Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Court applied the general rule that costs follow the event under Rule 14-1(9), requiring a principled reason to deny the successful party its costs.
• Petitioner’s attempt at judicial review was found to be a collateral attack on steps leading to the final decision and partly on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BC Human Rights Tribunal.
• Good-faith belief in the merits of the petition was held not to be an “extraordinary factor” that could justify depriving the successful respondent of its costs.
• The petitioner’s self-represented status was found irrelevant to the allocation of costs, as the Rules of Court apply equally to represented and unrepresented litigants.
• Claimed financial hardship, even if genuine, was held insufficient on its own to depart from the general principle that costs should follow the event.
• Considered cumulatively, the petitioner’s good faith, self-representation, and financial hardship did not amount to a case-related basis to waive or vary the respondent’s entitlement to costs.

Facts of the case

The case arises from a dispute between Christine Akemaru, a student, and Vancouver Community College (VCC), a public post-secondary institution in British Columbia. Ms. Akemaru challenged aspects of VCC’s decision-making that affected her ability to continue with her education. She believed that certain procedural and fairness issues in the way VCC handled her situation adversely affected her educational prospects and sought to raise those concerns in court through a petition for judicial review. Although the full underlying factual matrix is addressed in an earlier decision (2026 BCSC 676), the costs judgment makes clear that the petition was directed at the fairness and validity of the processes leading up to VCC’s final decision, rather than at the final decision itself. The petitioner stated that she was not pursuing the matter for financial gain, but rather to correct what she saw as unfairness in how the college dealt with her case, including matters she believed impacted her educational opportunities and her ability to continue her studies. She also explained that she was suffering significant health-related issues that left her unable to work and in serious financial difficulty.

Procedural background and earlier decision

The initial petition was brought as a judicial review in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. On April 16, 2026, the Court (LeBlanc J.) issued reasons indexed as 2026 BCSC 676, striking Ms. Akemaru’s petition under Rule 9-5 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. The court concluded that the petition did not, in substance, seek judicial review of VCC’s final decision. Instead, Ms. Akemaru was found to be mounting a collateral attack on preliminary steps or matters that led to that final decision. In addition, some of the issues she sought to raise fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, meaning they were not properly before the Supreme Court on judicial review. Because the petition was struck without leave to amend, VCC was clearly the successful party in the main proceeding. In the original reasons, the court did not decide costs, instead setting a timetable for written submissions. VCC was given time to file written submissions if it wished to seek costs, and Ms. Akemaru was given a corresponding opportunity to respond, with a right of brief reply for VCC. Pursuant to that timetable, VCC delivered written submissions seeking costs on May 1, 2026. Ms. Akemaru filed her written submissions on May 4 and May 6, 2026. The judgment now under consideration, 2026 BCSC 901, is Justice LeBlanc’s decision dealing solely with the issue of costs.

Positions of the parties on costs

Vancouver Community College, as respondent, relied on the Supreme Court Civil Rules and the general principle that a successful party is presumptively entitled to its costs. Specifically, VCC pointed to Rule 14-1(9), which provides that costs in a civil proceeding must be awarded to the successful party unless the court orders otherwise. It also referenced other subrules (including Rule 14-1(1)(c) and (d)) concerning the scale and character of costs awards. VCC argued there was no principled reason to depart from the ordinary rule and that, as the successful party in having the petition struck, it should receive its costs. The petitioner, Ms. Akemaru, opposed any award of costs against her. She asserted that the petition had been brought in good faith, motivated by a genuine concern for the fairness of VCC’s decision-making process and its impact on her education. She emphasized that she was self-represented and submitted that, as a public institution, VCC was better positioned to absorb its own legal expenses. She further argued that an order of costs against her would be unduly harsh and disproportionate, given her lack of financial means and the health problems that prevented her from working. Altogether, she invited the court to consider her good faith, self-represented status, and serious financial hardship as special circumstances warranting a departure from the usual “costs follow the event” rule.

Court’s analysis of costs factors

Justice LeBlanc began by reaffirming the governing legal principles. Under Rule 14-1(9), costs are to be awarded to the successful party unless the court orders otherwise. Case law such as Staley v. Squirrel Systems of Canada, Ltd. and Duhamel v. Financial Institutions Commission has confirmed that this presumption applies both in ordinary civil cases and in judicial review proceedings. The Court cited Bailey v. Victory for the rationale behind costs: they are intended, in part, to indemnify a successful party who has been forced into litigation, and they also serve broader functions such as discouraging frivolous or abusive proceedings and encouraging settlement. Against this background, the Court framed the question as whether there existed some principled, “extraordinary” factor sufficient to justify depriving VCC of its costs. On the petitioner’s first point—her good-faith belief in the merits of the petition—the Court held that a litigant’s subjective view of the strength of their case cannot be the basis for departing from the ordinary rule. Allowing subjective beliefs to control costs would permit unsuccessful litigants to avoid the normal consequences of losing whenever they personally believed their case was strong, undermining both the text and purpose of Rule 14-1(9). What matters is the actual outcome: once success is determined, the court may then examine whether extraordinary factors justify a departure. The Court found that Ms. Akemaru’s reasons for bringing the petition, although sincerely held, did not qualify as such an extraordinary factor. Turning to the second point—self-representation—the Court relied on authority including LeClair v. Mibrella Inc. to confirm that the Rules of Court and rules of evidence apply equally to represented and self-represented parties. Self-representation, whether voluntary or compelled by circumstances, is not a reason “connected with the case or leading up to the litigation” that would justify departing from the general rule on costs. To treat self-represented litigants differently on costs would create a parallel costs regime and undermine the consistency and predictability of the system. Finally, on financial hardship, the Court expressed sympathy for Ms. Akemaru’s situation but concluded that hardship alone does not provide a principled basis for refusing costs to the successful party. The Court referred to Laktin v. (Vancouver) City and the authorities discussed there, including Robinson v. Lakner and Chen, which collectively establish that a party’s unfortunate personal or financial circumstances, standing alone, are not proper grounds for departing from the usual “costs follow the event” rule. To base costs decisions on the relative financial means of the parties would invert the system, measuring costs not by success in the litigation but by the parties’ personal situations, leading to inconsistency and undermining the “winnowing” function of costs.

Outcome on costs

After reviewing the three main considerations advanced by Ms. Akemaru—good faith, self-representation, and financial hardship—Justice LeBlanc concluded that none of them, individually or collectively, amounted to a principled, case-related reason to deny VCC its costs. The factors were not sufficiently “connected to the case” in the sense required by the authorities; they were largely personal circumstances rather than features of the litigation or the conduct of the parties in it. Considering them in the aggregate could not transform them into a proper basis to depart from the established rule. The Court therefore held that Vancouver Community College, as the successful party, is entitled to its costs payable on Scale B, with any dispute as to the quantification of those costs to be resolved by the Registrar in the usual way. The order also dispenses with the need for Ms. Akemaru’s signature on the formal order. In the result, Vancouver Community College is the successful party, but the exact total amount of costs payable to it is not specified in this decision and cannot be determined from the text of the judgment alone.