Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The court considered whether a tax deed issued under the Municipal Act, 2001 extinguished any occupancy rights held by the prior owner's family.
   
• Justice Stothart evaluated whether Mako Group Inc. held valid registered title following a municipal tax sale completed on January 8, 2026.
   
• Evidentiary weight was given to the transfer deed and title registration confirming the property's conveyance to the applicant.
   
• Procedural history from a related file, including a lifted temporary injunction, informed the court's assessment of the tax sale's validity.
   
• Hardship arguments raised by the respondents were addressed against the backdrop of established case law on writs of possession.
   
• Outstanding submissions on costs were left to a structured post-decision process rather than resolved within the ruling itself.
   

Facts of the case

Mako Group Inc. applied to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for a declaration of ownership and an order for vacant possession of property municipally known as 449 Ferguson Avenue, described in the decision as being situated in both Haileybury and Temiskaming Shores, Ontario. The applicant had purchased the property through a municipal tax sale on January 8, 2026, but could not obtain possession because the respondents, Patricia Riethmueller and her husband (named as John Doe in the proceeding), refused to vacate. The property had previously belonged to Patricia Riethmueller's mother, Gerda Riethmueller. When municipal property taxes went unpaid, the City of Temiskaming Shores proceeded with a tax sale under the Municipal Act, 2001. Patricia Riethmueller had earlier sought an injunction to halt the sale in a separate proceeding (CV-25-0055); a temporary injunction was granted on September 16, 2025 by Bellows J., who noted the motion had been brought by Patricia Riethmueller rather than the property's owner, Gerda Riethmueller, and adjourned the matter for correction. Bellows J. lifted the injunction on September 24, 2025, clearing the way for the tax sale to proceed. Following the January 8, 2026 sale, the applicant served the respondents with a demand to vacate on February 10, 2026. Patricia Riethmueller responded that she was unaware of the change in ownership and asked to discuss a rental arrangement, citing poor health. Kevin Mako, acting for the applicant, declined a tenancy but offered a two-month rent-free accommodation period ending April 15, 2026; no agreement was ultimately reached. The respondents also pursued further motions under CV-25-0055 and correspondence with the Director of Land Titles disputing the tax deed's validity, none of which succeeded in halting the process.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

The decision turned on several provisions of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25. Section 379(7) provides that a tax deed vests in the purchaser an estate in fee simple, free from prior estates and interests, subject only to limited exceptions such as easements, restrictive covenants, and certain Crown interests, none of which applied here. Section 383 provides that a registered tax deed is final, binding, and conclusive, and not subject to challenge for reasons including invalidity of the underlying assessment or breaches of notice requirements under the Act. The court also applied Rule 59.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that an order is effective from the date it is made unless stated otherwise, and Rules 60.03 and 60.10, which govern enforcement of possession orders through a writ of possession, obtainable only with leave of the court.

Reasoning and analysis

Justice Stothart found that title had been properly transferred to the applicant by tax deed registered on January 8, 2026, based on the transfer deed and title registration provided in evidence. The court held that Bellows J.'s September 24, 2025 order lifting the temporary injunction was effective from the date it was made, consistent with Rule 59.01 and the reasoning in Karkar v. Karkar, 2011 ONSC 2550, meaning the City was free to proceed with the sale once that order took effect. The court noted that the former owner, Gerda Riethmueller, had not challenged the tax sale, and that both she and Patricia Riethmueller had received notice and demands for payment before the sale proceeded. Under section 379(7) of the Municipal Act, any leasehold or occupancy interest the respondents may have held through the prior owner was extinguished upon the tax sale, a conclusion supported by Lewis v. Mani (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 310 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Kenora (City) v. Eikre Holdings Ltd., 2018 ONSC 7635. The court acknowledged the respondents' evidence that they were vulnerable seniors facing difficulty securing alternative housing, but found this did not provide a legal basis to remain in possession. Citing Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. McLean, [1983] O.J. No. 269 (Ont. H.C.) and Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2025 ONSC 2966, the court held there is no discretion to refuse leave for a writ of possession on the basis of hardship alone. The court also observed that the respondents' stated intention to appeal the tax sale should not further delay the relief sought, given the extended time that had passed since the injunction was lifted and since the applicant took ownership.

Ruling and overall outcome

Justice Stothart granted the application in favour of Mako Group Inc. The court declared the applicant to be the registered owner of the property in fee simple and declared that the respondents, Patricia Riethmueller and her spouse, hold no lease, tenancy, licence, or other continuing right of possession against the applicant. The respondents and any other occupants were ordered to deliver vacant possession within fourteen days of the order, and the applicant was granted leave to issue a writ of possession directed to the Sheriff of the Territorial District of Timiskaming. On the issue of costs, the court did not fix an amount; instead, it directed the applicant to serve written submissions of no more than two pages within fifteen days of the decision, with the respondents permitted a further fifteen days to respond, failing which the costs issue would be deemed determined.