Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• David Tucci sought judicial review of a professional complaints committee's decision not to refer his complaint against an investigator to a discipline committee.
• Standing was the central legal issue: as a complainant in a professional discipline matter, Tucci had no right to challenge the substantive reasonableness of the committee's decision.
• Limited standing exists for complainants in professional discipline cases, but only to raise procedural fairness concerns — not to contest the merits of a decision.
• Tucci's procedural fairness arguments lacked sufficient specifics, amounting only to a general complaint about the adequacy and intelligibility of the committee's reasons.
• Jurisdiction was also contested; Tucci ultimately revised his requested remedy from a referral order to a remittal for reconsideration, but no formal amendment to the application was filed.
• Because the applicant lacked standing, the court dismissed the application without reaching the merits.

Facts of the case

David Tucci, a teacher, was found to have breached rules of professional conduct and was suspended for ten days without pay. The investigation into the allegations of professional misconduct was conducted by a Mr. Lorez. Dissatisfied with the investigation, Tucci filed a complaint against Lorez with the Human Resources Professionals Association (HRPA). On December 24, 2025, the HRPA's Complaints Committee declined to refer the complaint to the Discipline Committee. Tucci, representing himself, applied to the Ontario Divisional Court for judicial review of that decision, alleging procedural unfairness and asserting that Lorez had not conducted a proper investigation.

Preliminary court direction and revised relief sought

Before the hearing, the court issued a direction on January 19, 2026, signalling that it was considering dismissing the application on two grounds: lack of jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, and absence of merit. Tucci was served with a Rule 2.1 notice (Form 21A) and given fifteen days to provide submissions. In response, Tucci clarified that he was no longer asking the court to order a referral to the Discipline Committee — a remedy the court expressly noted it had no jurisdiction to grant. Instead, he revised his position to seek "the ordinary judicial review remedy of setting aside the December 20, 2024 decision and remitting the complaint for reconsideration by the Complaints Committee, by a differently constituted panel, with directions as the Court considers appropriate." Despite this revised position, Tucci did not formally amend his application to reflect the change.

Policy terms and procedural framework at issue

The governing statutory framework — referenced through the court's analysis and prior case law — makes clear that professional disciplinary proceedings are a matter between the regulatory association and its member whose conduct is under investigation. Complainants are not made parties to either the investigation or the disciplinary process itself. Under this framework, a complainant's standing to seek judicial review is narrowly circumscribed: unless a statute expressly provides otherwise, a complainant may only challenge a decision not to refer a complaint on grounds of procedural fairness, and may not challenge the substantive reasonableness of that decision.

Reasoning and analysis

Justice Shore applied the standing principles set out in Fuchigami v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2024 ONSC 106 (Div. Ct.), which confirmed that a complainant in a professional discipline case has no standing to challenge the substantive reasonableness of a decision not to refer a complaint to a discipline hearing. That decision drew on a broad line of Canadian authority — including decisions from Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and the Supreme Court of Canada (leave to appeal applications) — all consistently holding that a non-party complainant cannot seek judicial review of the merits of a disciplinary body's decision, with any available judicial review limited to procedural fairness issues.

Tucci argued that his application engaged procedural fairness, characterizing the Complaints Committee's decision as based on an unreasonable finding of fact in light of the evidence, and raising a general concern about the adequacy and intelligibility of the committee's reasons. The court found these submissions insufficient. Justice Shore held that the application failed to raise any genuine issues of procedural fairness, noting that Tucci provided no specifics beyond a vague complaint about reasons. Accordingly, even accepting the revised relief Tucci sought, the court found he lacked the standing necessary to bring the application.

Ruling and overall outcome

Justice Shore dismissed the application. The court held that Tucci lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Complaints Committee's decision, as his submissions did not raise any cognizable procedural fairness issue and a complainant has no standing to challenge the substantive reasonableness of such a decision absent express statutory authority. With no standing to bring the application, dismissal was required. The respondent, the Human Resources Professionals Association, was the successful party. The decision does not specify any costs award or monetary amount ordered.