Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Christina Orticello sued UltraStor-Caledon for conversion, negligence, and breach of contract, and sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to prevent the disposal or auction of her storage unit contents.
• Central to the dispute was the Use Agreement dated January 10, 2023, which permitted UltraStor to sell or dispose of stored property after seven consecutive days of payment default.
• Orticello's arrears under the Agreement amounted to approximately $9,725.80 at the time of the motion.
• No serious issue to be tried was found, as Orticello was in breach of the Agreement and UltraStor was exercising remedies expressly available to it under both the Agreement and the Repair and Storage Liens Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.25.
• Irreparable harm was not established, as Orticello repeatedly declined reasonable accommodations — including videoconference observation of the emptying and alternative storage arrangements — offered by both UltraStor and the court.
• The balance of convenience favoured UltraStor, given Orticello's own evidence that she could not pay her arrears until the resolution of unrelated personal injury actions, leaving UltraStor with little prospect of recovering what it was owed.

Facts of the case

Christina Orticello, self-represented, entered into a Use Agreement with UltraStor-Caledon ("UltraStor"), a commercial storage company, on January 10, 2023, for the rental of two storage units. Beginning in early 2025, UltraStor accommodated Orticello by accepting partial payments and reducing or waiving late fees. By January 30, 2026, UltraStor notified Orticello that her accounts were approximately a year past due and demanded full payment by March 31, 2026, failing which the unit contents would be auctioned without further notice. Orticello did not pay, and her outstanding arrears at the time of the motion totalled approximately $9,725.80. While Orticello disputed the amount, the court found that UltraStor had provided clear documentation of her payments and debt, and that no specific unaccounted-for payment could be identified from her materials.

Prior to commencing this action, Orticello had made two prior injunction attempts in separate personal injury proceedings to which UltraStor was not a party. Both motions were dismissed by Merritt J. On April 7, 2026, Merritt J. dismissed the second injunction motion but ordered that Orticello be permitted to observe the emptying of her units by videoconference within ten days, and that UltraStor would store any identified "evidence" for six months. On April 20, 2026, Merritt J. clarified that Orticello could identify evidentiary items to UltraStor during the emptying process. Orticello did not attend the scheduled videoconference observation. She maintained that the volume of material made identification impractical and that all unit contents — including food and propane canisters prohibited under the Agreement — had to be preserved in their entirety. UltraStor emptied the units after she failed to attend. On April 29, 2026, Orticello issued a Statement of Claim against UltraStor, and two days later brought the present injunction motion.

Policy terms and contractual clauses at issue

The Use Agreement set out monthly rent obligations for each of the two storage units and provided for the imposition of late charges. Critically, it stipulated that if Orticello defaulted on her payment obligations for seven consecutive days, UltraStor could treat the units and their contents as abandoned and terminate the Agreement. Upon such termination, UltraStor was entitled to sell, destroy, or otherwise dispose of the stored property to recover rental arrears, late fees, and the costs of effecting the sale. These contractual rights were mirrored in the Repair and Storage Liens Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.25, Part I. The Agreement also prohibited the storage of food and propane canisters — items that were found in Orticello's units.

Court's reasoning and analysis

Justice Parghi applied the well-established three-part test for interlocutory injunctive relief from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311: whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether irreparable harm would result if the injunction is refused, and whether the balance of convenience favours granting relief. The court noted the criteria are interrelated and not to be assessed in isolation, citing Circuit World Corp. v. Lesperance (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 674 (C.A.).

On the first branch, the court found no serious issue to be tried. Orticello's claims of breach of contract, negligence, and conversion each depended on the assertion that UltraStor acted unlawfully — a premise the court squarely rejected. It was Orticello who was in breach of the Agreement, and UltraStor was exercising its lawfully available remedies. UltraStor owed no duty to provide storage services for free or to preserve property after a prolonged default, and its actions did not constitute wrongful interference with property.

On irreparable harm, the court found that even accepting Orticello's claim that the units contained evidence relevant to her two personal injury actions, she had declined every reasonable opportunity to prevent harm to that evidence: she failed to bring her accounts current despite ample time; she made no alternative storage arrangements; and she did not attend the court-ordered videoconference observation. The court held that any resulting harm would be of her own making and could not, in those circumstances, be characterized as irreparable in the legal sense — harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or cannot be cured (RJR-MacDonald, at p. 341). Additionally, the court's order granting a 21-day window before any disposal gave Orticello one final opportunity to retrieve her belongings.

On balance of convenience, the court found that to allow Orticello's unreasonable conduct to tilt the balance in her favour would reward irrational behaviour and undermine the principles underlying injunctive relief. Citing Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, the court weighed the harm to each party and found that UltraStor — which, based on Orticello's own evidence, would almost certainly be unable to collect its arrears even after trial — would suffer greater prejudice if the injunction were granted.

Ruling and overall outcome

Justice Parghi dismissed Orticello's motion and granted UltraStor's request for an order permitting it to dispose of or auction the storage unit contents no sooner than 21 days from the date of the decision — being June 9, 2026 or thereafter — without further notice to Orticello. Until that date, Orticello remained at liberty to retrieve some or all of her belongings at her own expense. UltraStor was the successful party. On costs, the court declined to award the substantial indemnity costs sought by UltraStor, finding that the elevated scale was not warranted given that Orticello's repeated motions were in part attributable to her initial failure to name UltraStor as a defendant. UltraStor was awarded costs and disbursements, inclusive of HST, in the amount of $2,000 (against its partial indemnity costs of $3,316.77), to be paid by Orticello within 30 days.