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Background and procedural context
This case arises from a proposed class proceeding brought in the Court of King’s Bench of New Brunswick under the Class Proceedings Act, RSNB 2011, c 125. The representative plaintiff, Kelly Ann Wood, commenced an action on May 2, 2022 alleging that multiple automobile insurers breached contractual obligations to pay weekly indemnity benefits under Section B coverage of the Standard Automobile Policy, the New Brunswick Automobile (Owner) Policy (N.B.F. No. 1). The class action has not yet been certified and no statements of defence have been filed. Two of the originally named defendants, RBC Insurance Company of Canada and AIG Insurance Company of Canada, have since been discontinued from the action. The motion before Chief Justice DeWare was not a certification motion but a procedural application to amend the Statement of Claim and add parties under Rule 27.10 of the Rules of Court.
Facts underlying the proposed class action
The proposed class action is framed as a breach of contract claim concerning entitlement to weekly indemnity benefits payable under the standard New Brunswick automobile policy, Section B. These weekly indemnity benefits are a first-party accident benefits coverage typically intended to provide income replacement to insured persons injured in motor vehicle accidents. While the decision does not set out all factual details of the alleged benefit denials, it makes clear that the representative plaintiff is advancing claims on behalf of a proposed class of insured persons who say their insurers failed to pay or continued to pay these Section B weekly indemnity benefits as required by the policy wording. The original pleading therefore proceeds against a large group of insurers who underwrite New Brunswick automobile policies, alleging common issues in how they handled or calculated Section B weekly indemnity entitlements.
Policy framework and causes of action
The legal framework is grounded in the New Brunswick Automobile (Owner) Policy (N.B.F. No. 1), specifically Section B, which deals with accident benefits including weekly indemnity payments for loss of income. The core contractual allegation is that the insurers did not honour their obligations to pay those weekly indemnity benefits in accordance with the policy’s promises. Beyond breach of contract, the plaintiff seeks to broaden the legal basis of the claim. By way of the proposed amendments, she asks to add causes of action for unjust enrichment, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, and to claim punitive damages. These additional causes echo common insurance-law themes: unjust enrichment where insurers allegedly retained funds that should have been paid, bad faith in claims handling and benefit administration, and misrepresentation or concealment in the way coverage or entitlements were communicated or administered. The motion decision, however, focuses on whether such amendments may be procedurally added, not on whether they will ultimately succeed on the merits.
Issues raised on the motion to amend
The representative plaintiff sought multiple amendments: to add Paula Joanne Sirois as an additional representative plaintiff; to add two insurers—Definity Insurance Company and The Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company—as defendants; and to expand the causes of action to include unjust enrichment, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and punitive damages. The defendant insurers did not oppose the addition of Definity and Wawanesa as defendants and, in substance, did not challenge the timing of additional causes of action at this early stage. Their central objection concerned the plaintiff’s attempt to add a new representative plaintiff. They argued that because Ms. Wood was not a resident of New Brunswick at the time the Statement of Claim was filed, the action never validly complied with section 3(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, which requires that “[o]ne member of a class of persons who are resident in New Brunswick may commence a proceeding” under the Act. From their perspective, this residency defect was a fatal flaw that deprived the proceeding of its status as a valid class proceeding from inception, and therefore could not simply be “cured” by adding a compliant representative plaintiff later. The plaintiff responded that the proceeding was at an early stage—pleadings not closed, no discoveries, no affidavits of documents, and no certification record filed—and that the addition of a new representative plaintiff and new defendants caused no real prejudice.
Court’s analysis on amendments and prejudice
Chief Justice DeWare approached the motion through the lens of Rule 27.10, which empowers the court to permit amendments “at any stage of an action” unless non-compensable prejudice would result, and obliges the court to allow amendments necessary “for the purpose of determining the real questions in issue.” The decision draws on Court of Appeal authority emphasizing that procedural rules are vehicles for the determination of substantive rights and that amendments should only “very rarely” be refused where they comply with basic pleading rules. The judgment highlights that typical prejudice—such as delay, disruption, inconvenience or added expense—can be addressed by costs or adjournments and does not, by itself, justify refusing an amendment. Prejudice in this context means a real impact on a party’s ability to fairly meet the case against it, for example through loss of evidence or loss of a substantive defence. Against that backdrop, the Chief Justice found no real prejudice in allowing the addition of new causes of action and new insurer defendants, given how early the litigation stood. The more difficult question was whether adding a new representative plaintiff would unfairly strip defendants of a potentially dispositive argument that the action was fatally flawed from the outset due to non-compliance with the Class Proceedings Act’s residency requirement.
Treatment of class proceedings and limitation periods
The defendants’ key substantive concern centred on limitation periods and the tolling (suspension) effect of a putative class action. Under section 41(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, any limitation period applicable to a cause of action asserted in a class proceeding is suspended for class members when the proceeding is commenced, resuming only when certain events occur (such as refusal of certification, opt-outs, decertification, dismissal, discontinuance or approved settlement). The insurers argued that if a non-compliant class proceeding—filed with a non-resident representative plaintiff—could later be cured by adding a resident representative plaintiff, the result would be that limitation periods for putative class members would be deemed suspended back to May 2022, even though, in their submission, the action could not lawfully have been certified at that time. That, they said, created substantive prejudice that could not be remedied by costs or adjournment. The court acknowledged that this is a serious question with potential consequences for limitation defences, and noted that the defendants intended to bring a separate preliminary motion seeking to have the action set aside for non-compliance with section 3(1) of the Class Proceedings Act. Chief Justice DeWare examined Ontario authority (Logan v. Canada (Minister of Health)) where a court allowed substitution of representative plaintiffs in a pre-certification class action and rejected the idea that a proceeding is merely an individual action until certified. That authority accepts that limitation periods may be tolled from the commencement of a proceeding designated as a class proceeding, not from the date of certification, in order to serve the objectives of judicial economy and access to justice. However, the New Brunswick decision stops short of deciding whether the residency defect in this case is truly “fatal” or how section 41(1) ultimately applies; instead, it holds that those substantive points must be argued in a dedicated motion on a fuller record.
Outcome and implications
In the result, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion in full. The representative plaintiff was permitted to file an Amended Notice of Action with Amended Statement of Claim, adding Paula Joanne Sirois as a plaintiff and adding Definity Insurance Company and The Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company as defendants, along with the expanded causes of action. The Chief Justice concluded that refusing such amendments at this procedural stage, based on an untested assumption that the original pleading is fatally flawed, would improperly resolve a substantive legal issue within a narrow procedural motion. The question of whether the action fails irreparably because Ms. Wood was a non-resident at the time of filing is left to a forthcoming preliminary motion to set aside the action prior to any certification hearing. For now, the successful party on this motion is the representative side—Kelly Ann Wood and the newly added plaintiff, Paula Joanne Sirois—because they obtained leave to amend and expand their claim. The court made no order as to costs, and no damages, indemnity payments, or other monetary sums were awarded at this stage. As a result, based on this decision alone, no total monetary award or quantified costs have been granted in favour of any party, and the amount ordered in favour of the successful party cannot be determined from this ruling.
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Plaintiff
Defendant
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Court of King's Bench of New BrunswickCase Number
MC/265/2022Practice Area
Class actionsAmount
Not specified/UnspecifiedWinner
PlaintiffTrial Start Date