Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Poplar River First Nation (PRFN) sought an interim and interlocutory injunction against Canada and the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation (FFMC) to halt the divestiture of the FFMC, including the MV Poplar River vessel critical to the community's economic survival.
   
• Central to the motion was whether the Court of King's Bench of Manitoba had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against the federal Crown and a Crown agency.
   
• Section 22(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50) and common law principles of Crown immunity were identified as the primary statutory and legal bars to the injunctive relief sought.
   
• Exclusive federal court jurisdiction under s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7) to grant injunctions against federal boards and the Crown on judicial review was a key contested issue.
   
• PRFN argued for application of exceptions to Crown immunity, including the status quo exception and the unique property preservation principle, but the court found none applied on the facts.
   
• No cause of action had been pleaded against the FFMC in the statement of claim, which further undermined the basis for injunctive relief against it.

Facts of the case

Poplar River First Nation (PRFN) is an Ojibway First Nation community located on the east shore of Lake Winnipeg, Manitoba. It is a remote, fly-in community of approximately 1,400 people, with winter access to Berens River, Manitoba, where it connects to the all-weather road, which is generally accessible from December to March. During the open water season — typically May to October — the community relies on the MV Poplar River (the "Vessel"), a vessel owned by the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation (FFMC), a federal Crown agency. The Vessel has serviced northern Manitoba communities, including PRFN, since 1970, and has been owned by the FFMC since 2016. PRFN uses it to transport commercially harvested fish for sale and to supply critical goods and equipment to the community.

A couple of years prior to the proceedings, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) initiated a multi-phase process to divest itself of the FFMC, including the Vessel. The divestiture process involved an open solicitation of interest (February 19 to April 5, 2024), followed by a formal request for proposal process with three stages: Stage 1 — Solicitation of Initial Letters of Intent (December 5, 2024 to March 28, 2025); Stage 2 — Solicitation of Final Letters of Intent (May 7, 2025 to September 17, 2025); and Stage 3 — Closing (negotiation of a binding, final agreement). By the time of the hearing, the divestiture had reached the Closing stage.

PRFN raised concerns about the divestiture's impact on its economy throughout the process. Then-Chief Vera Mitchell wrote to the DFO on July 5, 2024, inquiring whether the Vessel would continue to serve PRFN following divestiture. David Mackay, Manager of PRFN's Negginan Fishing Station, participated in meetings with DFO representatives on or about November 22, 2023, February 1, 2024, and September 26, 2024. On September 26, 2025, counsel for PRFN wrote to the minister of the DFO, signalling an intention to seek injunctive relief if there was further inaction. On November 7, 2025, the minister replied, reiterating the DFO's public announcement of the divestiture decision made in November 2023 and stating that proposals were being assessed with input from Indigenous governments and organizations, including PRFN.

On December 11, 2025, PRFN filed a statement of claim against Canada and named the FFMC as a defendant, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the duty to consult and accommodate. That same day, PRFN also filed a notice of motion seeking an interim, interlocutory, and permanent injunction against Canada and the FFMC. The motion first appeared on the civil uncontested list on December 17, 2025, was adjourned by consent to January 5, 2026, and then adjourned by consent sine die. On March 4, 2026, PRFN requisitioned the motion back onto the list for March 11, 2026, and the parties agreed to set March 20, 2026, for argument on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

The court identified s. 22(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50) as the principal statutory bar to the relief sought against Canada. That provision states that where proceedings are brought against the Crown, and any relief is sought that might, in proceedings between persons, be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, a court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for specific performance, but in lieu thereof may make an order declaratory of the rights of the parties.

The court also considered ss. 18(1)(a) and 18(1)(b) of the Federal Courts Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7), which confer exclusive original jurisdiction on the Federal Court to issue injunctions, writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto, as well as declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission, or other tribunal, and to hear any application for relief of that nature — including proceedings brought against the Attorney General of Canada — but only on an application for judicial review. Additionally, the court examined whether any recognized exceptions to Crown immunity applied, including the constitutional challenge exception under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the unique property preservation exception established in Couchiching First Nation v. Attorney General of Canada (2010 ONSC 4373).

Reasoning and analysis

The court began by confirming that the essence of PRFN's underlying claim — for damages and declaratory relief — was within the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench, as agreed to by all parties and consistent with Manuge v. Canada (2010 SCC 67) and Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc. (2010 SCC 62). The dispositive question, however, was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant interim or interlocutory injunctive relief on the motion.

The court rejected PRFN's reliance on TeleZone as a complete answer to the jurisdiction question. In the court's view, TeleZone addressed the Grenier principle — specifically, whether litigants must proceed through judicial review in federal court before pursuing damages against the Crown in superior court — but did not address jurisdiction to grant interim or interlocutory injunctions in a damages claim against the Crown. Nothing in TeleZone departed from the well-established law that s. 22(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and common law principles of Crown immunity prohibit such coercive orders against Canada.

Turning to the FFMC, the court found that while the FFMC acknowledged being excluded from Crown immunity as a Crown agency pursuant to s. 35(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, this did not assist PRFN. There was no evidence that the FFMC had an independent or delegated duty to consult. Moreover, because an injunction cannot be obtained against Canada, it equally cannot be obtained against the FFMC — granting relief against the FFMC alone would effectively permit PRFN to circumvent Crown immunity, which would be improper. The court further noted that an injunction is not a stand-alone remedy but is ancillary to a cause of action, and no cause of action had been pleaded against the FFMC in PRFN's statement of claim (R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5).

The court then considered the available exceptions to the prohibition against injunctive relief binding the Crown. It found no constitutional challenge to legislation that would engage s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The unique property preservation exception from Couchiching was also inapplicable: post-Couchiching jurisprudence has distinguished between the preservation of unique property rights and the protection of economic interests, with the latter generally not attracting injunctive relief. PRFN's interests in the Vessel were economic in nature. The court further declined to apply the status quo exception. It noted that the motion's evidentiary foundation was insufficient, as PRFN could not advise the court where the Vessel currently was or in whose possession it remained. Without that information, the court could not determine what the status quo was or how an order could be drafted to preserve it. The court also observed that PRFN's notice of motion sought not merely to maintain the status quo but to require Canada to take positive steps to restore it — combining both prohibitive and mandatory injunctive relief in a manner that compounded the jurisdictional difficulty.

Ruling and overall outcome

The court dismissed PRFN's motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction, finding that the Court of King's Bench of Manitoba lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief sought against Canada and the FFMC. On costs, Canada made no submission, and while the FFMC sought an order for costs in its motions brief, the matter was not addressed at the oral hearing. The court noted that PRFN's motion raised important and complex issues, including the question of jurisdiction, and expressed the hope that the parties could agree to bear their own costs. If there is disagreement on costs, the court directed that an appointment be made for a one-hour hearing within 30 days of the decision, failing which the court declined to grant costs to any party. No monetary award was made. The defendants were the successful parties on the motion.