Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• CLBC moved to strike or dismiss the plaintiff's third amended notice of civil claim (TANOCC) under Rules 9-5(1) and 9-6(5) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules.
• Central to the case is whether CLBC owed a duty to reassess the plaintiff's eligibility for community living support services, particularly between 2010 and 2024.
• Disputed factual issues exist as to whether the plaintiff made repeated requests for reassessment between 2010 and 2018, which CLBC denies receiving.
• Limitation period defences raised by CLBC turn on unresolved questions of discoverability and whether the plaintiff qualifies as a person under a disability under the Limitation Act.
• Several of the plaintiff's legal pleas — including administrative unlawfulness, fiduciary duty, and equality and disability accommodation — were struck or dismissed as legally untenable.
• Claims arising from events prior to the 2010 denial were dismissed, as those earlier disputes were either settled by a consent order or addressed by a reassessment that resulted in the 2010 denial.

Facts of the case

Li Wen Tan, appearing in person, brought a civil claim against Community Living British Columbia (CLBC), a government service provider established under the Community Living Authority Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 60, which is mandated to deliver community living support to adults with developmental disabilities. The plaintiff reached adulthood on June 4, 2008, having previously received support services through the Ministry of Children and Family Development. In anticipation of that transition, a representative applied for CLBC services on the plaintiff's behalf in May 2007. That application was denied on the basis that the plaintiff did not have a developmental disability, as CLBC's policy at the time required an IQ score of 70 or below — a requirement found only in CLBC's Provisional Policy Manual, not in the legislation itself. Following a dispute resolution process initiated in March 2008, CLBC confirmed the denial on April 24, 2008.

The plaintiff initiated judicial review proceedings regarding the 2007 denial, which were settled by a consent order requiring services to be provided until July 28, 2009. He applied again for services, and Dr. Joseph Klancnik of West Coast Psychological Services prepared a report dated May 11, 2009, finding the plaintiff's Full Scale IQ score to be 91. The application was again denied (the "2009 denial"). In October 2009, the Regulation was amended to create a new eligibility stream — the Personalized Supports Initiative (PSI) stream — applicable to persons diagnosed with, among other conditions, pervasive developmental disorder, provided they had significant limitations in adaptive functioning measured at least three standard deviations below the mean. The plaintiff had been diagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder. Dr. Klancnik reviewed earlier assessments from 2007 and 2008 and concluded that the plaintiff's combined score for all adaptive skill areas fell only 2.5 standard deviations below the mean, resulting in a further denial on February 9, 2010 (the "2010 denial"). CLBC asserts it had no further contact from the plaintiff after 2010, a position the plaintiff disputes through affidavit evidence from himself, his mother, and a friend. It is common ground that the plaintiff was reassessed by CLBC in early 2024 and was found eligible for services starting later that year. The plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Notice of Civil Claim on November 10, 2025.

Policy terms and regulatory criteria at issue

The eligibility framework turned on several iterations of the Community Living Authority Regulation, B.C. Reg. 231/2005. The original "developmental disability" definition required significant impairment of intellectual functioning manifesting before age 18, concurrent with impaired adaptive functioning, and meeting prescribed criteria. CLBC's policy imposed a 70 IQ threshold, later codified in 2008 when s. 2.1 of the Regulation was amended to prescribe a standardized IQ test score of 70 or below as an eligibility criterion. The PSI stream, added in October 2009, extended eligibility to persons with pervasive developmental disorder under s. 2.4, subject to s. 2.5's requirement of a combined adaptive skill score at least three standard deviations below the mean. In 2018, s. 2.1(b) introduced a less objectively measurable criterion, allowing a finding of developmental disability where a psychologist determines, in accordance with DSM-5, that adaptive behaviour problems are so severe that actual intellectual functioning is comparable to that of persons scoring 70 or below — even where the test score itself exceeds 70.

Reasoning and analysis

Justice Loo considered CLBC's three-pronged argument: that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action or genuine issue for trial; that the claims were plainly time-barred; and that certain legal pleas were legally untenable. On the first ground, the Court divided the relevant period into four segments. Claims arising prior to and up to the consent order were dismissed because those disputes had been resolved by settlement. Claims for the period between the consent order and the 2010 denial were also dismissed, as the plaintiff was in fact reassessed under the PSI stream and notified of the result on February 9, 2010. For the period from 2010 to 2018, however, the Court found a genuine issue for trial. The plaintiff pointed to ongoing personal difficulties — including conflicts with family, police involvement, and housing disputes — as evidence that his adaptive functioning had declined since 2008, and asserted that he had repeatedly sought reassessment during that period. Whether those requests were made presented a live factual dispute that could not be resolved on a striking application. For the period after the 2018 amendment, the Court found that the plaintiff's claim that he sought reassessment and would have qualified under the less objective 2018 criteria was not bound to fail — particularly given that he was in fact approved for services in 2024 under the current criteria.

On the limitation issue, the plaintiff invoked the discoverability provisions of the Limitation Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 13, and s. 19, which tolls the limitation period for persons under a disability until the later of when the disability ends or the claim is discovered. Dr. Todd Mason, a clinical psychologist, provided a letter dated November 17, 2025, opining that the plaintiff's longstanding neurodevelopmental and psychiatric conditions rendered him incapable of or substantially impeded in managing his personal legal affairs, and that these limitations would have materially prevented him from recognizing or pursuing legal remedies on his own initiative. Citing Rooney v. Galloway v. A.B., the Court held that limitation defences — particularly those turning on discoverability and disability — are inherently factual exercises requiring a full evidentiary foundation, and are rarely resolved on a striking application.

On the legal pleas, the Court struck the plea of "administrative unlawfulness" and the related prayer for a declaration of procedural unfairness, as there is no civil action for damages for breach of the duty of fairness — such remedies lie only in judicial review, per Roeder v. Lang Michener Lawrence & Shaw, 2007 BCCA 152. The plea of fiduciary or fiduciary-like obligations was dismissed because vulnerability alone is insufficient to ground a fiduciary duty; the plaintiff failed to identify any statutory undertaking by CLBC to act in his best interests, as required by Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24. The plea of "equality and disability accommodation" was struck on the basis that such matters fall under the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, and are not properly raised in a civil action.

Ruling and overall outcome

Justice Loo issued reasons for judgment on June 2, 2026. CLBC achieved partial success: the plaintiff's claims for the period up to the 2010 denial were dismissed under R. 9-6, and the pleas of administrative unlawfulness, equality and disability accommodation, and fiduciary or fiduciary-like obligations were struck or dismissed. CLBC's application to strike or dismiss the remaining claims was otherwise dismissed, meaning the plaintiff's core negligence claim — that CLBC failed to reassess him between 2010 and 2024 — survives and may proceed to trial. No monetary award, costs order, or damages amount was specified in this judgment.