Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• Genora Ann Collmann appealed a Supreme Court of British Columbia order striking her negligence claim against her lending institution's lawyer and his firm.
   
• Respondents David B. Rally and Beck, Robinson & Company, Law Corporation applied to quash the appeal as devoid of merit.
   
• Collmann had admitted, both in her application response and during submissions, that the respondents owed her no duty of care.
   
• Three grounds of appeal were advanced: improper fact-finding by the chambers judge, erroneous rejection of a duty of care, and loss of her right to examinations for discovery.
   
• Each ground was found to lack arguable merit given her admission and the availability of recourse against Capital Direct and Rosborough in the related foreclosure proceeding.
   
• Costs had not yet been determined, and the quashing order was made without prejudice to any future leave application on costs.
   

Facts of the case

Genora Ann Collmann obtained a two-year mortgage from Capital Direct Lending Corp. in June 2024 in connection with a property purchase. She was represented by Rosborough & Company, while Capital Direct was represented by David B. Rally and Beck, Robinson & Company, Law Corporation (the respondents). Around the time she agreed to the mortgage, Collmann signed a Hypothecated Funds Agreement requiring her to deposit $23,651 into the respondents' trust account, funds intended to cover her first 12 months of mortgage payments. The parties disputed whether she was also required to provide a void cheque or a pre-authorized debit agreement (PAD). Collmann maintained she sent a void cheque to Rosborough in June 2024 after being instructed to do so by one of that firm's conveyancers. In April 2025, Capital Direct requested a void cheque or PAD from Collmann, which she says she never received. No void cheque or payment reached Capital Direct before the hypothecated funds ran out, and her mortgage fell into arrears after June 1, 2025. Collmann attributed the missed payments to clerical errors by Capital Direct, the respondents, or Rosborough. Capital Direct filed a foreclosure petition, and Collmann responded by suing the respondents and Rosborough in negligence, believing examinations for discovery would reveal who was responsible for the breakdown in communication. The respondents applied to strike her claim, and a chambers judge granted that order in January 2026. Collmann appealed, and the respondents then applied to quash the appeal itself.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

The chambers judge's original order relied on Rule 9-5(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, which allow a claim to be struck where it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, or is an abuse of process. On the application to quash the appeal, the Court of Appeal relied on section 24(1)(c) of the Court of Appeal Act, S.B.C. 2021, c. 6, which gives a division of the court jurisdiction to make any order it considers just. The court applied the established test that an appeal will be quashed where it is so devoid of arguable merit as to amount to an abuse of process.

Reasoning and analysis

Writing for the court, Justice Winteringham noted that the chambers judge had reviewed the applicable law and found that a lawyer does not owe a duty of care to a non-client where doing so would conflict with the lawyer's duty to their own client. Critically, Collmann had pleaded in her own application response that the respondents owed a duty of care to Capital Direct but not to her personally. That admission, repeated during oral submissions on the quashing application, was treated as fatal to her negligence claim regardless of the underlying factual disputes. The court rejected Collmann's argument that the chambers judge improperly made findings of fact, holding that the disputed facts she identified were irrelevant once she had conceded the absence of a duty of care. Her argument that a distinct duty arose from the respondents' handling of her void cheque was found comparable to one rejected in Mattu v. Punjab Law Group LLP, 2026 BCCA 112, since a lawyer's mere handling of funds for a non-client does not itself create a duty of care absent something more, such as an undertaking relied upon by the plaintiff. Collmann had not pleaded any such undertaking or reliance. Finally, the court found no merit in her argument that striking the claim deprived her of a means to determine who was at fault, noting she retained the ability to convert the foreclosure petition into an action against Capital Direct and to pursue discovery against Rosborough, who remained a defendant in her original claim.

Ruling and overall outcome

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia found each of Collmann's grounds of appeal to be without arguable merit and held that pursuing the appeal, in light of her own admission that the respondents owed her no duty of care, amounted to an abuse of process. The court granted the respondents' application to quash the appeal. No monetary award, costs, or damages were determined in this decision; costs had not yet been assessed, and the order was made without prejudice to any future application for leave to appeal a costs order.