Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The Quebec Superior Court considered whether Mark Diaz's application for judicial review of the Club's August 31, 2017 refusal decision was filed within a reasonable delay.
• Jurisprudence generally treats 30 days as the benchmark for a reasonable delay in judicial review matters, absent exceptional circumstances.
• Evidence showed Diaz knew the content of the 2017 decision by August 24, 2017, yet did not file his application until 57 days later.
• Bylaw Article 6 permitted the Club's directors to refuse membership applications without giving or recording reasons.
• Natural justice principles, including the right to be heard, were found not to have been respected when Diaz's permanent membership was effectively revoked.
• No causal link was established between the Club's alleged conduct and the moral or pecuniary damages Diaz claimed.

Facts of the case

Mark Diaz had been a member of the Pointe-Claire Oldtimers Hockey Club Inc. (the "Club") for about a dozen years. In June 2015, despite his status as a permanent member, the Club refused his registration for the 2015-2016 season and barred him from its activities. This followed a physical altercation on November 24, 2013, between Diaz and Dario Fraticelli, then a Club board member, after which the Club's discipline committee suspended both men for one game. In early 2014, Diaz filed a complaint with police against Fraticelli, leading to criminal charges; Fraticelli was acquitted by the Montreal municipal court on September 30, 2015. On June 16, 2015, Diaz was informed of the Club's refusal of his registration for 2015-2016 (the "2015 Decision"), made unanimously by the board, with Fraticelli not participating in that discussion. Diaz's lawyers contested this decision in a July 8, 2015 letter but took no further action at that time. On August 4, 2016, Diaz's lawyers requested reinstatement for the 2016-2017 season and compensation for alleged moral damages; on August 30, 2016, he was informed the board had maintained his exclusion (the "2016 Decision"). Diaz again took no legal action. On July 17, 2017, Diaz applied and paid fees for the 2017-2018 season, but learned the board had decided at an August 16, 2017 meeting to refuse him. On August 24, 2017, Diaz's lawyer sent a formal notice proposing a meeting with the board. By letter dated August 31, 2017 (the "2017 Decision"), based on a board decision made August 9, 2017, the Club confirmed the refusal. Diaz commenced this judicial review proceeding on October 20, 2017, seeking $10,000 in moral damages and $1,080 in pecuniary damages, with legal interest from August 4, 2016.

Policy terms or contractual clauses at issue

The Club's by-laws set out categories of membership and the conditions under which membership rights arise and may end. Article 6 provides that "applications may be refused by the directors without the necessity of giving or recording reasons," with membership rights coming into existence only upon board approval. Article 7 describes a permanent member as someone who "will remain a member unless his membership is defaulted according to the by-laws or he is not deemed to be a member in good standing by the Board of Directors." The Club relied on Article 6 to justify its repeated refusals of Diaz's registration. The court found, however, that because Diaz held permanent member status, the Club's refusal functioned more like an expulsion than an ordinary refusal of a new membership application, which raised the requirement that internal by-laws governing revocation of membership be properly followed.

Court's reasoning and analysis

The court first addressed the timeliness of the judicial review application. Citing the principle that a 30-day period is generally treated as reasonable for bringing such an application, absent a demonstration of exceptional circumstances, the court noted Diaz knew of the substance of the 2017 Decision by August 24, 2017, yet filed his proceeding 57 days later, on October 20, 2017. The court also questioned why no recourse had been pursued earlier, given that the 2015, 2016, and 2017 decisions were essentially identical and based on the same grounds since 2015. Finding no fundamental right at stake and no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay, the court concluded the application was untimely and dismissed it on that basis alone, without needing to decide whether the 2017 Decision was arbitrary or unmotivated.

The court nonetheless examined the merits briefly. It explained that courts rarely intervene in the internal governance of private nonprofit corporations, doing so only where a decision is manifestly unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive to the point of suggesting bad faith or clear error. Because the Club's decision did not originate from an administrative body, the framework from Vavilov did not apply; instead, doctrinal principles governing private corporations applied. The court found that Diaz raised a legitimate concern: given his permanent member status, the refusal was effectively an expulsion, and he was never informed that his membership status was under board consideration, nor given an opportunity to respond to the concerns raised against him. On this basis, the rules of natural justice, including the right to be heard, were not followed.

On the damages claim, the court distinguished judicial review—which concerns the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of a decision-making process rather than monetary compensation—from a separate action in damages, noting the two recourses do not preclude one another. The court reviewed the factors the Club's secretary stated were considered in deciding to exclude Diaz, including the altercation with Fraticelli, the resulting criminal charges, other players' reluctance to play with Diaz, his litigious temperament, and a perceived failure to respect the league's values. The court found that filing a police complaint against Fraticelli was not in itself wrongful, and that it was not the court's role to assess the harshness of the board's decision, which resulted from internal deliberation. Ultimately, the court held Diaz had not established a causal link between any fault and the damages claimed.

Ruling and overall outcome

The Superior Court dismissed Diaz's application for judicial review and damages, finding that the proceeding had been brought outside a reasonable delay and that no causal link was shown between the alleged conduct and the damages sought. The Club and the Foundation were the successful parties. No monetary damages were awarded to Diaz; the judgment states the matter is dismissed "with costs" ("avec frais de justice"), but does not specify a dollar amount for those costs.