Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Daniel Binette and Louise Giguère sought a court order compelling Shawn Coulter to allow pedestrian and vehicular access across his property for all Blue Hills sector residents.
• Standing to sue requires a direct, personal, and current legal interest under Article 85 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.
• Coulter argued that the plaintiffs lost their legal interest after selling their vacant lot on November 28, 2025.
• Partial inadmissibility was raised under Article 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the conclusion lacked a legal basis and that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
• At the preliminary stage, the court found it was not clear and obvious that the plaintiffs held no personal right of access under the special conditions in Coulter's title deed.
• Reformulating the contested conclusion to claim only rights personally held by the plaintiffs — rather than rights on behalf of all Blue Hills residents — was authorized by the court.

Facts of the case

Daniel Binette and Louise Giguère (the plaintiffs) and Shawn Coulter (the defendant) are owners of residences in Morin-Heights, in a sector commonly known as "Blue Hills." At the time the proceedings were initiated, the plaintiffs also owned a vacant lot in the same sector, identified as lot 6,364,431 of the Cadastre du Québec. On July 10, 2025, the plaintiffs commenced legal proceedings seeking, among other things, a declaration that their lot was landlocked, the establishment of a right-of-way over a lot belonging to Coulter — which in practice serves as a road used by sector residents — and damages for the prejudice allegedly caused by Coulter's conduct. On November 28, 2025, the plaintiffs sold the vacant lot. On February 5, 2026, the plaintiffs substantially amended their originating application to remove the conclusions targeted by the inadmissibility motion, with one exception: they maintained their claim seeking an order compelling Coulter to allow pedestrian and vehicular access across his lot (lot 3,737,350 of the Cadastre du Québec) for all residents of the Blue Hills sector.

Contractual clauses at issue

The plaintiffs grounded their remaining claim in the special conditions stipulated in the deed of sale by which Coulter acquired his lot. Those conditions provide, in relevant part, that the acquirer — Coulter — "obliges himself to never annul the character of the street" and "allows Blue Hills pedestrian and traffic." The plaintiffs argued that these clauses conferred on them, as Blue Hills sector residents, a right of pedestrian and vehicular access over Coulter's lot. Coulter, however, contended that the plaintiffs' residence never belonged to Blue Hills Company Ltd., which he argued is the only party the special conditions were intended to benefit, and that the plaintiffs were in any event seeking to enforce rights belonging to third parties not before the court.

Court's reasoning and analysis

Justice Pierre A. Béliveau of the Superior Court assessed the motion under Articles 168(2) and 168(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit a party to seek dismissal of a claim that is manifestly unfounded in law or brought by a party that manifestly lacks standing. The court noted, citing the Court of Appeal's decision in Province canadienne de la Congrégation de Sainte-Croix c. Centre de services scolaire Chemin-du-Roy, 2022 QCCA 227, that dismissal at a preliminary stage is warranted only where the absence of a legal basis is clear and evident on the face of the pleadings and supporting exhibits. Applying that standard, the court found it was not clear and obvious, at this stage, that the plaintiffs held no right entitling them to claim pedestrian and vehicular access, given that the pleadings and exhibits supported the finding that the plaintiffs reside in the Blue Hills sector — a fact Coulter himself acknowledged. Several factual and legal questions remained unresolved, including the precise scope of the "Blue Hills" sector referenced in the deed, the true reach of the special conditions, and their connection to the plaintiffs' property — matters that could not be resolved without weighing evidence, which falls outside the scope of a preliminary inadmissibility motion.

On the question of standing, the court reiterated the Supreme Court of Canada's teaching from Brunette c. Legault Joly Thiffault, 2018 CSC 55, that the required interest under Article 85 C.p.c. must be legal, direct, personal, born, and current. While the court accepted that the plaintiffs, as Blue Hills residents, could not be said to manifestly lack all legal interest, it identified a fundamental problem in the wording of the conclusion itself: it sought an order for the benefit of "all residents of the Blue Hills sector" rather than for the plaintiffs personally. Under Quebec procedural law, a party in an individual action cannot seek relief on behalf of a collectivity whose members are neither parties to the proceedings nor otherwise represented in accordance with applicable rules. Since the other Blue Hills residents were neither parties to the action nor otherwise put in issue, the conclusion as drafted was inadmissible.

Ruling and overall outcome

The court partially granted Coulter's inadmissibility motion. The contested conclusion — seeking access for all Blue Hills residents — was rejected for lack of sufficient standing to act on behalf of third parties. However, recognizing that the deficiency arose from the wording of the conclusion rather than from any manifest absence of a right of action, the court authorized the plaintiffs to amend their application to reformulate the conclusion so as to assert only the rights they personally claim to hold. The plaintiffs were ordered to notify this amendment within 15 days of the judgment, dated June 5, 2026. No monetary amount was awarded or ordered; costs were reserved to follow.