

COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: *Pereira v. British Columbia Labour
Relations Board*,
2026 BCCA 271

Date: 20260618
Docket: CA50643

Between:

Corinne Pereira

Appellant
(Petitioner)

And

**British Columbia Labour Relations Board, Horizon North Camp & Catering Inc.,
Managing Partner of Horizon North Camp & Catering Partnership,
and Unite Here Local 40**

Respondents
(Respondents)

And

Attorney General of British Columbia

Respondent

Before: The Honourable Chief Justice Marchand
The Honourable Justice Edelmann
The Honourable Justice Francis

On appeal from: Orders of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, dated
April 30, 2025 (*Pereira v. Dexterra Group Inc.*, 2025 BCSC 1100, Terrace Docket
S22228), May 2, 2025 (*Pereira v. British Columbia (Labour Relations Board)*,
2025 BCSC 1162, Terrace Docket S22228) and June 9, 2025 (*Pereira v. British
Columbia (Labour Relations Board)*, 2025 BCSC 1346, Terrace Docket S22320).

The Appellant, appearing in person:

C. Pereira

Counsel for the Respondent, British
Columbia Labour Relations Board:

J.M. O'Rourke

Counsel for the Respondent, Horizon North
Camp & Catering Inc.:

D.A. Crawford, K.C.

Counsel for the Attorney General of British
Columbia:

P.D. Ameerli, K.C.
D.K. Wong

Counsel for Owen Bird Law Corporation:

D.W. Burnett, K.C.

Place and Dates of Hearing:

Vancouver, British Columbia
January 8 and 9, 2026

Place and Date of Judgment:

Vancouver, British Columbia
June 18, 2026

Written Reasons of the Court

Summary:

The appellant appeals orders made by a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia sitting in chambers: (1) striking a petition seeking judicial review of four decisions made by the respondent British Columbia Labour Relations Board; (2) declaring her proceedings vexatious; and (3) dismissing her application for the chambers judge to disqualify himself. The appellant also seeks a review of an order made by a single judge of this Court sitting in chambers dismissing her application for disclosure of certain documents and information related to her appeal. In support of her appeals, the appellant has applied to adduce fresh evidence. The respondent Attorney General of British Columbia seeks to adduce fresh evidence in response.

Held: Applications to adduce fresh evidence, appeals and review dismissed. The appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence fails the Palmer test and must be dismissed. The respondent's proposed fresh evidence is therefore unnecessary. On the merits, the appellant has not established any reviewable error in either court.

Reasons for Judgment of the Court:**Introduction**

[1] The appellant, Corinne Pereira, appeals three orders made by a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia sitting in chambers ("chambers judge"):

1. An order made April 30, 2025, striking a petition ("new petition") she filed seeking judicial review of four decisions made by the respondent British Columbia Labour Relations Board ("Board"): *Pereira v. Dexterra Group Inc.*, 2025 BCSC 1100.
2. An order made May 2, 2025, declaring her proceedings vexatious: *Pereira v. British Columbia (Labour Relations Board)*, 2025 BCSC 1162.
3. An order made June 9, 2025, dismissing her application to disqualify the chambers judge: unreported but indexed as *Pereira v. British Columbia (Labour Relations Board)*, 2025 BCSC 1346.

[2] Ms. Pereira also seeks a review of an order made by a single judge of this Court ("CA chambers judge") dismissing her application for disclosure of certain

documents and information related to her appeal. The CA chambers judge's reasons are indexed as: *Pereira v. British Columbia Labour Relations Board*, 2025 BCCA 391.

[3] In support of her appeals, Ms. Pereira has applied to adduce fresh evidence related to a Freedom of Information request she made to the Ministry of the Attorney General. The respondent Attorney General of British Columbia ("AGBC") seeks to adduce fresh evidence in response.

[4] Finally, Ms. Pereira has written to the Court several times since the hearing of her appeal. Essentially, she has asked that certain information related to her Freedom of Information request be brought to the Court's attention.

[5] Ms. Pereira's written and oral submissions focused on the chambers judge's order dismissing her disqualification application. If the chambers judge was biased or there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, the chambers judge should not have heard the strike and vexatious litigation applications and his orders in relation to these applications would have to be set aside.

[6] For the reasons that follow, Ms. Pereira's application to adduce fresh evidence fails the *Palmer* test and must be dismissed. The AGBC's proposed fresh evidence is therefore unnecessary. On the merits, we are not satisfied Ms. Pereira has established any reviewable error by either the chambers judge or the CA chambers judge. Her appeals and review application are therefore dismissed. Her post-appeal communications to the Court do not affect the outcome.

Brief Background

[7] On September 23, 2020, the respondent, Horizon North Camp & Catering Inc. ("Horizon North"), terminated Ms. Pereira's employment. Ms. Pereira's union, the respondent, UNITE HERE Local 40 ("UNITE HERE"), pursued and settled two grievances on her behalf. The settlements concluded all existing and possible claims arising from Ms. Pereira's employment with Horizon North.

[8] Ms. Pereira was unhappy with the settlements and filed written complaints under s. 13 of the *Labour Relations Code*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244 alleging UNITE HERE breached its duty of fair representation in settling the grievances. Both complaints were heard and dismissed by a member of the Board, Associate Chair Glougie (as she then was). Ms. Pereira sought reconsideration of both decisions, but these were denied by a panel of the Board.

[9] Ms. Pereira then sought judicial review of all four decisions (Associate Chair Glougie's two decisions and the review panel's two decisions). In *Pereira v. British Columbia Labour Relations Board*, 2022 BCSC 1205, Justice Punnett dismissed Ms. Pereira's two petitions for judicial review of the four Board decisions. This Court dismissed Ms. Pereira's appeal from that decision: *Pereira v. British Columbia (Labour Relations Board)*, 2023 BCCA 165. The Supreme Court of Canada denied Ms. Pereira's application for leave to appeal: 40748 (21 December 2023).

[10] On February 3, 2025, Ms. Pereira filed the new petition for judicial review. She sought to quash the four Board decisions on the basis they were obtained by fraud. Among other things, Ms. Pereira asserted Associate Chair Glougie altered evidence, deliberately misrepresented Ms. Pereira's goals for the grievance process, failed to refer to critical evidence, "created facts" and "improperly assumed the role of the Union's spokesperson".

[11] Several applications were subsequently scheduled before the chambers judge. Initially, he recused himself on the basis he had worked for the respondent AGBC for 24 years, during that time he had worked with counsel for the AGBC, Mr. Ameerali, K.C., and it had been less than two years since his appointment. However, when the chambers judge was made aware his recusal might cause an adjournment of the applications, he reconsidered and concluded the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[12] Before proceeding to hear the applications, the chambers judge disclosed his work history and limited social ties to Mr. Ameerali to the parties. He asked whether any of them objected to him hearing the applications. None objected, so the

chambers judge heard two applications filed by Horizon North and its parent, Dexterra Group Inc. (who I will refer to collectively as “Horizon North”). He then heard a third application filed by Ms. Pereira.

[13] First, the chambers judge heard Horizon North’s application to strike the new petition under the *Supreme Court Civil Rules* 9-5(2)(b) and (d), principally on the basis of *res judicata* (“strike application”). As noted above, on April 30, 2025, the chambers judge granted the application: 2025 BCSC 1100. In his view, the record disclosed no indication of bad faith or fraud on the part of Associate Chair Glougie—only possible factual errors that had already been or could have been addressed in prior proceedings. Since the allegations in the new petition were or could have been raised earlier, the chambers judge determined *res judicata* applied. In his view, “this is as clear a case of re-litigation as there could be”: at para. 80.

[14] While the chambers judge was delivering his oral reasons on the strike application, Ms. Pereira hung up from the Teams call through which the hearing was taking place. Afterwards, she asked the chambers judge to “recuse” himself on the basis his spouse was working as a legislative drafter in the Ministry of the Attorney General. The chambers judge summarily dismissed Ms. Pereira’s request.

[15] Second, the chambers judge heard Horizon North’s application, under s. 18 of the *Supreme Court Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 443, and the inherent jurisdiction of the court, for a declaration that Ms. Pereira is a “vexatious litigant”, and for an order prohibiting her from bringing any proceedings in the Supreme Court without leave (“vexatious proceedings application”). Ms. Pereira confirmed on the record she did not wish to make any submissions on the vexatious proceedings application. As noted above, on May 2, 2025, the chambers judge granted the application: 2025 BCSC 1162.

[16] After setting out the applicable legal principles, the chambers judge reviewed the history of Ms. Pereira’s litigation, including six separate actions filed by her related to the same underlying conflict: at paras. 17–32, 42–71. The chambers judge found five of these proceedings were “vexatious” on the basis they were either re-

litigation, meritless, brought for an improper purpose, or targeted at counsel for an opposing party: at para. 72. He also concluded Ms. Pereira's proceedings were "habitual" and "persistent": at paras. 73–77.

[17] Ultimately, the chambers judge declared Ms. Pereira to be "a person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of British Columbia": at para. 88. To avoid further abuse of the court process, and because Ms. Pereira is a creative litigant, the chambers judge prohibited her from instituting further legal proceedings in any court except: (1) with leave of a justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia; or (2) in relation to a family law matter: at paras. 86–88.

[18] Finally, after the chambers judge made the strike and vexatious litigation orders, Ms. Pereira applied for the chambers judge to reconsider his "recusal" decision and set aside both orders ("disqualification application"). The chambers judge granted Ms. Pereira leave to bring the disqualification application but concluded he was not required to disqualify himself because no reasonable apprehension of bias arose. The chambers judge did not set aside his previous orders: 2025 BCSC 1346.

Issue 1: Did the chambers judge err in finding there was no reasonable apprehension of bias and declining to disqualify himself?

Ms. Pereira's Position

[19] Ms. Pereira submits the chambers judge erred in declining to disqualify himself based on reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias. At a high level, she asserts the chambers judge's work history and social relationships demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias and his conduct demonstrates actual bias.

[20] We consider the following to succinctly and fairly summarize Ms. Pereira's extensive arguments:

1. Associate Chair Glougie was appointed by former Attorney General (and current premier), David Eby, and promoted to Chair by current Attorney General, Niki Sharma.
2. If heard on the merits, the new petition will establish that Associate Chair Glougie committed fraud, bringing into question the integrity of the administration of labour relations in British Columbia over the many years she has served on the Board.
3. To avoid this outcome, the AGBC improperly interfered in these and related proceedings, including by (1) bringing the strike application and the vexatious proceedings application and (2) secretly hiring senior counsel, Daniel Burnett, K.C., to represent Margaret Klonarakis, an individual opposed to Ms. Pereira in related proceedings.
4. The chambers judge gave oral reasons for judgment the day after hearing the strike application. Certain passages in his reasons display that, in that short time, he did not review the full record. His decision was therefore pre-determined, and his reasons amount to no more than after-the-fact justification.
5. The chambers judge was "dishonest". For example, the chambers judge held his decision to proceed was not based on Ms. Pereira's consent when, according to Ms. Pereira, it was.
6. The chambers judge's pre-appointment academic writings and public statements are at odds with his reasons for judgment. In particular, while in practice, the chambers judge advocated for the unionization of provincial government lawyers to protect them from political pressure.

7. Ms. Pereira's case has become a political case in which the AGBC seeks to silence her. This raises a concern about the chambers judge's partiality, given he worked for the AGBC for 24 years, he was appointed less than two years prior to hearing the applications at issue, he has a social relationship with Mr. Ameerali and his spouse was working for the Ministry of the Attorney General at the time the applications were heard.
8. The chambers judge "descended into the arena" by providing the AGBC's position.
9. The chambers judge seized himself of all matters involving Ms. Pereira in both the Supreme and Provincial Courts of British Columbia.
10. The chambers judge altered his oral reasons for judgment to shore them up for appeal.
11. The chambers judge viewed the circumstances subjectively rather than through the lens of members of the public, many of whom do not believe the government can be trusted.
12. The chambers judge did not address the cumulative impact of all these factors.

Bias and Reasonable Apprehension of Bias

[21] The law on bias and reasonable apprehension of bias is well-established.

[22] Judges are presumed to be impartial, and this presumption carries considerable weight: *Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada*, 2003 SCC 45 at para. 59, citing *R. v. S. (R.D.)*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at para. 32, 1997 CanLII 324.

[23] Where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, a judge has no discretion to hear a matter—they are disqualified from hearing it. However, in some cases, a judge will voluntarily recuse themselves from hearing a matter out of an abundance of caution. Simply because a judge recuses themselves does not mean there is a

reasonable apprehension of bias: *R. v. Quinn*, 2006 BCCA 255 at paras. 44–45, citing *Wewaykum* at para. 78.

[24] The standard for disqualification is a reasonable apprehension of bias. The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is whether an informed person, looking at the matter realistically and practically, and having thought it through, would conclude it is more likely than not the decision-maker would not decide fairly, whether consciously or unconsciously. The apprehension of bias must be reasonable, and held by a reasonable, right-minded and informed person: *Wewaykum* at para. 60, citing *Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394, 1976 CanLII 2, Grandpré J dissenting.

[25] The question of whether a judge is legally disqualified from hearing a matter raises issues of mixed fact and law: *Skyllar v. The University of British Columbia*, 2022 BCCA 138 at para. 23. The standard of review on a question of law is correctness. The standard of review on questions of fact is palpable and overriding error. Unless there is an extricable legal question, the standard of review for questions of mixed fact and law is also palpable and overriding error: *Housen v. Nikolaisen*, 2002 SCC 33 at paras. 8, 10, 36.

[26] Ms. Pereira has not raised any concerns with the chambers judge's statement of the law.

Analysis

[27] We are not persuaded the points raised by Ms. Pereira, individually or cumulatively, establish a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias on the part of the chambers judge. We say this for the following reasons.

[28] First, as discussed further below, Ms. Pereira has already raised allegations of fraud against Chair Glougie in earlier proceedings and none have been established. The courts are not open to Ms. Pereira to revisit her allegations hoping for a different outcome.

[29] Second, there is no evidence whatsoever the AGBC is concerned a hearing of the new petition on the merits will undermine the integrity of the administration of labour relations in British Columbia. And, the allegation the AGBC has intentionally and improperly interfered in these and related proceedings, to ensure a hearing on the merits does not happen, is similarly baseless.

[30] At most, the AGBC's alleged misconduct amounts to (1) bringing unnecessary applications to strike the new petition and have Ms. Pereira's litigation behaviour declared vexatious and (2) together with other respondents, inadvertently seeking to file an inaccurate order.

[31] Ms. Pereira sees a sinister motive behind the AGBC's applications. She says they go beyond the AGBC's proper role in a judicial review where the tribunal and other parties are represented. Even if that were true, we would need evidence of bad faith before concluding the AGBC's litigation conduct was anything more than a difference of perspective regarding the appropriate role of the AGBC. This is particularly so because it appears to us the AGBC had a reasonable basis to be concerned about the impact of Ms. Pereira's repeated litigation on the justice system and therefore the public interest generally. In any event, the chambers judge heard Ms. Pereira's concerns but did not find it necessary to hear the AGBC's applications. As set out above, he heard and determined only Horizon North's strike and vexatious proceedings applications.

[32] Ms. Pereira relies on her proposed fresh evidence to establish the AGBC retained Mr. Burnett to represent Ms. Klonarakis. However, the Ministry of Citizens' Services' response to Ms. Pereira's broadly worded Freedom of Information request only establishes the existence of some unspecified records related "to the retention and funding of [Mr. Burnett's firm] for the representation of Margaret Klonarkis". The Ministry's response does not provide any evidence whatsoever that the Province retained Mr. Burnett to represent Ms. Klonarakis. The fresh evidence, taken with the other evidence, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the outcome and is therefore inadmissible: *Palmer v. The Queen*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 at 775, 1979

CanLII 8. Nothing in Ms. Pereira's post-appeal communications to the Court alters these basic facts.

[33] In the absence of Ms. Pereira's proposed fresh evidence, the respondents' proposed fresh evidence is not necessary. However, it is only fair to note Mr. Burnett has sworn an affidavit indicating he was not retained by the AGBC or any other government entity to represent Ms. Klonarakis. It is not reasonable to think Mr. Burnett would put his professional reputation and livelihood at risk by "lying" about this as asserted by Ms. Pereira.

[34] We discern nothing nefarious about the AGBC and other respondents attempting to file an inaccurate order. These represented parties were surely aware systems are in place to catch drafting errors and have them corrected by court registry staff or, as happened in this case, the responsible judge. It is not reasonable to think they would waste their time on a futile effort to purposefully alter a court order, especially one that is available for all to see in publicly available and easily accessed written reasons for judgment.

[35] Third, while it is impossible to say whether the judge reviewed the entire record, he was not obliged to do so. More importantly, his reasons for judgment make clear he had a very good command of the relevant material and grappled with the live issues.

[36] Fourth, the chambers judge's reasons for judgment do not establish any "dishonesty" on his part. For example, although he was careful to canvass whether the parties had any objection to him hearing the applications at issue, his reasons display he took the absence of any objection into account as one of many legitimate factors. He did not base his decision to hear the applications on Ms. Pereira's consent.

[37] Fifth, we see nothing untoward about any asserted difference between the judge's pre-appointment academic writings or advocacy and his reasons for judgment. The judge's reasons stand or fall on their own merit. He was required to

set his mind to the issues raised by the parties with an open mind. He was not bound by his prior academic work or advocacy.

[38] Sixth, there is no question the chambers judge's prior work for the AGBC and social relationships warranted the cautious approach he took. But Ms. Pereira has not established any error of fact or law in the chambers judge's conclusion a fully informed member of the public would not reasonably apprehend partiality on his part.

[39] In this regard, we recognize some members of the public do not trust the government, or the courts for that matter. But we are also aware that some of this mistrust is uninformed, ill informed, misinformed or disinformed. We are satisfied the judge looked at the circumstances through the appropriate lens, namely that of a fully informed and reasonable member of the public. In fact, the judge referred to the correct lens no less than eight times in his reasons for judgment: see paras. 5(b), 47–48, 61, 66, 72, 74–75.

[40] With respect to his relationship with Mr. Ameerali, the chambers judge was quite right to:

1. take guidance from s. 5.C.7 of the Canadian Judicial Council's publication "Ethical Principles for Judges";
2. distinguish his past employment with the AGBC from the situation of a judge who had been in private practice hearing a case involving his former firm;
3. note that slightly less than two years had passed since his appointment, but he had not worked closely with Mr. Ameerali for over a decade and did not have a close social relationship with him; and
4. note that it would have been difficult to find another judge to hear the applications during the week of April 28, 2025.

[41] Likewise, with respect to his spousal relationship, the chambers judge was quite right to:

1. take guidance from s. 5.C.8 of the Canadian Judicial Council's publication "Ethical Principles for Judges";
2. rely on case law establishing that, normally, no reasonable apprehension of bias arises simply because a judge's family member works for a law firm involved in a case;
3. identify that his spouse was a legislative drafter with the AGBC, had no role in Ms. Pereira's matters, and had nothing to gain or lose based on the outcome of the new petition; and
4. note there is no history in post-war Canada of an executive government visiting employment consequences on the family member of a judge to send a message to the judge about how they should rule in a particular case (as doing so would require the participation of multiple people and would be scandalous, if not criminal).

[42] Seventh, we see no indication of the chambers judge improperly "descending into the arena" by somehow speaking for the AGBC. Ms. Pereira submits the chambers judge "supplied the government's defense" when he said there would be no impact on the government if he granted all the relief she sought. In our view, this is no more than a restatement of the AGBC's position that it was representing the public interest, not advancing its own interest.

[43] Eighth, for efficiency, consistency and fairness, it is normal and appropriate for a judge to seize themselves of all matters involving a self-represented litigant whose litigation behaviour is vexatious.

[44] Ninth, we have listened to the recording of the chambers judge's oral reasons for judgment and compared it to his written reasons for judgment.

[45] At the outset of his oral reasons for judgment, the chambers judge reserved the right to edit a written version of his reasons for “errors, omissions, repetition and clarity”, and “to add citations to authority and the evidence”. In his written reasons for judgment, he states “I have made edits within these parameters. The result has not changed, nor has the basis for it.”

[46] As noted by Ms. Pereira, the chambers judge made a significant number of edits to his oral reasons for judgment, but she has not identified any edits that are indicative of actual bias or that would lead an informed and reasonable observer to apprehend bias.

[47] Tenth, the chambers judge did not expressly consider the cumulative impact of all the points made by Ms. Pereira. He should have. But his failure to do so would have had no impact on the outcome. Most of Ms. Pereira’s complaints are meritless and the judge adequately addressed the points of substance, namely the impact of his work history and social and work relationships.

[48] We dismiss Ms. Pereira’s appeal of the chambers judge’s dismissal of her disqualification application. We also dismiss the parties’ fresh evidence applications.

Issue 2: Did the chambers judge err in striking the new petition?

[49] The general principles of *res judicata* are well-established. In *Erschbamer v. Wallster*, 2013 BCCA 76, citing *Cliffs Over Maple Bay (Re)*, 2011 BCCA 180, this Court succinctly explained:

[12] ...The doctrine has two aspects, issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. In brief terms, issue estoppel prevents a litigant from raising an issue that has already been decided in a previous proceeding. Cause of action estoppel prevents a litigant from pursuing a matter that was or should have been the subject of a previous proceeding...

[50] The doctrine is founded on two overarching public policy principles: “a litigant’s interests in fairness” as no party should be “twice vexed in the same cause”, and society’s interest in concluding disputes and the finality of judicial

decisions: *Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. v. 11368 NL Inc.*, 2026 SCC 15 at paras. 36–37, citing *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79*, 2003 SCC 63.

[51] Here, Ms. Pereira freely acknowledges she advanced allegations of fraud against Associate Chair Glougie in her original petitions. In fact, she is critical of the chambers judge for finding she “could have” raised certain allegations, when in fact she did. Either way, regardless of Ms. Pereira’s dissatisfaction with how the courts previously addressed her allegations of fraud, she is not entitled to repackage her arguments and ask the court to come to a different conclusion.

[52] Ms. Pereira has not identified any error in the judge’s straightforward application of the well-known doctrine of *res judicata*. In fact, her submissions support the judge’s conclusion. We dismiss Ms. Pereira’s appeal from the chambers judge’s order striking the new petition.

Issue 3: Did the chambers judge err in finding Ms. Pereira’s proceedings to be vexatious?

[53] Section 18 of the *Supreme Court Act* provides as follows:

If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving the person an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.

[54] As set out above, the chambers judge was satisfied the circumstances established all required elements to declare Ms. Pereira’s proceedings vexatious.

[55] Ms. Pereira had, but did not take, the opportunity to make submissions before the chambers judge and this Court regarding Horizon North’s application to have her proceedings declared vexatious. Ms. Pereira has not pointed us to a reviewable error in the chambers judge’s analysis. In fact, she made it quite clear she intends to continue what she sees as a quest for justice, regardless of this Court’s decision and regardless of the impact on the other parties and the justice system generally.

[56] In the absence of reviewable error, we must dismiss Ms. Pereira’s appeal against the “vexatious litigant” order.

Issue 4: Did the CA chambers judge err in dismissing Ms. Pereira’s disclosure application?

[57] Ms. Pereira applied in this Court for pre-appeal disclosure of a wide variety of materials. More specifically, as noted by the CA chambers judge at para. 1, Ms. Pereira sought the following:

1. An order for disclosure of the retainer or engagement documents for Owen Bird Law Corporation’s representation of Margaret Klonarakis, together with any related correspondence identifying who retained and funded them.
2. An order for disclosure of all communications between Supreme Court scheduling staff and Justices Power and Morley concerning the assignment and reassignment of my petition (file S22320) and civil claim (file S22228).
3. An order for disclosure from the RCMP Kitimat Detachment of all records, notes, and communications related to the false wellness check conducted on July 7, 2025.
4. An order for disclosure of the emails exchanged between counsel for the respondents and counsel for the Attorney General regarding the scheduling of my application that had been tentatively set for July 17, 2025.
5. An order requiring Jonathan Penner to disclose the nature of his professional and personal relationship with Justice Morley.

[58] The CA chambers judge recognized he had a limited discretion to order pre-appeal disclosure but declined to exercise it in favour of doing so, principally on the basis Ms. Pereira’s requests were founded on speculation. We see no error in the CA chambers judge’s analysis.

[59] At a high level, the burden has always been on Ms. Pereira to establish “fraud” and “bias”. Her disclosure applications would reverse the onus and require others to establish the absence of these things.

[60] Of course, it can be difficult to adduce evidence of something that did not happen. Here, it is the absence of evidence of fraud or bias that makes Ms. Pereira’s requests speculative. Ms. Pereira’s “fishing expedition” was properly dismissed by the CA chambers judge. There is no basis to set aside or vary his decision.

Conclusion and Disposition

[61] Ms. Pereira is sincere in her quest to correct what she considers to be a grave injustice. She seeks to prove (or potentially disprove) serious misconduct on the part of high-ranking public officials and members of the legal profession.

[62] The justice system in British Columbia has flaws, but it is robust, ethical, impartial and fair. It is populated by individuals who are committed to doing right and who are fiercely independent. Despite that, errors can occur. When they do, the usual explanation is the simple one. Someone made an honest mistake.

[63] We are fortunate in Canada that there is essentially no history within our justice system of the type of collusion, unethical behaviour and corruption alleged by Ms. Pereira. In Ms. Pereira's case, there is no cogent evidence of this type of misconduct. Rather, Ms. Pereira relies on differences of opinion or perspective, imperfections in expression and the absence of evidence of things that almost certainly did not occur.

[64] Ms. Pereira is clearly dissatisfied with the justice system's handling of her many claims. But the courts are not intended to serve as a roving commission of inquiry with an unlimited mandate directed by Ms. Pereira to disprove her unsupported subjective belief that public institutions, ministers of the Crown, highly respected professionals, and others have colluded to do her wrong, all because of an unfortunate but routine labour dispute.

[65] Ms. Pereira's original dispute was understandably of great personal significance to her. She was unsuccessful. She has identified nothing sinister about that.

[66] When a final decision has been made, and all avenues of appeal have been exhausted, the parties must live with the outcome. Efforts that deny this reality are fruitless. Here, we can only hope Ms. Pereira is able to accept that her legal avenues have been exhausted and move on.

[67] Ms. Pereira’s appeals, Ms. Pereira’s application to review the decision of the CA chambers judge and the parties’ applications to adduce fresh evidence are all dismissed.

“The Honourable Chief Justice Marchand”

“The Honourable Justice Edelman”

“The Honourable Justice Francis”