Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Royal Bank of Canada commenced a summary judgment motion against defendant Yvonne Davis for credit card and line of credit debt in London (Middlesex County), a venue with no rational connection to the dispute.
• All material connections to the dispute — including where the contracts were formed, where the plaintiff's relevant offices are located, and where the defendant resided at the time — pointed to Peel Region, not Middlesex County.
• Justice Leach initiated a case management conference on his own motion under Rule 13.1.02(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assess whether the matter should be transferred to a more appropriate venue.
• Counsel for the plaintiff candidly acknowledged that the sole connection to London was the plaintiff's choice to retain counsel whose office is located there, which the court found insufficient to justify venue selection.
• Forum shopping by selecting a venue based on perceived procedural advantages — such as earlier hearing dates — was found to be improper both before and after the January 2026 rule amendments.
• Costs were denied to the plaintiff entirely, notwithstanding any contractual provisions contemplating cost recovery in collection proceedings, as an expression of the court's disapproval of the improper venue selection.

Facts of the case

Royal Bank of Canada commenced an action against Yvonne Davis, seeking summary judgment for credit card and line of credit debt allegedly owed to the bank. The motion was scheduled to be heard at London's regular motions court on June 5, 2026, before Justice I.F. Leach of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The underlying contractual arrangements between the parties were entered into at the Heart Lake Plaza branch of the bank, located in Brampton, in the Regional Municipality of Peel, in or around July 2013. At that time, Ms. Davis was a resident of Brampton. Between 2013 and the commencement of litigation in April 2025, she relocated to Fort Erie, in the Niagara Region. The plaintiff's credit card statements were issued from the bank's Credit Card Payment Centre in Toronto, and the supporting affidavit filed in support of the motion was sworn by Ms. Danielle Beausejour, who identified herself as being from Peel Region and associated with the plaintiff's office in Mississauga. The plaintiff was aware of Ms. Davis's Fort Erie address at the time it commenced proceedings, as that address was used on the statement of claim and on credit card statements sent to her there.

Contractual and procedural provisions at issue

The court's analysis turned primarily on Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets out the factors a court must consider in assessing whether a proceeding has a rational connection to a particular venue. These factors include where the substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, where the damages were sustained, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and whether judges and court facilities are available at the proposed alternative venue. Rule 13.1.02(4) confers jurisdiction on the court to order a transfer on its own initiative, a power that came into force as part of amendments effective January 6, 2026. The plaintiff argued that the amended rule should not apply because the action was commenced prior to February 1, 2026, when certain amendments took effect. The court also noted that the underlying agreements between the parties may have contained provisions contemplating the plaintiff's recovery of costs in collection proceedings, though the court ultimately declined to give effect to those provisions in the circumstances.

Court's reasoning and analysis

Justice Leach applied the Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors holistically, finding that none of them supported London (Middlesex County) as an appropriate venue. The substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim — including the formation of the credit agreements, the issuance of payment demands, and the defendant's alleged default — all occurred outside the Southwest Region, in Peel Region, Metropolitan Toronto, and/or the Niagara Region. Similarly, the damages alleged by the plaintiff were sustained in those regions. The court found that the convenience of the parties and witnesses also favoured transfer: the plaintiff's relevant offices were in Peel Region and Toronto, the defendant had never had any connection with Middlesex County, and witnesses with relevant knowledge were located outside the county. The court rejected the plaintiff's submission that the matter was effectively grandfathered by having been commenced before the amended rules took effect. Citing The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc., 2024 ONSC 5377 and The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End, 2025 ONSC 85, the court noted that forum shopping had never been appropriate even prior to the rule amendments, and that litigants who engaged in such conduct did so at their own peril. The court also dismissed the argument that the plaintiff's choice of London counsel was a factor deserving significant weight in determining venue, noting that summary judgment motions are presumptively heard virtually and that counsel could file electronically in any region just as easily. The court drew on Business Development Bank of Canada v. Ang, 2025 ONSC 1752, and Gallant v. Roswell, 2026 ONSC 2829, to reinforce that selecting a venue based on the hope of an earlier hearing date constitutes improper forum shopping, unfair to litigants who properly commenced proceedings in rationally connected judicial centres.

Ruling and overall outcome

Justice Leach ordered the transfer of the matter from London (Middlesex County) to Brampton (Peel Region), finding that Brampton was the reasonable and appropriate venue given its clear rational connection to the dispute — it was where the contractual arrangements were made, where the plaintiff's relevant branch and identified witness were located, and where the defendant resided at the time the contracts were entered into. The defendant, Yvonne Davis, was the successful party on the venue transfer issue. As a further expression of the court's disapproval of the improper forum shopping, the plaintiff was awarded no costs whatsoever in relation to the hearing, regardless of any contractual provisions in the underlying agreements contemplating cost recovery in collection proceedings. No exact monetary amount was ordered or awarded.