes et du revenu). In that case, a tobacco manufacturer had asked the Court to treat its licence as though it remained valid despite an administrative decision refusing renewal, effectively overriding a specific administrative refusal. Here, by contrast, the government had not decided against renewing the Decree; there was no refusal to review or renew. The applicants were not inviting the Court to substitute itself for the government or to rewrite the Decree. Instead, they asked the Court to temporarily suspend the automatic effects of article 17.01—the programmed expiry—so that the Minister could consider the renewal request without the industry being plunged into immediate uncertainty. On that basis, the Court concluded that it had both jurisdiction over the matter and the power to issue relief of the type sought.

Discussion of the decree and statutory framework

The central policy instrument in dispute is the Decree itself, particularly article 17.01, which stipulates that the Decree remains in force until 30 November 2025. This provision functions as a sunset clause: its operation triggers the expiry of the Decree and the rights and obligations it creates. The applicants’ motion was thus framed as a request to suspend the operation of this specific clause. In addition, the Court referred to the Loi sur les décrets de convention collective. Under article 4 of that Act, a request for renewal of a decree must be accompanied by the relevant collective agreement. The Attorney General argued that the applicants had not attached the collective agreement to their renewal request, potentially undermining its validity. The Court noted that the Minister already had a copy of that collective agreement and, more importantly, that article 4.2 of the statute expressly prevents the Minister from declaring a request inadmissible without first notifying the requester of his intention, stating the reasons for inadmissibility, and giving the requester an opportunity to respond. This statutory safeguard reduced the weight of the Attorney General’s technical objection. Finally, the Court drew attention to article 8 of the same Act, which explicitly provides that “le gouvernement [peut] en tout temps prolonger le décret.” This clause confirms that the government retains the power at any time to extend the Decree. It also underscores that the interim judicial stay does not usurp the executive’s role: the government remains free to extend or not extend, but the stay temporarily maintains the status quo so that any governmental decision is taken in a stable legal context.

Assessment of urgency

Urgency was the Attorney General’s primary ground of opposition. The motion was filed roughly 48 hours before the Decree’s scheduled expiry, a last-minute posture the Court openly criticised. The applicants justified the delay by explaining the prolonged internal disagreement within the Comité conjoint’s board of directors over the desirability of seeking renewal. Some employer-side members favoured non-renewal, which delayed any consensus on making a request. Once a majority of the board decided to ask for renewal, further delay occurred because the board president—aligned with an employers’ association opposing renewal—refused to sign the request. The applicants only then realised that the president’s signature was not legally required and that a request could be validly submitted by board members representing the majority. The Court found it difficult, on the limited evidentiary record at this interim stage, to definitively assess the reasonableness of these explanations. It recognised, however, that while the situation could resemble a self-created urgency, there was no indication of a deliberate attempt to manufacture artificial urgency or of gross negligence so serious that it would justify discounting an otherwise real and pressing situation. In light of the Decree’s imminent expiry and the concrete consequences its termination would have for the joint committee and the affected workers and retirees, the Court held that the criterion of urgency was satisfied.

Appearance of right (apparence de droit)

Turning to the appearance of right, the Court reiterated that this is not a stringent threshold at the safeguard-order stage. The applicants need only demonstrate a serious question to be tried that is neither frivolous nor vexatious; the Court should not engage in a deep merits analysis at this point. The existence of a timely renewal request to the Minister, coupled with the absence of any indication that the Minister intends necessarily to refuse renewal, was sufficient to establish a serious issue. The Attorney General’s reliance on the missing collective agreement was diminished by the statutory protections in article 4.2 of the Loi sur les décrets de convention collective, which require notice and an opportunity to be heard before any declaration of inadmissibility. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the applicants had met the relatively low threshold for appearance of right.

Serious or irreparable prejudice

On the criterion of serious or irreparable prejudice, the Court found the evidence compelling. The applicants argued that expiry of the Decree would result in the end of the Comité conjoint’s existence, triggering the liquidation of its assets. While the legislative texts were not entirely clear about how soon those consequences would materialise, the Court accepted that such an outcome was a realistic possibility in the short term and could not be ignored. Beyond institutional consequences for the joint committee, the expiry of the Decree would directly terminate the more favourable working conditions it guaranteed. This would affect approximately 1,099 active workers and around 2,000 retirees, with very real financial implications for both groups. The expiry risked provoking significant disruption in the industry by leaving employers and workers uncertain about the applicable norms and standards. Given the scale of potential disruption, and the difficulty of fully compensating such consequences after the fact, the Court held that the criterion of serious or irreparable prejudice was clearly met.

Balance of convenience and public interest

The balance of convenience (prépondérance des inconvénients) also favoured granting interim relief. The Court emphasised that this was not a situation where the applicants’ interests clashed starkly with the interests of another clearly identified party or with an articulated public interest. The competent bodies had already decided to submit a renewal request, and no party had come forward to oppose that request before the Court. On the public interest side, the Court saw no evidence that a short postponement of the Decree’s expiry would harm the public or undermine any governmental policy choice. The Attorney General maintained that granting the stay would effectively give the applicants the benefit of what they seek on the merits—an extension of the Decree’s life—before a full hearing. The Court acknowledged that interim relief often confers part of the ultimate benefit sought and that this alone is not a reason to refuse a stay. What matters is whether, on balance, the temporary preservation of the status quo is justified to avoid serious harm while the dispute is more fully argued. Here, the absence of demonstrable prejudice to third parties or to the public, and the potential for serious harm to the applicants and the affected workers, tipped the balance in favour of the stay.

Scope and duration of the stay ordered

While granting the applicants’ request in principle, the Court adjusted the scope of the relief, particularly in terms of duration. The applicants had sought a 45-day safeguard order continuing all effects of the Decree as though it had been fully renewed. The Court instead considered that a 10-day stay was appropriate. It stayed the application of article 17.01 of the Decree until 9 December 2025 at 23:59. This shorter period was designed to allow the parties to better prepare a full debate on the merits of the case if needed. The motion had been filed in the morning and argued only in late afternoon on the same day, leaving little time for either side to develop their positions in depth or for the Court to deliberate extensively. The impending expiry of the Decree also compelled a quick decision. In the Court’s view, the interests of the parties, the proper functioning of the justice system, and the public interest all supported a limited interim measure that would stabilise the situation while allowing for a more complete and orderly examination later. The Court also noted that the parties themselves, or the government, retained other avenues to avoid a legal vacuum. Article 8 of the Loi sur les décrets de convention collective explicitly empowers the government to prolong the Decree “en tout temps,” meaning that, regardless of the judicial stay, the executive could act directly to extend the Decree if it deemed it appropriate.

Outcome and identification of the successful party

In its formal disposition, the Superior Court partially granted the applicants’ motion for a safeguard order. It ordered a 10-day stay of the application of article 17.01 of the Decree on the metal joinery industry of the Montreal region, thereby temporarily preventing the Decree from expiring on 30 November 2025. Costs (frais de justice) were reserved to follow, and no damages or other monetary relief were awarded at this stage. The effective successful parties in this interim decision are the applicants, the Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction and the Comité paritaire d’installation d’équipements pétroliers du Québec, because they obtained the core relief they sought—continuation of the Decree’s effects through a judicial stay—albeit for a shorter period than requested. The judgment does not fix any specific amount of damages, costs, or other monetary award in their favour; the total monetary award in this decision is therefore undetermined, as costs are left “à suivre” and no quantified sums are ordered.

Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction
Comité conjoint des matériaux de construction
Procureur général du Québec
Law Firm / Organization
Bernard, Roy & Associés
Quebec Superior Court
500-17-136395-251
Labour & Employment Law
Not specified/Unspecified
Applicant