Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The appeal centered on whether registering a second certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the same property constituted an abuse of process.
   
• Ms. Davis's litigation strategy involved discontinuing her first action while registering a fresh CPL, then removing the original CPL from title.
   
• 1316215 BC Ltd. argued that this conduct deprived it of its crystallized right to a determination of its pending application to cancel the first CPL under section 252 of the Land Title Act.
   
• The chambers judge had concluded there was no abuse of process and, in the alternative, declined to exercise her discretion to cancel the CPL.
   
• Justice Riley found the chambers judge erred by failing to consider whether the manner of proceeding was abusive despite a valid protective purpose for the second action.
   
• A remedy was ordered remitting the matter to the Supreme Court of British Columbia for reconsideration under the section 252 framework.
   

Facts of the case

This appeal arose from a property dispute involving Jessica Ashley Davis and fourteen defendants, including the appellant, 1316215 BC Ltd. ("1316 Co."). Ms. Davis alleged that she and Edward Archibald had together purchased a property in Squamish, British Columbia (the "Squamish Property"), with title registered in the name of a company incorporated by Mr. Archibald in which Ms. Davis expected to be an equal shareholder and director. She further alleged that Mr. Archibald caused the company to sell the Squamish Property without her knowledge and below market value, and that the sale proceeds were used to purchase a property in Lake Country (the "Lake Country Property") in the name of one of his alter ego companies. Ms. Davis filed a first action against Mr. Archibald and related parties, including 1316 Co., which held title to the Squamish Property as trustee for the purchaser under a bare trust agreement. She registered CPLs against both properties (the "First CPLs"). During the first action, 1316 Co. applied twice to cancel Squamish CPL #1, with its second application invoking section 252 of the Land Title Act on the basis that no litigation step had been taken for over a year. Before that application was determined, Ms. Davis commenced a second action naming all original defendants plus additional defendants, registered fresh CPLs against both properties (the "Second CPLs"), then discontinued the first action and removed the First CPLs. Several defendants, including 1316 Co., applied in the second action to cancel the Second CPLs. The chambers judge dismissed 1316 Co.'s application, finding no abuse of process and, in the alternative, declining to exercise her discretion to cancel the CPL even if the registration had been abusive.

Policy and legislative provisions at issue

The case engaged Part 14, Division 3 of the Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 250 (LTA), which governs CPLs. Section 215 permits a party claiming an estate or interest in land to register a CPL against title. Section 216(1) prevents the land title registrar from making entries affecting the property until the CPL is cancelled in accordance with the LTA. Section 252(1) allows a property owner to apply to cancel a CPL where no step has been taken in the underlying proceeding for one year, reflecting the principle that a validly registered CPL is presumptively prejudicial to the property owner and that claimants must prosecute their claims diligently. The judgment also referenced sections 253, 254, and 256 as alternative avenues for cancellation, based respectively on discontinuance of the underlying claim, final dismissal of the claim, and hardship or inconvenience. Beyond the statutory scheme, the court considered the common law doctrine of abuse of process, including the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of British Columbia to cancel a CPL where pleadings fail to disclose an interest in land or where litigation conduct amounts to improper duplicative proceedings.

Reasoning and analysis

Justice Riley, writing for the Court, accepted the chambers judge's factual finding that Ms. Davis filed the second action for a genuine protective purpose rather than to intentionally thwart 1316 Co.'s section 252 application, noting that this finding could only be disturbed for palpable or overriding error. However, the Court found that this finding did not resolve the separate question of whether Ms. Davis's subsequent conduct — registering a fresh CPL and discontinuing the first action before 1316 Co.'s application was determined — was itself abusive. Drawing on Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, the Court reasoned that a multiplicity of proceedings can amount to an abuse of process where it offends judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice. The Court distinguished cases involving cautiously managed protective actions, such as The Owners, Strata Plan No. VIS3578 v. John A. Neilson Architects Inc., 2010 BCCA 329, and Esteghamat-Ardakani v. Taherkhani, 2023 BCCA 290, noting that Ms. Davis had not formally notified opposing parties of a protective intent, had not pursued a joinder application as an alternative, and had no compelling reason to immediately discontinue the first action before 1316 Co.'s pending application was heard. The Court concluded that Ms. Davis's manner of proceeding fell outside the range of reasonable strategic litigation choices and knowingly deprived 1316 Co. of its crystallized right to a determination of its section 252 application. On the question of remedy, the Court held that the chambers judge erred in principle by assessing prejudice through the lens of the hardship-and-inconvenience test under sections 256 to 257 of the LTA, rather than recognizing that prejudice is presumed once an applicant establishes a year of inaction under section 252.

Ruling and overall outcome

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal brought by 1316215 BC Ltd. Justice Riley, with Justices MacNaughton and Brundrett concurring, held that Ms. Davis's registration of the second CPL, combined with the discontinuance of the first action, constituted an abuse of process because it knowingly frustrated 1316 Co.'s crystallized right to a hearing on its application to cancel the first CPL under section 252 of the LTA. Rather than ordering outright cancellation, the Court determined that the appropriate and just remedy was to remit the matter to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, directing it to reconsider 1316 Co.'s application to cancel Squamish CPL #2 as though it were an application to cancel Squamish CPL #1 under the section 252 framework, with cancellation of the second CPL to follow if the Supreme Court determines that the first CPL should have been cancelled. The decision did not order any monetary award, damages, or costs at this stage; the Court instead invited supplementary submissions on 1316 Co.'s claim for special costs, to be filed according to a set schedule following release of the reasons.