Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The central issue is whether a private electric scooter (E-Scooter) constitutes an "automobile" under the Insurance Act, RSA 2000, c I-3, for the purposes of Section B accident benefits coverage.
   
• Because Mr. Le Prieur was an occupant of the E-Scooter at the time of the collision, he is excluded from Section B coverage if the E-Scooter qualifies as an automobile.
   
• Aviva argued the statutory definition of "automobile" — which includes any self-propelled vehicle — plainly encompasses the E-Scooter, making resort to rules of contractual construction unnecessary.
   
• Mr. Le Prieur contended that "automobile" should be interpreted narrowly to include only registrable and insurable vehicles, and that micro-mobility users should be treated as pedestrians for Section B purposes.
   
• Under the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c T-6, the E-Scooter is classified as a prohibited miniature motor vehicle that cannot be registered or insured in Alberta.
   
• Ontario jurisprudence relied on by Mr. Le Prieur did not assist his position, as Alberta applies the statutory definition directly rather than a disjunctive three-part test.

Facts of the case

On October 18, 2024, Matthew Le Prieur was riding his personal Blade GT-II electric scooter (E-Scooter) in a downtown Edmonton bike lane when a corporate minivan, driven by an employee, commenced a right-hand turn across the lane into an alleyway. The E-Scooter and the Minivan collided, leaving Mr. Le Prieur injured and unable to work. The Minivan was insured by Aviva Insurance Company of Canada under the standard form owner's automobile policy approved by the Alberta Superintendent of Insurance, S.P.F. No. 1, the form in effect as of May 1, 2021 (the Policy). The parties agreed that at the time of the collision, the E-Scooter was self-propelled and that Mr. Le Prieur was an occupant of the E-Scooter. Under the Traffic Safety Act, the E-Scooter is classified as a miniature motor vehicle — specifically a prohibited one — that cannot be registered or insured as a motor vehicle in Alberta, except for authorized rental e-scooters in Edmonton and Calgary.

Mr. Le Prieur made a claim as an insured person under Section B of the Policy, which Aviva denied. Section B provides no-fault accident benefits including medical expenses (up to $50,000) and income replacement ($600/week for up to two years). Section B covers "insured persons," a category that includes any person struck by the described automobile who was not "the occupant of an automobile" at the time of the accident. Because the parties agreed Mr. Le Prieur was an occupant of the E-Scooter, his eligibility for Section B benefits turned entirely on whether the E-Scooter qualified as an automobile. If it did, he was excluded.

Policy terms and statutory provisions at issue

The Policy does not contain a general definition of "automobile." The Policy's definitions of "the automobile" and "the Described Automobile" define only the specific insured vehicle and its replacements. Accordingly, the court turned to the Insurance Act, which defines "automobile" at s 1(d) as including "a trolley bus and a self-propelled vehicle, and the trailers, accessories and equipment of automobiles, but does not include watercraft, aircraft or railway rolling stock that runs on rails." The Policy also defines "occupant" as a person driving, being carried in or upon or entering or getting on to or alighting from an automobile. Section B's insured person definition, at subsection 1(c), covers any person not the occupant of an automobile or railway rolling stock who is struck in Canada by the described automobile or a newly acquired or temporary substitute automobile.

Reasoning and analysis

Applications Judge Wanke held that the Insurance Act definition of "automobile" applies to the Policy. Relying on s 13 of the Interpretation Act, RSA 2000, c I-8, the court found that statutory definitions extend to regulations enacted under the same enactment unless a contrary intention appears. The Policy is a standard form approved by the Superintendent under s 551(1) of the Insurance Act, and neither the regulations nor the Policy expressed a contrary intention. The court also drew support from Twa v Co-operative Fire & Casualty Co, [1975] 1 SCR 97, in which the Supreme Court of Canada applied the definition of "automobile" from the Alberta Insurance Act, RSA 1955, c 159, to an automobile insurance contract and found that a motorcycle was a self-propelled vehicle within that definition.

Mr. Le Prieur's reliance on Thomeus v Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co, 1978 ALTASCAD 73, was rejected. That case dealt with a general accident policy, not an automobile insurance policy; automobile policies, unlike accident policies, are prescribed forms under the Insurance Act. Thomeus itself acknowledged at paragraph 9 that for automobile policies, the statutory definition of automobile applies and cannot be ignored. Ontario authorities, including Adams v Pineland Amusements Ltd, 2007 ONCA 844, were also found unhelpful: Ontario applies a disjunctive three-part test for determining whether a vehicle is an automobile, whereas Alberta applies the statutory definition directly. R v Pizzacalla, 2014 ONCA 706, similarly did not assist Mr. Le Prieur, as that case found an e-bike with inoperable pedals was a motor vehicle.

The court found the E-Scooter clearly qualifies as a vehicle under both the Traffic Safety Act definition and ordinary usage, and as a self-propelled vehicle it falls within the Insurance Act definition of automobile. The court found the policy language clear and unambiguous, making resort to rules of contractual construction — including contra proferentem — inappropriate. Even if construction rules applied, the court indicated it would reach the same conclusion. The court declined to accept Mr. Le Prieur's characterization of the E-Scooter as a low-speed micro-mobility device warranting special treatment, noting there was no evidence it was a low-speed device beyond an agreement as to its speed at the time of the collision, and that no evidence established legislative intent to extend Section B to riders in these circumstances.

Ruling and outcome

Applications Judge S. Wanke granted Aviva's application for summary dismissal and denied Mr. Le Prieur's cross-application for summary judgment. Because the E-Scooter constitutes an automobile under the Insurance Act, Mr. Le Prieur was an occupant of an automobile at the time of the accident and is therefore excluded from Section B coverage under the Policy. The court noted that Mr. Le Prieur has commenced a separate tort claim against the Minivan driver and owner, and that the outcome of this decision has no bearing on that proceeding. Costs were not resolved at the time of the decision; if the parties could not agree, written submissions were to be made within 30 days. The matter was heard on May 20, 2026, and the decision was dated June 17, 2026, with Aviva Insurance Company of Canada as the successful party. No monetary award or costs amount was specified in the decision.