Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Dispute centered on whether the worker received the Board’s January 31, 2025 permanent disability decision and whether the 90-day review deadline should be extended in light of that alleged non-receipt.
• Application of the statutory presumption of service by mail under s. 344 of the Workers Compensation Act, and whether the worker’s absence from Canada and subsequent move rebutted that presumption.
• Reasonableness of the Chief Review Officer’s refusal to extend time under s. 270(2), including failure to treat the worker’s sworn factual account as evidence and to assess his good faith.
• Adequacy of proof that the decision was actually mailed, and whether the Board could rely on portal posting and non-returned mail to discharge its service obligations.
• Scope of procedural fairness owed in extension-of-time decisions, particularly the duty to consider relevant evidence, avoid presuming a lack of credibility, and give an opportunity to provide corroboration.
• Question whether denying an extension based on a misdelivered or unreceived decision creates an “injustice” within the meaning of s. 270(2)(b) of the Act.

Background and injury

The case arises from a workplace injury suffered by the petitioner, Dylan Carpenter, on January 16, 2024 in the course of his employment. His claim was accepted by the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia for a lumbar back strain on April 9, 2024. Shortly thereafter, on April 22, 2024, the Board decided that he was no longer temporarily disabled and ended his entitlement to wage loss benefits beyond April 14, 2024. Mr. Carpenter disagreed with that early termination of benefits and sought review within the internal review system of the Board (the Review Division). On December 3, 2024, the Review Division varied the Board’s initial wage loss decision, finding that he remained entitled to wage loss benefits beyond April 14, 2024 and remitting the matter to the Board to determine the nature and extent of his benefits beyond that date.

Board decisions and timelines

Following the successful wage loss review, the Board issued a further decision on January 31, 2025 dealing with the petitioner’s permanent disability (the Permanent Disability Decision). In that decision, the Board determined that his lumbar strain had resolved and his pain condition had stabilized by July 16, 2024, effectively limiting the recognized duration and consequences of his injury. The Board asserts that this decision was mailed to Mr. Carpenter at his last known address on January 31, 2025, but it did not produce direct proof of mailing such as a mailing record or postal confirmation. Under s. 344(1)(b) and (2) of the Workers Compensation Act, documents sent by mail to a party’s last known address are “deemed” to be received on the eighth day after mailing, subject to an exception where absence or other factors beyond the party’s control mean the document is not actually received. The 90-day limit to request review of a Board decision under s. 270(1) of the Act would therefore ordinarily run from that deemed date of receipt. In September 2025, months after the Permanent Disability Decision, Mr. Carpenter contacted the Board about his long-term disability referral. On September 23, 2025, a long-term disability officer informed him by phone that a 2.5% loss of functional impairment had been implemented. It was during that call that he first became aware that a permanent disability decision had been made at all, and he indicated he did not recall ever receiving the January 31, 2025 letter. On September 25, 2025, the Board issued a written loss of function decision awarding him a lump-sum loss of function payment of $35,626.57. That amount, however, was an administrative award by the Board and not a new monetary award made by the Supreme Court in this judicial review proceeding.

Extension of time dispute

Once he learned of the Permanent Disability Decision, Mr. Carpenter promptly filed a request for review on October 1, 2025, accompanied by a request for an extension of time to bring the review. He explained that he had not received the January 31, 2025 letter and had only become aware of it during the September phone call. The Review Division denied the extension request on October 9, 2025, finding that he had not provided sufficient information to explain his failure to receive the decision and therefore had not demonstrated “special circumstances” under s. 270(2) to justify an extension. In response, Mr. Carpenter sought reconsideration by the Chief Review Officer on November 3, 2025. He provided further detail: he had been outside Canada around the time the decision was issued, there had been a Canada Post strike and resulting mail backlog, and he moved residences in late February 2025, providing his new address. He argued that the combination of international travel, postal disruption, and moving house constituted special circumstances explaining why he did not receive the decision within the 90-day period. The Chief Review Officer issued a reconsideration decision on December 15, 2025, confirming the original denial of the extension. She found no evidence of a continuing mail backlog after the Canada Post strike ended on December 17, 2024 and noted there was “no evidence” that the petitioner had actually moved in February 2025. She also emphasized that the Permanent Disability Decision had been available to him on the online WorkSafeBC portal once issued, and that the letter was not returned to the Board as undeliverable. On that basis, she concluded that the factors he advanced did not explain his inability to submit a request for review within the statutory 90-day limit and refused to extend time. Mr. Carpenter then sought judicial review in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, challenging the reasonableness of the Reconsideration Decision.

Statutory framework and policy guidance

The legal framework is rooted in the Workers Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 2019, c. 1. Section 270(1) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing review requests. Section 270(2) allows the Chief Review Officer to extend that time where two requirements are met: (a) “special circumstances” existed that precluded filing the review request within 90 days, and (b) an “injustice” would otherwise result. Service of decisions is governed by s. 344. Under s. 344(1)(b) and (2), a decision mailed to a party’s last known address is deemed to be received eight days after mailing. But s. 344(4) carves out a critical exception: the deeming rule does not apply if, “through absence, accident, illness or other cause beyond the party’s control,” a party who acts in good faith does not receive the copy until after the deemed date. The Review Division’s own Manual of Practices and Procedures fleshes out how these statutory concepts are applied in practice. Item A2.4.2.1 explains that the statutory presumption of receipt is rebuttable and that an applicant must provide evidence of specific circumstances that led, or could reasonably have led, to non-receipt; it gives examples such as interference with a mailbox or confusion between similar addresses. Item A2.4.2.6 confirms that the Chief Review Officer may reconsider denied extension applications and make a new decision, noting that a new application is more likely to succeed if brought without unreasonable delay and supported by new information or identification of an error in the previous ruling. Although the Manual provisions are not themselves legislative “policy terms” in the sense of a private insurance contract, they function as internal procedural rules guiding how the Board interprets and applies the statutory clauses on service, special circumstances, reconsideration, and timelines.

Reasoning of the Supreme Court

On judicial review, the Supreme Court applied the standard of reasonableness to the Chief Review Officer’s decision, given that decisions about extensions of time and review procedures are not appealable to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal and fall within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over compensation matters. The central question was whether the Reconsideration Decision was justified, intelligible, and transparent in its treatment of the evidence and the statutory criteria. The Court focused on several key concerns. First, it found that the Chief Review Officer unreasonably failed to meaningfully consider the petitioner’s direct evidence that he did not receive the Permanent Disability Decision letter. His non-receipt was, in itself, a plausible explanation for why he could not request a review within 90 days, and he had no obligation under the Act to monitor the online portal to discover decisions; the statutory duty is on the Board to serve its decisions properly by mail. The mere fact that the decision was posted to the portal, or that the physical letter was not returned to the Board as undeliverable, did not prove service or disprove his account. Second, the Court held that the Chief Review Officer effectively discounted his evidence about being out of the country and moving house, relying instead on internal file memos that did not mention a move or travel. The Court noted these memos were not determinative of whether he had actually been abroad or relocated and that the decision-maker should not have used the absence of such references to undermine his credibility. Third, the judge stressed that Mr. Carpenter was being asked to “prove a negative”: proving that he had not received a letter is inherently difficult beyond his own testimony. In the course of the judicial review, he was in fact able to produce corroborating documents—such as flight records showing travel from Vancouver to Santa Ana, California from February 2 to February 12, 2025, and a rental agreement for a 24-foot moving van dated February 23, 2025—which supported his assertion that he was away and then moving house in the immediate period after the decision was allegedly mailed. The absence of a prior opportunity to provide this corroboration before the Reconsideration Decision was made underscored the procedural fairness concern. Fourth, the Court took issue with the way credibility and good faith were assessed. Unlike in earlier authorities where the tribunal had proactively invited more information about delay, here the Chief Review Officer appeared to presume a lack of credibility without giving the petitioner the same opportunity to bolster his explanation. Given that he applied for an extension as soon as he learned of the decision and provided a coherent account of absence and relocation, his conduct suggested that he was acting in good faith and that his situation fell squarely within the statutory exception in s. 344(4) for non-receipt “through absence” or other causes beyond his control. Finally, the Court accepted that being denied any chance to challenge the substantial Permanent Disability Decision solely because of a misdelivered or unreceived letter would amount to an “injustice” under s. 270(2)(b), especially where the decision affects wage loss and long-term disability entitlements.

Outcome and implications

The Supreme Court concluded that the Chief Review Officer’s refusal to grant an extension of time was unreasonable in its treatment of the evidence, its application of the statutory presumption of service, and its assessment of good faith and special circumstances. The Court emphasized that the Board cannot shift its obligation to serve decisions by mail onto a worker by insisting that he should have discovered the decision through the online portal. If the decision letter was never received, and there were credible reasons—such as documented absence from the country and a subsequent move—that could have disrupted mail delivery, a rigid reliance on the presumption of service and on internal file notes was not justified. The petition for judicial review was therefore allowed. The matter was remitted to the Chief Review Officer to reconsider the extension application afresh, this time taking proper account of Mr. Carpenter’s evidence that he did not receive the decision, his documented travel outside Canada, and his move, and permitting him to adduce further evidence about the timing and circumstances of his relocation. In practical terms, this outcome leaves the underlying entitlement to permanent disability and wage loss benefits still to be determined within the Board’s internal review system. The successful party in the judicial review is the petitioner, Dylan Carpenter, but the Court did not itself grant or quantify any new monetary award, damages, or costs in his favour; on the face of the judgment, the total amount ordered or awarded by the Court cannot be determined.