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Facts of the case
Port4Homes Inc. (the "Landlord") owns and operates Rocky Creek Village Manufactured Home Community, a manufactured home park on Vancouver Island. The Park is owned by Margot Mallicoat's parents, and Ms. Mallicoat and her brother Joel Walker are employees who manage it. Mary Jane Leena Skogland and Timothy Michael Poilievre commenced occupying site 66 at the Park on October 1, 2020 pursuant to a tenancy agreement, with both listed as tenants and a monthly rent of $570. In September 2021, a police incident occurred at the Park involving Ms. Skogland and Mr. Poilievre. Mr. Poilievre stopped residing at the Park shortly after the incident. No new tenancy agreement was signed between Ms. Skogland and the Landlord following his departure.
On September 12, 2021, Ms. Mallicoat sent Ms. Skogland an email acknowledging the police incident and stating that she could not end the existing tenancy without a police report or Mr. Poilievre's agreement. Nothing was done by either party to have a new tenancy agreement listing only Ms. Skogland as a tenant signed. A tenancy agreement with Mr. Poilievre's name crossed out was adduced in evidence at the RTB hearing; it was in dispute who had crossed out his name and when.
In September 2025 — approximately four years after Mr. Poilievre had left the Park — the Landlord contacted him and obtained his signature on a mutual agreement to end tenancy, with an eviction date of September 30, 2025. The Landlord took the position that the tenancy was ended for both Mr. Poilievre and Ms. Skogland and requested that Ms. Skogland vacate. Ms. Skogland refused. The Landlord filed an application for dispute resolution with the Residential Tenancy Branch (the "RTB"), seeking an order for possession. The matter was heard on November 14, 2025 by Arbitrator Mau. Ms. Skogland submitted evidence that the Landlord had commenced previous unsuccessful eviction proceedings against her at the RTB, and that she had filed a small claims action against the Landlord in September 2025 for damage to property, legal fees, and acts of nuisance. Her position was that the Landlord was acting in retaliation by relying on a mutual agreement signed by Mr. Poilievre, who had not resided at the site since 2021.
The arbitrator's decision
The Arbitrator issued her reasons on November 24, 2025, dismissing the Landlord's application for an order of possession. The Arbitrator found that the mutual agreement to end tenancy had been signed by Mr. Poilievre and the Landlord on September 23, 2025, and required all tenants to vacate the site by September 30, 2025. However, the Arbitrator found that Mr. Poilievre's tenancy had ended in 2021 pursuant to s. 37(1)(d) of the Manufactured Home Park Tenancy Act (MHPTA) when he vacated the manufactured home. The Arbitrator further found that by allowing Ms. Skogland to remain at the site after Mr. Poilievre vacated, the Landlord had effectively entered into a new but unwritten agreement with Ms. Skogland. Accordingly, the Arbitrator found that when Mr. Poilievre signed the mutual agreement — four years after vacating — he had no standing to do so, and the mutual agreement dated September 23, 2025 was of no force or effect. The Landlord's application was dismissed without leave to reapply.
Standard of review and statutory framework
The Landlord sought judicial review of the Decision, arguing it was patently unreasonable in its interpretation of s. 37(1)(d) of the MHPTA and that the reasons were insufficient. Under s. 5.1 of the MHPTA and s. 58 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (ATA), the applicable standard of review is patent unreasonableness, given the MHPTA's privative clause. A decision is patently unreasonable where it is "openly, clearly, evidently unreasonable" or where the result "must almost border on the absurd."
Section 37(1)(d) of the MHPTA provides that a tenancy ends when "the tenant vacates the manufactured home site or abandons a manufactured home on the site." Both "manufactured home" and "manufactured home site" are defined terms: a manufactured home site is a site rented for the purpose of being occupied by a manufactured home, while a manufactured home is a structure designed to be moved and used as living accommodation. The MHPTA does not define co-tenants, but RTB Policy Guideline 13 provides guidance on the rights and responsibilities of multiple tenants under a single tenancy agreement, including the rule that a tenancy may also end if the landlord and any tenant or co-tenant mutually agree in writing to end the tenancy, with that notice or agreement applying to all co-tenants.
Reasoning and analysis
Justice Chan found the Arbitrator's interpretation of s. 37(1)(d) to be patently unreasonable. It was undisputed that after Mr. Poilievre left in 2021, the mobile home remained on site and Ms. Skogland continued to live there — meaning the manufactured home site was never vacated. The Arbitrator did not explain how she interpreted "tenant" in s. 37(1)(d) to include only Mr. Poilievre, nor how she concluded that his departure from the manufactured home (as distinct from the manufactured home site) sufficed to end his tenancy under the section. The court noted that interpreting s. 37(1)(d) to allow a tenancy to end by a tenant leaving the Park regardless of whether the mobile home is removed would render the second situation in the provision — abandonment of the manufactured home on the site — superfluous. The court also found there were no prior court decisions on point and no judicial guidance as to the criteria for concluding that a tenant has vacated a manufactured home site.
In addition, the Arbitrator failed to engage with RTB Policy Guideline 13 on co-tenancy in the context of s. 37(1)(d). While not binding, guidelines are relevant and failure to address applicable guidelines — or explain a departure from them — may render a decision patently unreasonable. The Arbitrator did not say whether she found Guideline 13 inapplicable, and did not consider how the co-tenancy context interacted with the operation of s. 37(1)(d).
On sufficiency of reasons, the court held that RTB arbitrators' reasons must set out the applicable legal test, the findings of fact and evidence supporting those findings, and apply the test to those facts in a way that makes clear how and why the final decision was reached. The Arbitrator's finding that the Landlord had effectively entered into a new unwritten tenancy agreement with Ms. Skogland was not supported by any articulation of the applicable legal test, factual findings, or analysis. The court noted that under the MHPTA, a tenancy agreement includes an oral, implied, or express agreement based on the parties' conduct, but the Arbitrator did not set out what conduct she relied on to support that conclusion.
Ruling and outcome
Justice Chan found the Decision patently unreasonable and set it aside. The matter was remitted back to the RTB for a rehearing. The court declined to order that the rehearing be conducted by a new arbitrator, finding that such a direction would interfere with the assignment of matters at the discretion of the director of the RTB. Port4Homes Inc. was the successful party on judicial review. No monetary award was made.
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Supreme Court of British ColumbiaCase Number
S103631Practice Area
Administrative lawAmount
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