Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The tenant challenged a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order dated May 20, 2025, arguing it was based on incorrect facts and invalid service.
   
• Failure to seek leave to appeal the consent order under section 133 of the Courts of Justice Act undermined the tenant's position from the outset.
   
• Four specific grounds attacking the validity of the N8 notice were each considered and rejected on the merits.
   
• A second review of the Board's decision was barred by rule 26.18 of the LTB Rules, and the Board found no basis to waive that prohibition.
   
• Section 71 of the Residential Tenancies Act permitted the landlord to bring its application without the delay the tenant alleged was required.
   
• Ultimately, the eviction order was upheld because it flowed directly from a valid and binding consent order that the tenant had breached.
   

Facts of the case

Emeka Christian Igwe-Nweke, the tenant, brought an application for judicial review of two Landlord and Tenant Board decisions dated May 20, 2025, and July 3, 2025, along with an appeal of a Board decision dated June 25, 2025. The landlord, 260 Wellesley Residences, had alleged that the tenant was persistently late in his rent payments, a fact the tenant did not dispute. This led to a series of Board proceedings and the tenant's eventual eviction. The landlord served the tenant with a form N8 in late 2024 and early 2025, seeking to end the tenancy for persistent late payment of rent as of the end of the tenancy term on March 31, 2025. After the tenant requested mediation on April 22, 2025, the parties attended a video conference hearing on May 8, 2025, and agreed to a consent order. That order, issued May 20, 2025, allowed the tenancy to continue if the tenant paid June 2025 rent by June 15, 2025, and then paid rent on the first of each month from July 2025 through June 2026. The tenant later sought review of the consent order on June 16, 2025, which was dismissed on June 17, 2025, and then sought a second review on July 2, 2025, which the Board addressed in its July 3, 2025 decision. Separately, after the landlord brought an ex parte application alleging breach of the consent order, the Board issued an eviction order on June 25, 2025. A motion to set aside that eviction order was dismissed on July 31, 2025, after the tenant acknowledged he had not paid rent as required and had no income. A court-ordered stay of the eviction, conditioned on rent payment, was lifted on September 8, 2025, and the tenant left the premises on October 13, 2025.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

Several provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 were central to the proceeding. Section 78 permitted the landlord to bring an ex parte application after an alleged breach of the consent order, and the eviction order was issued under section 78(6) on that basis. Section 71 authorized the landlord to file its application without the premature delay the tenant claimed was required. Section 210 limits appeals from the Board to this court to questions of law alone, while section 133 of the Courts of Justice Act requires a party to obtain leave before appealing a consent order. Rule 26.18 of the LTB Rules prohibits a second review of a Board decision, a rule the Board declined to waive in this case. The court also applied guidance from Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, on the availability of judicial review where a statutory right of appeal is circumscribed, and on the applicable standards of review for questions of law, fact, and procedural fairness.

Reasoning and analysis

Justice Brownstone identified a threshold problem with the tenant's application: he had not sought leave to appeal the consent order under section 133 of the Courts of Justice Act, and given the weakness of his grounds, leave likely would not have been granted. The court then addressed each of the tenant's four objections to the N8 notice. The notice was found not to be false, since it accurately reflected that November and December 2024 rent was outstanding as of the date it was prepared, even though that rent was later paid before the consent order was reached. The court held there was no requirement for personal service by the landlord or for the tenant's middle name to appear on the order, and found the typographical error in a payment date immaterial, since the document clearly referred to a specific late payment. The court further held that any issues with the N8 should have been raised at the initial hearing rather than after the tenant chose to consent. On the second review order, the court found nothing unreasonable in the Board's refusal to waive rule 26.18, or in its conclusion that the landlord's application was not premature under section 71. Turning to the appeal, the court noted the tenant appealed only the eviction order, not the order confirming it, and in any event raised no question of law. His position rested entirely on the argument that the eviction order should fall because the consent order was invalid; having found the consent order valid and the tenant in breach of it, the court concluded there was no error in the eviction order or its confirmation.

Ruling and overall outcome

The court dismissed both the tenant's application for judicial review and his appeal, concluding that the consent order was valid, that the tenant had breached its terms, and that the resulting eviction order and subsequent confirming decisions disclosed no reviewable error. The landlord, 260 Wellesley Residences, was the successful party. The landlord sought no costs, and the court did not order any, so no monetary award was made in this decision.