

# Court of King's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Piri v Good Samaritan Society, 2026 ABKB 515**

**Date:** 20260716  
**Docket:** 2506 00781  
**Registry:** Lethbridge

Between:

**Gabri O. Piri aka (also known as) Jennifer L Laurie**

Applicant

- and -

**Good Samaritan Society; Head Office  
Angela Henke Hospitality Manager**

Respondents

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**Memorandum of Decision  
of the Honourable  
Associate Chief Justice  
D.B. Nixon**

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## **I. Introduction**

[1] Gabri O. Piri is the Applicant in this matter. On November 4, 2025, the Applicant filed an Application against the Respondents, together with an Affidavit sworn on the same date.

[2] The Good Samaritan Society (“GSS”) is one of the Respondents. On November 21, 2025, Counsel for GSS wrote to the Court and asked it to review the Application under Civil Practice Note 7 (“CPN7”).

[3] CPN7 is a mechanism to assess, manage and dismiss hopeless, frivolous, or abusive litigation. It is also known as the Vexatious Application/Proceeding Show Cause Procedure and is read together with rule 3.68 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*, Alta Reg 124/2010. It applies to a “claim, defence, action, application, or proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process”.

[4] I reviewed the Application. Based on my review of the evidence and analysis of the law, on January 12, 2026 I issued an Apparent Vexatious Application or Proceeding (AVAP) Notice, reported as *Piri v Good Samaritan Society*, 2026 ABKB 28. I issued that notice because I found the Application appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process for several reasons.

[5] In particular, the Applicant states that her grounds for making the Application are that she was “not properly terminated/offboarded”. She claims she received neither an acceptance letter for her tendered resignation nor a complete and accurate Record of Employment which has led to several subsequent cumulative grievances. She seeks “justice” and compensation on this basis.

[6] In support of her Application, the Applicant relies on numerous statutes: the *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985 c C-46; the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Part I to the *Constitution Act, 1982*, Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (UK), 1982, c 11; the *Occupational Health and Safety Act*, SA 2020, c O-2.2; the *Employment Standards Code*, RSA 2000, c E-9; and the *Personal Information Protection Act*, SA 2003, c P-6.5. She also appears to rely on internal human resources policies of GSS.

[7] Given the context, I directed the Applicant, if she wished to respond, to prepare a Written Submission addressing the questions enumerated in the AVAP Notice. The Respondents were then given the opportunity to reply.

[8] The Court also wishes to clarify for the Applicant that when Counsel for GSS submitted a request for the Court to review the Applicant’s Application under CPN7, the Court proceeded with the assessment through a document process with no oral appearances. On the Court record, there were neither *ex parte* attendances by GSS in connection with the CPN7 process nor any attendances required by the Applicant concerning the CPN7 process. Rather, GSS wrote to the Court requesting review, which then led to the issuance of the AVAP Notice and the opportunity for all parties to provide written submissions. As such, the Applicant’s right to defend her Application is established through the Written Submissions in response to the AVAP Notice.

[9] The Applicant provided her Written Submission on January 22, 2026. Counsel for GSS provided a Written Reply on February 5, 2026. The Applicant also submitted a letter with attachments which was dated January 22, 2026, but received by the Court on June 4, 2026. Given the time elapsed, it appears the January 22, 2026 date was in error. The attachments include a copy of her resignation letter, a Record of Employment, and emails with Counsel for GSS. It is unclear whether the Respondents were served with a copy of this submission.

[10] I have now considered the parties’ submissions through the CPN7 process.

## II. The Application

[11] The Applicant seeks the following relief in her Application:

“1. Justice

2. Compensation – Sever[a]nce Package for Hardship and Non-Compliance
3. [B]ack pay from email stating on Paid Leave July 14, 2023 at new contract payscale till present (new contract after I Tendered my Resignation)
4. Mental Capacity Assessment for Angela Henke. Not being able to follow through with investigation remedies. Not upholding Managerial tasks - Not Coaching when a complaint is put in.
5. Locked In Lira unlocked because of wrong info on beneficiary. It was blank now it is my ex spouse, Terry Laurie with wrong birthday of Jan 1, 1980 instead of May 27, 1973”

[12] As noted above, the Applicant states in her Application that she was “not properly terminated/offboarded” and that she submitted her “Letter of Tender of Resignation and did not receive an Acceptance Letter nor a complete ROE for [her] 16 year employment.” She goes on to rely on the *Criminal Code*, with respect to intimidation, theft and possession of documents, slander, sabotage, breach of contract, breach of trust, and falsification of books, documents, and employment records. This appears to be in reference to the beneficiary information on her LIRA account and the duration of employment stated in her Record of Employment. She also states that she relies on sections 1, 2, 7, 15 and 24 of the *Charter*.

[13] Although the CPN7 process requires any deficiencies in a pleading to be clear on the face, I also reviewed the Applicant’s supporting Affidavit to glean more information on the factual basis for her allegations. The circumstances can be summarized as follows:

- (a) The Applicant was employed with one of the Respondents, GSS.
- (b) The Applicant alleges that following several alleged workplace events, she “feels” that she was “[s]abotaged to be forced to quit”.
- (c) Although she submitted a Letter of Tender of Resignation dated July 14, 2023 with an effective date of July 28, 2023, she was “not properly terminated/offboarded”, in that she received neither an Acceptance Letter nor a complete Record of Employment.
- (d) Consequently, she alleges that she is “off on paid leave without being compensated or paid”.

### III. Responses to AVAP Notice

[14] The Applicant provided thoughtful responses in her AVAP Notice to some of the questions posed to her, but a significant portion of her Written Submission focused on the Court process itself, including service of her claim on Ms. Henke, her right to a fair trial, and Chambers applications by GSS on this matter.

[15] In response to the inference that the Applicant tendered her resignation unwillingly, the Applicant corrects this in her Written Submission saying that she in fact tendered her resignation willingly, but that she has not been paid in “approx the last 2.5 years”. The Applicant appears to rely on provisions of the *Employment Standards Code*. She references section 58(1)(b), which provides that 2 weeks’ notice must be given, unless a provision in 58(2) applies. She refers to 58(2)(b) which provides that an employee does not need to provide the required notice when

their personal health or safety would be in danger if the employee continued to be employed by the employer. In any event, the Applicant submitted a copy of her termination notice which is dated July 14, 2023 with an effective date of July 28, 2023, so it appears that she did provide 2 weeks' notice.

[16] The Applicant also references in her Written Submission section 60 of the *Employment Standards Code* which states that a termination notice is of no effect if an employee continues to be employed by the same employer after the date specified for termination of employment. Her argument appears to be that her employer failed to properly accept her Tender of Resignation and offboard her accordingly, so consequently, she is still employed without being paid, which she refers to as “[o]ff on paid leave without proper termination.”

[17] Nevertheless, she then asserts in her Written Submission that her Tender of Resignation “was approved as having merit by the Government of Alberta allowing [her] Employment Insurance Benefits”. Notwithstanding its merit, the Applicant then asserts that the Record of Employment provides incorrect information, which is a “non-compliance in the Criminal Code”. The alleged falsities are that: (a) the Applicant resigned; (b) the timeframe of her service; and (c) the holidays are not listed. These alleged falsities purportedly “compromised the amount and length of the allotted employment insurance benefit”.

[18] In the AVAP Notice, I also asked the Applicant for clarification on the status of her proceedings before the Social Security Tribunal of Canada. In her Written Submission, the Applicant advised that her status is “closed” and that her first application was denied in November 2024. She also advised that she had a “second appeal application” and was denied leave to appeal in November 2024. In response to the request for clarification as to a judicial review of such decision, she advised:

It has been over 30 days in which the statute of limitations allows for Judicial Review in Federal Court, which is Calgary Courthouse. I had no funding for legal representation at the time. I put in an inquiry for a pro bono lawyer in Calgary twice, without any response so was made to retreat. [Underlining in original]

[19] In her Written Submission, the Applicant provided further details of the interactions in July 2023 between her and Ms. Henke that are at the centre of the dispute leading to the subject resignation. These meetings and emails purportedly relate to scheduling matters, training, working in or out of scope of union duties, and workplace environment. It appears that they also contributed to mixed signals between the Applicant and her employer, including the understanding that she was “Off on Paid Leave” and that “All monies owed will be paid”, supposedly implying that she was entitled to a severance payment of some sort.

[20] The Applicant in her Written Submission then asserts that she has had difficulty finding new employment or even an interview in the time since, alleging that “someone is not speaking nice about me (Slander or Libel). I cannot prove anything but with my credentials something is definitely wrong.” She then asserts that:

With a Severance package, I will be able to open a Bakery/Café to have fresh baked goods, including new products using Sourdough discard. This will be my niche. I feel they have had a hand in ruining my reputation as an honest, loyal, hardworking employee. They should compensate me and set me up so that I can

continue my contribution to the community for the next 14 years, upon retirement at 65.

[21] In response to the AVAP Notice, the Court received a Written Reply from Counsel for GSS. In their submissions, Counsel for GSS submits that the Applicant's Application should be struck for all the grounds set out in rule 3.68(2). Notably: they argue that (a) the Court has no jurisdiction because the Applicant's claim is statute barred by the *Limitations Act*, RSA 2000, c L-12 and the Applicant was an employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement governing the processes; (b) the Application discloses no reasonable claim with respect to end of employment; (c) the pleading is frivolous, irrelevant, and improper; and (d) the Application constitutes an abuse of process.

[22] With respect to jurisdiction, Counsel for GSS asserts that the Applicant's Application constitutes a procedural deficiency since no Statement of Claim or commencement document was filed. Regardless of those deficiencies, the *Limitations Act* applies such that the claim should have been brought within 2 years from July 28, 2023, a time period which the Applicant herself acknowledged in her Written Submission.

[23] Counsel for GSS also asserts that a collective bargaining agreement governed the Applicant's employment relationship, and the grievance or arbitration procedures outlined therein provide for exclusive jurisdiction for which the Court should not interfere: see **Weber v Ontario Hydro**, [1995] 2 SCR 929 [**Weber**]. They also argue the *Labour Relations Code*, RSA 2000, c L-1 at section 135, which provides for this "exclusive jurisdiction model": **Pickle v University of Lethbridge**, 2024 ABKB 378, paras 39 and 43-46.

[24] Concerning the Application itself, Counsel for GSS argues that somewhat contradictorily, the Applicant asserts that she willingly resigned in the face of difficult employment conditions, but was "not properly terminated/offboarded" and is therefore still employed, but off on paid leave. For this reason, Counsel argues that it is unclear the grounds on which the Applicant is seeking compensation.

[25] Counsel for GSS then relies on **De'Medici v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company**, 2023 ABKB 210 at para 19 [**De'Medici**] to argue the Applicant's Application is "so obviously bad on its face that no real argument is necessary to demonstrate its deficiencies". Counsel maintains this is because the Applicant makes frivolous claims, seeks improper and disproportionate remedies, and does not provide particulars to allow the Respondents to make a meaningful response.

[26] With respect to abuse of process, Counsel for GSS relies on **De'Medici** and **Chutskoff v Bonora**, 2014 ABQB 389 [**Chutskoff**] at paras 91-92, aff'd 2014 ABCA 444 to argue that the Application constitutes an abuse of process since it is a collateral attack on proceedings before the Social Security Tribunal and/or the Applicant's Employment Insurance application. Lastly, Counsel contends that the Application is hopeless, scandalous, and inflammatory, with references to criminal misconduct on the part of the Respondents and what appears to be irrelevant legislative authorities.

#### IV. The Law

[27] Rule 3.68(1) of the *Alberta Rules of Court* permits the Court to end or restrict the scope of litigation where significant deficiencies occur. If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following:

- (a) that all or any part of a claim or defence be struck out;
- (b) that a commencement document or pleading be amended or set aside;
- (c) that judgment or an order be entered;
- (d) that an action, an application or a proceeding be stayed.

(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following:

- (a) the Court has no jurisdiction;
- (b) a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim;
- (c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper;
- (d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process;
- (e) an irregularity in a commencement document or pleading is so prejudicial to the claim that it is sufficient to defeat the claim.

[28] The test for this rule 3.68 procedure is well established. However, there are some differences between the procedure for a normal application in Chambers to strike a pleading under rule 3.68 and the procedure for a review of a pleading under CPN7.

[29] In particular, there must be a reason to prefer the CPN7 process since it truncates the rights of a litigant, including a reversed burden of proof, reliance on written submissions without an oral hearing, and dependence on little/no evidence: *De'Medici* at para 9; *Wilyman v Cole*, 2024 ABCA 41 at paras 12-14, 20, 24.

[30] In addition, given the wording in CPN7 that a pleading must be on its face “frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process”, only the conditions in 3.68(2)(c) and/or (d) can be relied upon for dismissal of a claim under the CPN7 process: *De'Medici* at para 14.

[31] Under rules 3.68(2)(c) and (d), frivolous, irrelevant or improper claims are a separate basis from abuse of process. However, the concepts are often interlinked: *R v Scott*, 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 979 at 1007; *Arabi v Alberta*, 2014 ABQB 295 at paras 101-103.

[32] Frivolous pleadings are those where the substance suggests bad faith or factual hopelessness. They are “so palpably bad” that the Court needs no real argument to be convinced: *Serdahely Estate*, 2008 ABQB 472 at paras 21 and 66.

[33] Vexatious litigation has many characteristics, as set out by Justice Lee in *Chutskoff* at paras 91-92. This includes, but is not limited to, collateral attacks, hopeless proceedings, escalating proceedings, persistent applications and appeals, or pleadings involving scandalous or inflammatory language.

[34] A pleading that constitutes an abuse of process is one that displays impropriety or vexatiousness: *Wong v Leung*, 2011 ABQB 688 at para 33; *Mcmeekin v Alberta (Attorney General)*, 2012 ABQB 144 at paras 11-12; *Reece v Edmonton (City)*, 2011 ABCA 238 at para

16. There is no single test or statement of law that encompasses all situations, particularly since the doctrine is used in a variety of contexts: **Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 79**, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77 at para 35. Nevertheless, Justice Lee in **Dykun v Odishaw**, 2000 ABQB 548 at para 42 provided a summarized non-exhaustive list of the types of proceedings that may be considered an abuse of process. For example, this includes where: (a) actions are brought to determine an issue which has already been determined; (b) it is obvious that an action cannot succeed; or (c) the proceedings are rolled-forward with supplemented and expanding claims and issues.

[35] It is also an abuse of process to pursue judicial proceedings without first exhausting appropriate administrative regimes: **Al-Ghamdi v Alberta**, 2017 ABQB 684 [**Al-Ghamdi**] at para 128, discussing the Federal Court of Appeal’s findings in **CB Powell Ltd v Canada (Border Services Agency)**, 2010 FCA 61.

[36] The common theme of abuse of process is that the Court and litigants rely on the doctrine to prevent the misuse of court procedures in a way that would be unfair to the parties to the litigation or otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

## V. Analysis of Defects

[37] I reviewed the Applicant’s Application generously to allow for the development and assertion of any novel claims she may wish to raise: **R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd**, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 [**Imperial Tobacco**] at para 21.

[38] Amongst other things, I agree with Counsel for GSS that a commencement document would have been appropriate to seek damages or compensation involving the deteriorated employment relationship. However, that is not the only relief the Applicant seeks, as her primary claim is for justice.

[39] The Applicant’s claims also appear to be statute-barred pursuant to the *Limitations Act*. The Applicant resigned effective July 28, 2023, and acknowledges in her Written Submission that “this matter may exceed the TIME STATUTE [sic]”. There are also concerns that the Applicant did not properly serve Ms. Henke with a copy of the Application and the Court has received no submissions from Ms. Henke in connection with the AVAP Notice.

[40] Nonetheless, these issues would more appropriately be considered on the basis of evidence and a proper Chambers hearing and are therefore not fatal defects for purposes of rule 3.68(2)(c) and (d) and assessment under the CPN7 process.

[41] I have considered other defects of the Application below.

### a. Lack of Jurisdiction

[42] It is clear that the Applicant is seeking resolution following the apparently traumatic breakdown of her employment relationship. It appears that she may be unsure of where to turn given the multiple forms of relief she seeks.

[43] There appears to have been a collective bargaining agreement in place. It is referenced by the Applicant in her affidavit, but the alleged agreement is not in evidence. In her Application, the Applicant has neither indicated that she initiated the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement nor suggested that she is making any arguments to challenge the jurisdiction or applicability of any such agreement. Also, she neither appears to be seeking a

declaration on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement nor review of any decision made under the agreement. Since the Applicant's Application primarily relates to employment conditions, discipline and resignation, this is troubling. Indeed, it is well established in common law in that labour tribunals generally have exclusive jurisdiction on dealing with disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements: see **Weber** at paras 58 and 67; see also s 135 of the *Labour Relations Code*.

[44] As mentioned above, the collective bargaining agreement is not in evidence. Given the absence of the document in evidence, I have not considered arguments by Counsel for GSS concerning the collective bargaining agreement for the purposes of the CPN7 review. Therefore, while these appear to be defects with the Applicant's Application under rule 3.68(2)(a), these flaws are not a reason to review the Application under CPN7 let alone make an order under rule 3.68(1). This is because there is no evidence before the Court of the collective bargaining agreement and any issues involving its interpretation or applicability would be more appropriately considered through a proper Chambers hearing. Nevertheless, setting these issues aside, there are additional concerns with the Application discussed below.

#### **b. Lack of a Valid Claim**

[45] In evaluating a pleading under rule 3.68(2)(b), the alleged facts are presumed to be true, and no evidence is permitted per rule 3.68(3). The facts plead must be sufficient to establish the claim. The test is from **Imperial Tobacco** at para 17:

A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: ... Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: ...

[46] Based on my review of the document, I am of the view that the Application does not disclose a reasonable claim. I make this determination because the Applicant simultaneously asserts that she was forced to resign due to workplace conditions and willingly resigned but was not properly terminated or offboarded and is therefore still employed without being properly paid. On this basis, she seeks both a "severance package for hardship and non-compliance" and "back pay from July 14, 2023 ... at new contract payscale till present (new contract after [she] tendered [her] resignation)". At the same time, she acknowledges through her Written Submission that she commenced processes with the Social Security Tribunal of Canada and the approval of her eligibility for Employment Insurance on the basis of a "validated reason for tendering a resignation".

[47] Although the Applicant does not state it, I infer she may be attempting to bring a constructive dismissal claim on the premise that she faced a hostile work environment. I make this inference because the Applicant references "Alberta Human Rights Commission: Undue Hardship – Failure to accommodate". It is not clear whether she has any ongoing or concluded regulatory processes with the Commission, or whether she is attempting to challenge a decision as part of her Application. She also alleges "[u]nsafe work – exhaust[s]tion, traumatized" under the *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and baseless allegations of criminal activity due to purported violations of the *Criminal Code*.

[48] In addition, the Applicant's reference to *Charter* provisions is without merit. I make this comment because she was in a private employment relationship, so cannot claim breach of *Charter* rights against her former employer and a private person. As noted in the AVAP Notice, generally only governments have obligations under the *Charter*, not private persons or organizations. The Applicant is correct that the Constitution provides her with certain rights. Notwithstanding that acknowledgment, GSS is a registered charity with funding and partnerships from different governments. Importantly, GSS is a private, non-government entity.

[49] As noted above, the condition in rule 3.68(2)(b) is not a condition that can be relied on for striking a claim through a CPN7 review. However, where there are obvious defects on the validity of a claim, it can have some overlap with the other conditions set out in rule 3.68(2): *De'Medici* at para 16.

### c. Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process

[50] Under rules 3.68(2)(c) and (d), frivolous, irrelevant or improper claims are a separate basis from, but can be indicative of, abuse of process.

[51] Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that the Applicant is acting in bad faith or in a frivolous or vexatious manner as recognized in the case law interpreting rule 3.68(2)(c). Rather, the Applicant articulates the significant psychological, emotional, and practical toll of the employment breakdown on her life. Her Written Submissions also make clear that she has had difficulty navigating legal and administrative processes and is seeking a resolution and closure. For these reasons, I decline to find that the Applicant's Application is frivolous, irrelevant, or improper under rule 3.68(2)(c).

[52] Notwithstanding my determination that the Application is not frivolous, irrelevant, or improper under rule 3.68(2)(c), I am of the view that the Application does constitute an abuse of process.

[53] As noted above, abuse of process is a flexible doctrine which prevents the misuse of Court processes and procedure in a way that would be manifestly unfair or bring the administration of justice and justice into disrepute: *Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd*, 2013 SCC 26, [2013] 2 SCR 227 at paras 39-40; *McLelland v McLelland*, 2021 ABCA 102 at paras 17-21.

[54] Although the Applicant argues that her rights have been infringed, the Applicant does not appear to have sought to resolve her grievances directly with her employer or through the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. I mention the collective bargaining agreement only because the Applicant refers to it in her affidavit. That said, I reiterate that I make no decision concerning the alleged collective bargaining agreement because the document is not in evidence. Given its absence, I have no foundation upon which to make any finding.

[55] She contends that the Record of Employment was falsified, but it appears that there is some confusion between the parties and the matter could have been resolved through communication, and if necessary, the records could have been corrected and amended. Similarly, her concerns that she "feel[s]" Ms. Henke was "setting [her] up for failure" and that she "immediately felt: 'You're Fired!'" would have been appropriately addressed through clarifying communication and established escalation protocols including the workplace grievance procedures and any other workplace policies.

[56] The Applicant in her Application relies on the *Criminal Code*, but it does not appear that there are any parallel criminal proceedings involving the parties and it does not appear the

Applicant has initiated a private prosecution under the *Criminal Code*, if that may have been appropriate in the circumstances. I do not put much weight on this defect because the Applicant may be unfamiliar with court processes and the difference between civil and criminal matters.

[57] Similarly, the Applicant appears to be pursuing multiple proceedings in different forums hoping for a positive result. She also is not following established appeal processes or judicial review processes for her administrative proceedings for unemployment benefits and human rights and occupational health and safety concerns. Per *Al-Ghamdi*, pursuing relief in one Court when action should be taken through another Court or administrative process also constitutes an abuse of process, not to mention the complexities with potential double-dipping of benefits.

[58] The relief sought by the Applicant is also improper and disproportionate. The Applicant seeks “justice”, “compensation”, back pay”, and “unlocking” of her LIRA. Her motivation appears to be financial gain through a variety of sometimes contradictory and unclear arguments.

[59] The Applicant also seeks a “Mental Capacity Assessment” for Ms. Henke on the basis of allegations that, at best, if substantiated, represent normal employee-employer relations for performance and discipline concerns. This does not provide sufficient material facts to demonstrate intentional wrongdoing to ground a civil tort claim, let alone sabotage, falsified records, and theft under the *Criminal Code*: *GH v Alcock*, 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58.

[60] In her Written Submission, the Applicant requests “permission to submit an application for a Mistrial to the Calgary Federal Court or a Judgement of Mistrial be made”. She alleges there has been “wrongful withholding or omission of important information one has a legal duty to share”. However, it is not clear to the Court to which trial she is referring. I make this comment because the Court record does not report any substantive court appearances concerning this matter.

[61] Perhaps she is referring to her stated intent to seek a judicial review of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada decision in Federal Court. Alternatively, perhaps she is referring to the Chambers applications on each of November 26, 2025 and January 14, 2026 in this present matter. However, in the former, the Court adjourned the matter until the latter date, and in the second hearing, the Court granted an order staying the matter on the basis of the active CPN7 application which is now the subject of this decision.

[62] The Court also wishes to clarify for the Applicant that the morning Chambers in Lethbridge is jointly Justice and Family Chambers meaning that both civil and family matters are heard. Based on my review of what is before me in this case, I see no evidence that her matter was incorrectly categorized by the Court in Lethbridge as a family matter.

[63] In respect of the above defects, I have considered whether the circumstances warrant granting leave to the Applicant to amend her Application. Unfortunately, I am not convinced that any part of her Application is viable. It is unlikely that the Applicant would be able to remedy the deficiencies and it would be a further abuse of process to allow this Application to prosecute to any next steps.

## VI. Conclusion – Dismissal

[64] Based on my review of the evidence that I am permitted to consider in these circumstances and my analysis of the law, I find the Application to be defective. Specifically, I make the determination that the Application is defective because it is an abuse of process under

rule 3.68(2)(d). Given the overall context, the Application has no prospect of success. Therefore, the Action must be dismissed.

[65] Counsel for GSS may prepare and serve an Order dismissing the Action. The Applicant's approval of that Order is not required, pursuant to rule 9.4(2)(c) of the *Alberta Rules of Court*.

## **VII. Costs**

[66] Each party shall bear their own costs. I make this determination because I infer: (a) the financial situation of the Applicant is thin; and (b) her confusion with processes.

**Dated** at Calgary, Alberta this 16<sup>th</sup> day of July 2026.

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**D.B. Nixon**  
**A.C.J.C.K.B.A.**

## **Appearances:**

Gabri O. Piri (aka Jennifer L Laurie) – Written Submission  
Applicant

Zac Houston – Written Submission  
Neuman Thompson  
Counsel for one of the Respondents, The Good Samaritan Society