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Facts of the case
Rocky View County (RVC) applied under section 554 of the Municipal Government Act for a statutory injunction against Westridge Utilities Inc., a regulated public utility that provides potable water service to roughly 1,800 residences and 6,500 people in RVC, including through nine fire hydrants in the Swift Creek subdivision. The hydrants were built under a 2007 development agreement between RVC and the original developer, Macdonald Westspring Properties, and received a Final Acceptance Certificate on February 2, 2011, showing flow rates of 2,100 to 2,500 litres per minute. Westridge acquired the Swift Creek Potable Water System, including the hydrants, later that month. RVC passed its Fire Hydrant Water Suppression Bylaw in 2013, and the two parties cooperated on hydrant testing from 2023 to 2025. On July 17, 2025, RVC learned two of the hydrants had been marked out of service, and on August 1, 2025, it issued an Enforcement Order requiring Westridge to provide inspection records and correct deficiencies. Westridge appealed, and while that appeal was pending, it marked all nine hydrants out of service on December 3, 2025. A subsequent report by Velocity Water Services, issued April 29, 2026, found that eight of the nine hydrants needed repair, three produced no water at all, and six produced only 257 litres per minute — well below both the certified 2011 flow rates and the bylaw's required 3,600 litres per minute. Westridge proposed an impairment plan on June 10, 2026; Westridge alleged that RVC did not respond to it, though the Court treated the question of RVC's response, or lack of response, as protected by settlement privilege and drew no inference from it either way. RVC's injunction application sought orders requiring Westridge to appoint an impairment coordinator, maintain a 24/7 fire watch, and establish a temporary freeze-proof water supply for Swift Creek.
Policy and legislative provisions at issue
The application turned on section 554(1) of the MGA, which allows a municipality to seek an injunction where there is a continuing contravention of an enactment it is authorized to enforce. RVC relied on section 5 of the Safety Codes Act, which requires an owner to ensure that a regulated thing complies with the Act and is properly maintained, together with the Alberta Fire Code and NFPA-25, both incorporated into the Safety Codes Act. Division C, section 2.2.7.2(5) of the Alberta Fire Code requires fire department approval before a hydrant is altered, repaired, shut down, or impaired, while Division B, section 6.4.1.1(1) incorporates NFPA-25's inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements. NFPA-25 defines "fire hydrant" in section 3.3.12 and sets out, in Chapter 15, the duties of an impairment coordinator during both preplanned and emergency impairments, including measures such as a fire watch or a temporary water supply where a system is out of service for more than ten hours in a 24-hour period. Westridge, for its part, pointed to the Fire Hydrant Bylaw's narrower definition of "fire hydrant" and to section 100 of the Public Utilities Act, which prohibits a public utility from providing services in an unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential manner.
Reasoning and analysis
Justice Jones first addressed evidentiary issues, declining to discount the Hansen Affidavit despite RVC's objections, but finding that the Velocity Water Services Report was hearsay if relied on for the truth of its contents, since its author did not attend the hearing and neither party cross-examined them. On threshold arguments, the Court held that RVC's application was not a collateral attack on, or an abuse of process relative to, the pending Enforcement Order Judicial Review, since the two proceedings sought different remedies and arose from a distinct statutory basis, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's recent guidance in Resler v Anglin, 2026 SCC 23. Turning to whether the hydrants were properly described as "fire hydrants," the Court applied the definitions in NFPA-25 and the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, together with the design intent reflected in the original subdivision and development approvals, and concluded that the hydrants met the definition regardless of Westridge's private ownership or the absence of any actual firefighting use. Applying the four-part test for a section 554(1) injunction set out in Kneehill County v Risler, 2024 ABKB 89, the Court found Westridge in continuing contravention of section 5 of the Safety Codes Act because it had failed to take the mitigation measures required under Chapter 15 of NFPA-25 after impairing the hydrants, and found that contravention unlikely to end without court intervention given the ten-month delay and the limited, conditional nature of Westridge's proposed impairment plan. The Court rejected Westridge's claim of exceptional circumstances, including arguments about selective enforcement, compliance costs, and potential conflict with the Public Utilities Act, relying in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Polai v City of Toronto that uneven enforcement does not excuse a party from complying with the law.
Ruling and overall outcome
Justice Jones granted Rocky View County's application for a statutory injunction under section 554(1) of the MGA, making Westridge the unsuccessful party on the central issue. The Court ordered Westridge to assign or identify an impairment coordinator within 24 hours, and to establish and maintain a freeze-proof temporary water supply for Swift Creek — capable of delivering at least 60 litres per second (3,600 litres per minute) for 1.5 hours, with a minimum volume of 320 cubic metres [the decision itself alternates between "cubic metres" and "cubic meters"] — within 10 days, or a later date if RVC consents. The Court declined to order a 24/7 fire watch, finding RVC had not shown it necessary, and declined to order general ongoing compliance with the Safety Codes Act, the Alberta Fire Code, and NFPA-25, citing the risk of requiring extensive judicial supervision of technical regulatory matters. The order remains in effect until the parties agree otherwise or the Court orders further. No monetary damages were claimed or awarded; costs were not determined in this decision, and the parties were directed to make written submissions on costs within thirty days if they cannot reach agreement, consistent with section 554.1 of the MGA governing municipal cost recovery.
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Court
Court of King's Bench of AlbertaCase Number
2601 02853Practice Area
Civil litigationAmount
Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
PlaintiffTrial Start Date