Executive Summary: Key Legal and Evidentiary Issues

• The applicant challenged a Board decision refusing to hear her unjust dismissal complaint due to jurisdictional limits under federal law.

• Central issue was whether the Canada Industrial Relations Board or the Canadian Human Rights Commission had primary jurisdiction.

• Paragraph 242(3.1)(b) of the Canada Labour Code was interpreted to bar the Board from considering complaints covered by other federal redress procedures.

• The applicant’s claim was based on alleged race- and age-based discrimination constituting a human rights issue.

• The Court held that the Human Rights Commission had exclusive first-instance jurisdiction, not the Board.

• The judicial review application was dismissed with costs of $1,500 awarded against the applicant.

Facts and outcome of the case

Background of the case

Precious Kaseke filed a complaint under section 240(1) of the Canada Labour Code, claiming she was constructively dismissed by Toronto Dominion Bank due to discrimination based on age and race. Her complaint was referred to the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB). However, after reviewing the matter, the Board declined to hear the complaint, citing paragraph 242(3.1)(b) of the Code. This provision prevents the Board from considering a complaint if a redress mechanism exists under another Act of Parliament—in this case, the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Several months after the complaint was filed, the Board invited submissions from both parties regarding its jurisdiction. It ultimately concluded that because Kaseke’s allegations fell within the scope of the Canadian Human Rights Commission’s authority, the Board lacked jurisdiction to proceed unless the Commission referred the matter back, which had not occurred.

Legal analysis by the Federal Court of Appeal

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Board’s conclusion, applying a correctness standard of review for jurisdictional decisions. The Court found that the Board’s reading of paragraph 242(3.1)(b) aligned with long-standing jurisprudence that mandates deference to alternate statutory redress mechanisms where applicable. The decision cited several precedents, including Re Cooper, Boutilier, and Byers, which collectively reinforce that jurisdiction belongs to the tribunal empowered under the relevant legislation when a suitable redress path is available.

Kaseke argued that the Board misapplied jurisprudence and that her case should have been heard by the Board, particularly in light of decisions like Vaid and Horrocks. However, the Court distinguished those cases on the basis that they involved legislative schemes granting exclusive jurisdiction to different forums, which was not the case here. The Court emphasized that the Human Rights Act does offer real and meaningful remedies, even if not identical to those under the Labour Code.

Outcome and costs

Ultimately, the Court rejected the application for judicial review. It concluded that the Board acted correctly in declining jurisdiction and reiterated that it had no discretion under the law to override paragraph 242(3.1)(b). It also held that any prejudice suffered by Kaseke—such as missing the one-year limitation period to file a human rights complaint—could have been avoided if she had filed with the Commission simultaneously. The Court awarded costs in the amount of $1,500 to the respondent, Toronto Dominion Bank.