Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Marie-Ange Mompremier failed to place her file in order and request inscription for hearing within the mandatory six-month deadline under the Code of Civil Procedure.
• A plaintiff who misses this deadline is presumed to have discontinued her action, and must demonstrate actual impossibility to act in order to be relieved of that default.
• Mompremier argued that the active status of the file, the complexity of the proceedings, and personal difficulties made it impossible to meet the deadline.
• The court found that her failure to seek a deadline extension was not the result of an impossibility, but rather ignorance of procedural rules and lack of diligence.
• Even had impossibility been established, the four-factor discretionary analysis — including the weak merits of the claim and a three-month delay in seeking relief — weighed against granting the application.
• Constitutional challenges raised by Mompremier were found to lack sufficient explanation and were seen as weakening rather than strengthening her claim.

Facts of the case

Marie-Ange Mompremier, self-represented, brought an action against the Ville de Montréal and the Procureur général du Québec claiming damages arising from a flood in one of her apartments. She also sought to have certain legislative provisions enacted by the Assemblée nationale declared invalid. Mompremier filed an initial originating application on February 3, 2025, serving the Ville de Montréal on February 12, 2025 and the Procureur général on February 14, 2025. Following a case management conference, the court set aside the imposition of a protocol on May 23, 2025, to allow Mompremier to file a revised originating application and to permit the defendants to bring motions to dismiss. On June 16, 2025, she filed a new originating application along with a notice of constitutional question. No protocol was ever concluded. Based on the progression of the file, the court fixed the date of service of that application at no later than August 11, 2025, making the deadline for inscription no later than February 10, 2026.

Procedural terms and statutory framework at issue

The key procedural obligation at issue is found in the Code of Civil Procedure (C.p.c.), which requires a plaintiff in a non-family civil matter to place her file in order and request inscription for hearing and judgment within a six-month deadline from the acceptance of a protocol, or from service of the originating application where no protocol exists. This six-month period is a strict deadline (délai de rigueur), and the sole responsibility for meeting it rests with the plaintiff. Under Article 177 of the C.p.c., a plaintiff who fails to meet this deadline within the prescribed period is presumed to have discontinued her action. To be relieved of this presumed discontinuance, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she was factually unable to request inscription within the strict deadline; and (2) that the circumstances justify lifting the sanction.

Court's reasoning and analysis

The court found that Mompremier was not in a state of impossibility. While she demonstrated some level of engagement with her file — evidenced by multiple amended pleadings and procedural steps — this did not constitute impossibility to act. The court emphasized that requesting an extension of the six-month deadline is not a complex matter, requiring only the filing of a case management notice (avis de gestion) with sufficient grounds. Mompremier testified orally that she was overwhelmed by her son's difficulties and by the volume of proceedings she had initiated, and that she was unaware of her obligation to seek inscription. The court held that ignorance of the law does not establish impossibility, and that a self-represented party is subject to the same procedural rules as a party represented by counsel. The court also noted that the Procureur général had informed Mompremier in writing, before the deadline expired, that she was in default — yet she took four months to respond to that correspondence and ultimately filed her application to be relieved of the default only after receiving the defendants' reply to a letter from the coordinating judge.

Proceeding to the discretionary analysis, the court assessed the four non-exhaustive factors. On the merits, the originating application failed to identify any fault on the part of the defendants or any causal link between a fault and the harm suffered, as required under Article 1457 of the Code civil du Québec. At the hearing, Mompremier was unable to explain what she was reproaching the Ville, let alone the Procureur général. Her constitutional questions — including a challenge to the internal limit on punitive damages under Article 1621 of the Code civil du Québec — were found to be unexplained and to weaken rather than strengthen her claim. As to delay, more than three months elapsed between the expiry of the six-month deadline and the filing of her application for relief, and the court found that Mompremier did not act promptly once she became aware of the default.

Ruling and overall outcome

The court rendered judgment on June 3, 2026. It declared that Marie-Ange Mompremier is presumed to have discontinued her originating application. Her application to be relieved of the default of failing to request inscription for hearing and judgment (séquence 61) was dismissed, with costs divided equally between the Ville de Montréal and the Procureur général du Québec. The defendants' motions to dismiss (séquences 27–28) were also dismissed, but as having become moot, and without costs. The Ville de Montréal and the Procureur général du Québec were the successful parties. No specific monetary amount was awarded in their favor beyond the costs order; the exact quantum of those costs was not specified in the judgment.