Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficient interest to bring a judicial review application under article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Reasonableness was confirmed as the applicable standard of review for assessing whether the City exceeded its delegated zoning powers.
• Justice Bélanger ruled that the City's interpretation of article 155 of the Charter of Ville de Montréal – Annexe C was unreasonable.
• Evidence showed the challenged zoning provisions restricted seniors' residences from converting to other residential uses beyond what the City's delegated authority allowed.
• Analysis of article 113 of the Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme revealed that the disputed provisions violated the rule requiring uniform land uses within a zone.
• Ultimately, the Tribunal declared thirteen borough-level zoning provisions invalid and ordered costs against the City of Montreal.

Facts of the case

The Regroupement québécois des résidences pour aînés, together with two seniors' residence operators, Le Sommet de la Rive, s.e.c. and Résidence Le St-Michel Inc., filed a judicial review application against the City of Montreal. They challenged zoning provisions adopted by thirteen Montreal boroughs that prevented seniors' residences from being converted into other residential uses, generally limiting conversion only to social or community housing. The plaintiffs argued the rules exceeded the City's zoning authority (ultra vires), restricted their contractual freedom, reduced the market value of their buildings, and created financing difficulties that could ultimately affect the services offered to seniors. The Attorney General of Quebec received notice under article 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure but did not intervene.

Regulatory provisions at issue

Central to the dispute was article 155 of the Charter of Ville de Montréal – Annexe C, which allows the City to vary the zoning norms set out in article 113 of the Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme according to several factors, including microclimatic impacts, sightline corridors, "uses and occupations exercised" together with construction on adjacent lots, and other site-integration criteria. The City argued this provision let it restrict changes of use based on "occupations exercised." The plaintiffs pointed to article 113(2)(3) LAU, which lets municipalities specify permitted and prohibited uses per zone, and to the uniformity requirement in article 113(2)(2) LAU, which mandates that permitted uses remain consistent throughout a zone. They also referenced article 113(2)(21) LAU, which allows municipalities to restrict a change from a residential to a non-residential use — an exception the City conceded did not apply here.

Court's reasoning and analysis

Justice Bélanger began by confirming the plaintiffs had sufficient interest to bring the application, both because their own residences were directly affected and because the case raised a matter of public interest extending to other service-based housing. Applying the reasonableness standard confirmed in Vavilov, the judge examined whether the City's reading of article 155 CVM-AC fell within a reasonable range of interpretations and held that it did not. The repeated use of the word "selon" throughout article 155 separates four distinct factors, meaning "uses and occupations exercised" must be read together with "construction on adjacent lots" as a single integration-related criterion rather than an independent basis for restricting use changes. Reading the article as the City proposed would also make the adjacent-construction reference redundant and would ignore the final catch-all phrase, which points toward site-integration standards rather than land-use restrictions. Turning to context, the judge found that article 113(2)(3) LAU already gives municipalities broad authority to permit or prohibit uses without needing article 155 CVM-AC, and that the challenged provisions instead contradicted that section by allowing an authorized use in a zone while blocking its conversion to other uses also authorized there. This conflicted with the settled rule requiring uniformity of permitted uses within a zone. While article 113(2)(21) LAU does permit municipalities to restrict certain use changes, the City acknowledged that this provision did not support the disputed rules. Because a delegated power to discriminate between uses must be express or necessarily implied, and article 155 CVM-AC contains no such authorization, the judge concluded that the City exceeded its zoning powers under both article 155 CVM-AC and article 113 LAU.

Ruling and outcome

The Tribunal granted the plaintiffs' judicial review application, siding with the Regroupement québécois des résidences pour aînés, Le Sommet de la Rive, s.e.c., and Résidence Le St-Michel Inc. It declared invalid thirteen specific zoning provisions adopted across the boroughs of Ville-Marie, Lachine, Mercier–Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, Rosemont–Petite-Patrie, Pierrefonds–Roxboro, Outremont, Sud-Ouest, Verdun, Plateau-Mont-Royal, Côte-des-Neiges–Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, Montréal-Nord, Rivière-des-Prairies–Pointe-aux-Trembles, and Villeray–Saint-Michel–Parc-Extension. Court costs were also ordered against the City of Montreal; the judgment does not specify an exact monetary amount for those costs, and no damages were claimed or awarded in this proceeding.