Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The defendants sought to be relieved of a default for failing to plead within the delay prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP).
   
• Central to the dispute was whether an answer filed after a first attorney ceased representing the defendants had been validly filed.
   
• Section 192 of the CCP requires a formal notice before a case may proceed when a party's lawyer withdraws, and no such notice was sent here.
   
• Both parties disagreed on whether the plaintiff needed to send that notice before requesting a default judgment.
   
• Jurisprudence on sections 84, 180, and 192 of the CCP was submitted by the parties following the hearing.
   
• Ultimately, the court struck the request for default judgment because the defendants were not actually in default when they answered.
   

Facts of the case

On February 23rd, 2026, Monavocat Inc. served an originating application on Cubed Biotech Inc. and Adam B. Coape-Arnold by bailiff, seeking $8,419.10 [source states $8419,10] in unpaid legal fees. An answer was notified to the plaintiff's counsel by email on March 18th, 2026 (exhibit R-6). The next day, Me Qiabi, the defendants' counsel from Gattuso Bouchard Mazzone, filed a notice to cease representing the defendants. Despite this, an answer dated March 18th, 2026 was filed into the court record by Me Qiabi on March 30th, 2026, roughly twelve days after it had been notified. On April 7th, 2026, the plaintiff filed a request to set the case down for default judgment (dated April 3rd, 2026), on the basis that the defendants had not replied to the summons. The defendants then applied on April 18th, 2026 to transfer the file to the small claims division, since the amount sought was under $15,000.00 [source states $15 000,00]. That transfer application was rejected on April 7th, 2026 by the court clerk on the stated grounds that a default judgment had already been rendered [note: the source dates the rejection before the application itself was filed, an inconsistency the underlying decision does not resolve], though the decision notes this stated reason was not actually accurate. Following an inquiry attributed to Me Pina Mancuso, who filed a notice of substitution as the defendants' new attorney on May 11th, 2026, a rectified decision on the transfer application was issued on May 4th, 2026 [note: this date precedes the substitution notice that reportedly prompted it, an inconsistency present in the source], again rejecting the transfer because a request for default judgment remained pending. The defendants' motion to be relieved of their default, dated May 13th, 2026, was presented to the court on June 1st, 2026. A hearing took place on July 1st, 2026, after which both parties were invited to submit jurisprudence on the interpretation of section 192 of the CCP.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

Several CCP provisions framed the analysis. Section 84 allows a court to extend a delay that is not a strict time limit and to relieve a party from a resulting default. Section 180 permits a plaintiff to obtain judgment without further notice where a defendant fails to answer the summons, subject to specific notice obligations in other circumstances. Section 192 requires that, before a case is taken under advisement, a formal notice must be given to a party whose lawyer withdraws, dies, or becomes disqualified, directing that party to appoint new counsel or advise of an intention to self-represent; the party then has ten days to respond, during which no pleading may be filed or judgment rendered. Section 147, paragraph 2 requires that an answer be notified to the opposing party and filed with the court office. Section 87, paragraph 3 requires legal persons to be represented by an attorney to be heard or to file proceedings. The court also considered section 224, paragraph 2 of the Courts of Justice Act, concerning the payment of fees as a condition of valid filing.

Reasoning and analysis

Referring to Frank-Fort Construction Inc. v. Porsche Cars Canada Ltd., 2016 QCCS 2032, the court reiterated that relieving a party from default is a discretionary case-management decision requiring a degree of procedural liberality, a balancing of the plaintiff's right to proceed by default against the defendant's right to be fully heard, and consideration of the reasons for default, the interests of justice, and the merits the defaulting party wishes to raise. Brosses Lacasse Inc. c. Hamel, 2023 QCCA 1023, was cited for the factors relevant to such motions, including elapsed time, the parties' conduct, the prima facie strength of the defence, and resulting prejudice. Turning to whether the defendants' answer was validly filed, the court applied Omega Laboratories Ltd c. Claris Lifesciences Ltd., 2018 QCCS 833, which holds that an answer transmitted before a plaintiff requests inscription for default judgment is validly filed and precludes such a request. Since the answer was notified on March 18th, 2026 and filed on March 30th, 2026, before the plaintiff's April 7th, 2026 request, the request for default judgment was found to have been improperly filed. The court then examined, per Caisse populaire Desjardins du Village huron c. Bouchard, 2007 QCCQ 9973, that an answer must also be paid for to be valid, which the court found had occurred here. However, because Cubed Biotech Inc. is a legal person and its lawyer had ceased representing it before the answer was filed, section 87 technically rendered the answer improperly filed absent representation. This raised the applicability of section 192: the court reasoned, drawing on Sullivan's Construction of Statutes, that the legislature's use of "must" makes the notice obligation imperative, not discretionary. Since no notice under section 192 had been sent to the defendants advising them to appoint new counsel before the request for default judgment was filed, the plaintiff could not properly have sought default judgment against Cubed Biotech Inc., and no such request could in any event have been filed against Adam B. Coape-Arnold individually, as he was not required to be represented by counsel.

Ruling and overall outcome

The court found in favour of the defendants, declaring that they were not in default because the plaintiff had not served the notice required by section 192 of the CCP before seeking a default judgment. Accordingly, the request to set the case down for default judgment, dated April 3rd, 2026, was struck from the court record. The parties were ordered to file the notices required by the CCP, and the Greffe was directed to convene a provisional roll call to fix a date for a case management conference. The court noted the defendants' stated intention to seek a transfer to small claims court and the plaintiff's indication that he may amend his originating application. No specific monetary amount was awarded in this decision; the judgment addressed only the procedural default issue, with costs ordered to follow the outcome of the underlying action.