Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• This application under subsection 14(1) of PIPEDA challenged Motus Bank's requirement to collect the secondary accountholder's Social Insurance Number (SIN) before a joint chequing account could be opened.
• At the centre of the dispute was clause 4.3.3 of Schedule 1, which bars an organization from requiring consent to collect information beyond what is needed for explicitly specified, legitimate purposes.
• Before the litigation, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner had found the complaint "not well founded" and concluded that the bank gave a fair and reasonable response.
• Because a subsection 14(1) proceeding is a de novo review rather than a judicial review, the Court owed no deference to the Commissioner's report.
• Carrying the burden of proof, the self-represented applicant had to establish a breach through clear, convincing, and cogent evidence.
• Finding no compelling evidence that the SIN requirement was unnecessary, the Court dismissed the application without reaching remedies or costs.

Facts of the case

Siyi Wang, a self-represented litigant, attempted to open a joint chequing account with Motus Bank, a virtual bank, on January 8, 2024. He identified himself as the primary joint accountholder and declined to provide the SIN of the secondary accountholder, which Motus Bank's policy required before a joint chequing account could be opened (the Disputed Requirement). Because he refused, the account was not opened, and the record before the Court did not clearly establish the identity of the secondary accountholder. Between January 8 and February 7, 2024, Wang corresponded with bank representatives seeking to bypass the requirement, and on February 7 he escalated the matter to a Member Concerns Officer. By letter dated March 1, 2024, that officer explained that an individual account had to be opened before a joint account could be created, that collecting a SIN was necessary because Motus Bank exclusively offers interest-bearing deposit products, and that the bank had robust controls to protect sensitive information. Wang then filed a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. In an Investigation Report dated July 21, 2025, the OPC found the complaint "not well founded" and concluded that Motus Bank had provided a fair and reasonable response. On October 24, 2025, Wang filed a Notice of Application under subsection 14(1) of PIPEDA. The named respondents were Motus Bank, Meridian Credit Union Limited, and Coast Capital Savings Federal Credit Union.

Provisions and policy at issue

The application was brought under subsection 14(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, which allows a complainant to apply to the Court for a hearing after receiving the Commissioner's report. The core substantive provision was clause 4.3.3 of Schedule 1, under which an organization "shall not, as a condition of the supply of a product or service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and legitimate purposes." Wang argued that demanding the secondary accountholder's SIN exceeded what was necessary. Motus Bank's own "Privacy & Security Notice," filed as an exhibit to the affidavit of Michelle Hebert, stated that SINs are used for tax reporting when customers request interest- or investment-income-generating products and to verify and report credit information, and it told customers they may refuse to consent to the use or disclosure of their SIN except for purposes required by law, such as tax reporting.

The court's reasoning and analysis

Justice D'Agostino first set aside large portions of the respondents' affidavit evidence as argumentative and of no moment, and declined to decide the respondents' mootness arguments because the conclusion on the merits resolved the matter. On jurisdiction, the Court held that it could hear the application because the issues fell within the four corners of section 14 of PIPEDA and neither recognized limit on a de novo review applied; once the Commissioner's report is complete, a person becomes a complainant whether or not their own information is at stake. The Court emphasized that a subsection 14(1) application is a de novo review of the conduct complained of, not a judicial review, so no deference was owed to the OPC Report, and that the applicant bore the burden of proving a breach on a balance of probabilities through clear, convincing, and cogent evidence. Turning to the merits, the Court found Wang had not met that burden. He argued that the Disputed Requirement — rather than the SIN collection itself — breached PIPEDA because collecting the secondary accountholder's SIN was not required by law, while the respondents maintained the collection was necessary to meet their tax-compliance obligations and noted there had been no direct communication with the secondary accountholder. The Court concluded that Wang offered no compelling evidence that the requirement was unnecessary or that the bank had failed to explain its need, and that his extensive correspondence expressing disagreement did not substantiate a breach. His status as a self-represented litigant did not relax the standard of proof.

Ruling and outcome

The Court dismissed the application, holding that Wang had not shown Motus Bank's conduct breached any principle of PIPEDA; because no breach was established, the Court did not go on to consider remedies. Motus Bank and the other respondents were therefore the successful parties. Consistent with that result, the judgment expressly made no order as to costs, so no monetary amount was ordered in any party's favour.