Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Central to the motion was whether the Court should grant the applicant an extension of time to appoint new counsel after it missed a court-ordered deadline.
• Governing the analysis was the four-factor Hennelly test for extensions of time, under which failing any single factor is not necessarily fatal.
• Whether the underlying application for judicial review had "some merit" turned on alleged breaches of procedural fairness by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA).
• A preliminary issue concerned the irregular form of the applicant's affidavit, which followed Quebec procedure rather than the Federal Courts Rules.
• Rule 302's limit on challenging multiple administrative decisions in one application was raised but found not without merit, given the close relationship between the two CFIA decisions.
• Costs formed the final consideration, with none awarded despite the applicant's success because deficiencies in its filings had complicated the analysis.

Facts of the case

The dispute arose from an application for judicial review that 9105-8015 Québec Inc. filed on May 9, 2025 against the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). The company challenged the cancellation of its licence, decided on April 9, 2025, and, on a full reading of the notice of application, also contested an earlier CFIA decision of December 18, 2024 suspending that licence. It alleged procedural irregularities, a flawed inspection and investigation process, and breaches of natural justice. Early in the proceeding the parties discussed amending the notice of application to address the defendant's concern that it improperly challenged two separate decisions. Those discussions did not resolve matters, and on August 20, 2025 the company's original lawyer, Pierre-David Gagnon, moved to withdraw as counsel, citing a breakdown in the relationship of trust. On January 27, 2026, Associate Judge Molgat granted that request and ordered the company to appoint new counsel by February 27, 2026. The company attempted to file a notice of change of counsel naming Jean-François Landry on March 25, 2026 — nearly a month late — and on March 31, 2026 tried to file a motion seeking an extension of time, leave to challenge two decisions, amendment of its notice of application, and special case management. On April 16, 2026, Associate Judge Shannon refused the late notice of change of counsel and, as a result, refused the March 31 motion. The company then filed the present application for an extension of time on April 22, 2026.

Statutory and procedural provisions at issue

Because the motion was decided in writing under Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules, the analysis centred on procedural provisions rather than any contract. The extension request was governed by the four-factor test from Canada (Attorney General) v Hennelly, which asks whether the party showed a continuing intention to pursue the claim, whether the claim has some merit, whether the opposing party would suffer prejudice, and whether there is a reasonable explanation for the delay; the Court noted that failing one factor is not necessarily fatal, the overriding consideration being that justice be done between the parties. Several other rules featured in the reasons: Rule 302, under which an application for judicial review normally relates to only one decision; paragraph 303(1)(a) and subsection 303(2), which require the Attorney General of Canada — not the federal body that made the decision — to be named as respondent; subsection 80(1) and Form 80A, which govern the form of affidavits; section 120, on representation of a corporation by one of its directors; and Rule 168, which allows dismissal of a proceeding that is irretrievably impeded by a court order. The Court also observed that the applicant's affidavit followed Quebec practice under articles 105 and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than the federal requirements.

The court's reasoning and analysis

The Court first addressed two preliminary matters. It agreed to amend the style of cause so that the Attorney General of Canada replaced the CFIA as defendant, as required by rule 303. It then declined to reject the applicant's affidavit: although the document did not comply with subsection 80(1) and Form 80A — it was sworn by a director who merely attested to the truth of the facts in the notice of application, in the Quebec style — the Court held the irregularity was not fatal, since rejecting it would not advance a case whose only live purpose was to regularize representation, and undertook instead to give the affidavit whatever weight it deserved. Turning to the Hennelly factors, the Court found the roughly one-month delay at least partly justified. While the affidavit and factum did not adequately explain the lateness — the factum's reference to resolving "procedural obstacles" and taking a step back being insufficient on its own — a review of the whole file showed the company had used the time to prepare a motion addressing the defendant's concerns and to propose measures to move the case forward, and the delay was in any event minor in the overall context. On continuing intention, the Court declined to find the company had abandoned its claim: former counsel had engaged in good-faith discussions, the stagnation stemmed mainly from the procedural impasse over representation rather than the company's conduct, and the March 31 motion — though refused — reflected an effort to get the case back on track, followed diligently the next week by the separate extension application. On merit, the Court accepted that the judicial review rested on arguable grounds, pointing to allegations that the CFIA's inspection "shifted into an investigation process without the applicant being properly notified," imposed control measures without "clear guidelines or normative references," ignored its own internal policies, and applied "extreme and permanent" penalties rather than graduated sanctions. As for Rule 302, the Court held the company's position was not without merit, because case law permits a single application where decisions are so closely related that they form a single whole. On prejudice, the Court noted the defendant did not claim it would be harmed and concluded the company was the only party that would suffer if the extension were refused, since it might otherwise be forced to seek representation by a director under section 120. Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's request to dismiss the entire proceeding under Rule 168, holding that this last-resort power did not apply at this stage.

Ruling and overall outcome

The applicant prevailed. Justice Joyal granted the extension of time to appoint new counsel, ordered the registry to accept the notice of change of counsel transmitted on March 25, 2026, and gave the company 15 days to file a further motion to regularize its notice of application and set a procedural framework, after which the time limits under articles 306 and following would begin to run again. Despite the applicant's success, the Court awarded no costs, directing that the matter be resolved "all without any expense" — because deficiencies in the application file had unduly complicated the analysis. No monetary sum was ordered, granted, or awarded to either side; the successful party, 9105-8015 Québec Inc., obtained procedural relief only, with costs set at zero.