Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The plaintiff sought $30 million in damages against the Crown for alleged wrongs by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), a non-suable quasi-judicial entity.
• Substituting Ontario as defendant in place of the HRTO does not cure the defect — the Crown is statutorily shielded from liability for acts of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
• Relitigating claims already dismissed in a prior action constitutes an abuse of process, offending principles of judicial economy, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice.
• A Rule 2.1 dismissal is appropriate only in the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleadings — a standard met here.
• The proper recourse for a party dissatisfied with a tribunal's decision is judicial review or a statutory appeal, not a civil damages action in the Superior Court.
• Bringing a collateral attack on a tribunal's decision through a civil action is itself an independent ground for dismissal as an abuse of process.

Background and facts

Pardeep Chodha, a self-represented litigant, had previously filed a human rights complaint against his former employer under the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c. H.19. That complaint was heard and determined by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO). Dissatisfied with the HRTO's handling of his discrimination claim, Chodha commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Toronto (the "First Action") against the HRTO itself, seeking $18 million in various heads of damages for alleged wrongs committed by the tribunal in the course of those proceedings.

On August 19, 2024, Justice Koehnen dismissed the First Action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg. 194, finding it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process on two grounds: first, that the HRTO, as a statutory tribunal exercising a quasi-judicial function, is not liable to suit for damages; and second, that the action constituted an improper collateral attack on the HRTO's decision. Justice Koehnen expressly directed Chodha that the appropriate avenue for challenging a tribunal's decision is judicial review or a statutory appeal — not a civil damages claim.

Despite that guidance, on January 27, 2025, Chodha commenced a new action in Brampton (the "within action") against the Attorney General of Ontario, seeking $30 million in damages. The statement of claim expressly framed the claim as being brought against Ontario "in lieu of the actionable wrongdoing of HRTO" or "on behalf of" the HRTO, which Chodha himself acknowledged was a non-suable entity. The claim arose from the same HRTO proceedings and discrimination complaint that formed the basis of the dismissed First Action.

The defendant filed a written request to stay or dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01. Justice Doi directed the registrar to notify the parties of the court's concern, and Chodha filed written submissions in response.

Legal framework: Rule 2.1 dismissal

Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure empowers a court to exercise a gatekeeping function and summarily dismiss a proceeding that is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court's process. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690, the rule must be interpreted and applied robustly to weed out clearly abusive litigation, and is reserved for the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleadings. No evidence is filed on such a motion — the analysis is confined to the pleadings and any party submissions filed under the rule. A court may also review reasons and pleadings from other proceedings to assess whether the case is abusive (Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320).

Analysis and findings

Justice Doi found that the within action was clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process on multiple and independent grounds.

First, the claim was found to be essentially an attempt to relitigate the same issues that were the subject of the First Action, already dismissed by Justice Koehnen. The court applied the abuse of process doctrine, which operates to prevent the misuse of court proceedings in ways that are manifestly unfair or that bring the administration of justice into disrepute (Toronto (City) v. CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63; Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26; Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29). Relitigating a previously determined claim violates principles of judicial economy, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice (Behn, paras. 40–41).

Second, the court rejected the argument that naming the Attorney General of Ontario — rather than the HRTO directly — rendered the within action legally distinct from the First Action. Under section 9(2)(b) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, SO 2019, c. 7, Sch. 17, the Crown is not liable for anything done or omitted by a person discharging responsibilities of a judicial nature. Furthermore, the relationship between the Crown and members of quasi-judicial boards and tribunals exercising adjudicative authority derived from statute falls entirely outside the scope of vicarious liability (Daly v. Ontario (Landlord and Tenant Board), 2023 ONCA 152, citing Speckling v. Kearney, 2007 BCCA 145). Simply substituting Ontario as the defendant did not cure the fundamental deficiency identified in the First Action.

Third, to the extent the within action was grounded on the HRTO's conduct or decisions in the course of the discrimination proceedings, it constituted a collateral attack on the HRTO's decision — an independent basis for dismissal as an abuse of process (CUPE Local 79, paras. 33–34, 37).

Finally, the statement of claim did not plead any discernible cause of action or material facts capable of supporting a damages claim against Ontario beyond the improperly relitigated HRTO grievance. Chodha's written submissions in response to the Rule 2.1 notice similarly failed to raise any legal or factual grounds supporting the claim; to the contrary, they reinforced the court's conclusion by asserting grounds that amounted to a further attempt to relitigate the underlying discrimination dispute.

Outcome

The action was dismissed in its entirety by Justice M.T. Doi on May 19, 2026. The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, was the successful party. The action was dismissed without costs — no monetary award was made in favour of either party.